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Foresight in corporate contexts includes generating futures knowledge (FK) – understanding of pos-
sible, probable and preferable futures of the macro and micro environments of the company. But how 
do foresight experts interpret the effects of external trends and phenomena to corporate strategies? 
How do they translate to executives what change in the operating environment the organization means 
for the business and its future, and why does it happen as it does? These are the questions I aimed to 
study in this thesis. The practice of futures knowledge interpretation (FKI) is not examined in-depth 
in the field of futures studies, even though this is a crucial part of applying foresight and ensuring it 
is valuable to companies. Prior research, expert articles and theoretical papers offer piecemeal advice 
on best-practices, tools and approaches. In addition to the practice, there exists a gap in understanding 
the capability of FKI.  
To help bridge these gaps and to draw a more holistic picture of how FKI is made and what impacts 
its success, I reviewed multiple different academic studies, research papers and books by experts. As 
my primary research, I interviewed in-depth ten experienced Finnish foresight practitioners. After 
summarizing their input and combining it with relevant prior research results, I had another round of 
talks with eight of the interviewees to validate the outcomes.  
The study produced a set of core characteristics of FKI, that describe what it is functionally and 
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“Purpose [of scenarios] is to gather and transform information of strategic significance 
into fresh perceptions. This transformation process is not trivial- more often than not it 
does not happen. When it works, it is a creative experience that generates a heartfelt 
"Aha!" from your managers and leads to strategic insights beyond the mind's previous 
reach. I have found that getting to that management "Aha!" is the real challenge of sce-
nario analysis. - - It happens when your message reaches the microcosms of decision 
makers, obliges them to question their assumptions about how their business world works, 
and leads them to change and reorganize their inner models of reality.” 
– Pierre Wack, 1985 
 
“The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in mind at the 
same time and still retain the ability to function.” 
 – F. Scott Fitzgerald, 1936 
 
Strategic foresight processes and practices, i.e. how knowledge about futures is created 
and made actionable in corporate organizations, are items of research that have received 
considerable attention in the field of futures studies (e.g. Horton 1999, Voros 2003, 
Rohrbeck 2012, Hammoud and Nash 2014, Peter and Jarratt 2015, Dufva and Ahlqvist 
2015a, Lehr et al 2017, Dadkhah et al. 2018). Multiple experts argue that a key element 
of foresight creation is the sense-making or interpretation of futures knowledge (Horton 
1999, Voros 2003, Uotila et al. 2005, Uotila and Melkas 2007, Könnölä et al. 2012) that 
concerns the perceived uncertainty in the organization’s external environment (Milliken 
1987) and is valuable for strategizing and building organizational resilience (Rohrbeck 
2012). Furthermore, visioning and making sense of implications suggested by past, pre-
sent, and alternative futures is considered one of the core competences of foresight experts 
(Hines et al. 2017). Yet, the utilization of futures knowledge can be hampered by a ‘black 
hole of interpretation and implementation’ where futures knowledge is not absorbed into 
strategy processes (Uotila and Melkas 2007, 1119).  While sense-making as a topic of 
organizational studies has been widely studied from both organizational, individual, be-
havioral and capability perspectives and their combinations (see e.g. Daft and Weick 
1984, Huber 1991, Weick et al. 2005, Weber and Glynn 2006, Duchek 2019), there is a 
lack of detailed understanding of how interpretation is done in the context of foresight 
and how this ‘black hole’ could be addressed. The topic of how sense-makers answer the 
foresight users’ questions of what futures knowledge means for the users or their organi-
zation, or more specifically what the impact of possible futures to the organization is and 
how should they act, is often overlooked and under-researched. For example, Voros 
(2003, 14) presents a generic foresight process where interpretation is about answering 
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the question of ‘what really is happening’ and uncovering deeper insights about analyzed 
future uncertainties. Voros’s interpretation is about probing the causalities of uncertain-
ties that both occur and have an impact in the environment external to organizations. 
Having a diametrically opposite perspective, Horton’s (1999, 6) view of the foresight 
process is centered on interpretation as contextualization: answering the question of ‘what 
does this mean for our organization’ and ‘what the implications of uncertainties are for 
us’. Although both include the task of answering the question ‘what should we do then’ 
in their foresight processes, Voros excludes contextualization from the foresight creation 
phase of his model and assumes the answers naturally stem from foresight as outputs, 
whereas Horton considers this issue an integral part of foresight creation itself. 
Furthermore, studies and concepts covering foresight processes and sense-making of 
futures knowledge lack detail that would help practitioners analyze and improve their 
own contextualizing type of interpretation.  
For example, Tapinos and Pyper (2018) identify a gap in research about how individ-
uals ‘do’ foresight and make sense of the future in practice. Supported by a case study of 
foresighters, they outline a process for individual foresight and sense-making. where out-
comes and impacts of future uncertainty are evaluated. Here, outcomes are estimations 
about how an uncertainty manifests, whereas impacts are identified through the different 
factors that the uncertainty affects. However, similar to the ‘Vorosian’ logic, their em-
phasis is on understanding the wider, general implications of uncertainties instead of con-
textualizing the implications to the organization for which the individuals work.  
In another example, Vecchiato and Roveda (2010) note that foresight scholars have 
mostly focused on analyzing so-called ‘state’ uncertainties, i.e. the uncertainties related 
to the evolution of environmental drivers of change themselves. Instead, they argue that 
firms’ future success depends on their ability to a) anticipate ‘effect’ uncertainties - the 
implications of drivers of change to their competitive capability – and to b) assess ‘re-
sponse’ uncertainties – choosing how to cope with drivers of change and their implica-
tions. However, their practical recommendations for practitioners about performing in-
terpretation, that is, anticipation and assessment of effect and response uncertainties, are 
limited to framing the effect analysis to the competitive industry structure and value chain 
of the firm in lieu of Porterian strategic thinking (Porter 1985), and to focusing interpre-
tation efforts to changing the mental models of decision-makers.  
In a third example, O’Brien and Meadows (2013) study how scenarios and scenario 
planning are used in the context of corporate strategy development. While assessing sce-
nario implications for the organization is one of three main activities they identify, their 
recommendations are limited to the usage of tools and frameworks such as SWOT, 
TOWS, Futures Group scenario method, SRI process, and competitive and core compe-
tence analyses. Similarly, Hines and Bishop (2013) present the “Houston way” of fore-
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sight creation and provide a detailed if technical process for contextual implications anal-
ysis where one performs “a transition from the description of the world ‘‘out there’’ to a 
focus on what it means for the client ‘‘in here” (ibid., 46).  However, the technical ‘best-
practices’ of the “Houston way” along with existing literature about foresight interpreta-
tion beg multiple questions: How do individuals perform contextualizing interpretation 
in reality? How is successful interpretation defined and what makes successful interpre-
tation? What individual and structural characteristics and capabilities support or hinder 
interpretation and its success (in terms of content, process & means, quality, utility, im-
pact and so on), and why? These are the questions that provide the foundation for my 
thesis. 
Noting how Horton claims “interpretation, the most crucial step in the whole [fore-
sight] process, is poorly understood, and has few theoretical techniques” (1999, 7), I pose 
two main research questions:  
1) How foresight practitioners interpret futures knowledge for the use of strategizing  
2) Why interpretation occurs as it does  
I use both to better understand the contextualization of foresight. Its use in strategizing 
provides a practical frame for studying “Hortonian” futures knowledge interpretation. To 
answer my questions, I study the practice of interpretation and factors of its success from 
practitioner and systemic perspectives. I agree with Tapinos and Pyper (2018, 292) that 
foresight is often examined as an impersonal, organizational activity and a research gap 
exists for understanding better the individual practice. Simultaneously, I explore the in-
terpretation as contextualization in more depth so that practitioners, using my findings, 
can assess and improve their own ways of working and value to their organizations. The 
systemic perspective complements the practitioner perspective and I use it also to avert 
reducing the behavior of foresight interpretation into a simplistic, linear process. Such 
reduction leads to illustrations that are uninformative and of little utility for developing 
one’s behavior, whereas a systematic perspective allows for more deeper, fuller analysis 
of interpretation both as an activity and capability. Additionally, as the individual behav-
ior does not happen in a vacuum and is part of a system, my intention is to understand the 
environmental factors that affect interpretation and drive its role and purpose in the wider 
organizational system context. Furthermore, for scoping reasons my thesis focuses on 
corporate strategizing or strategy making as a context of foresight use and does not in-
clude e.g. third sector or public policy-making. The empirical research of the thesis is 
based on the in-depth interviews ten experienced foresight practitioners who are either 
in-house analysts or external consultants. It contributes to strategic foresight practice by 
providing practical understanding of methods, tools and capabilities and systemic factors 
that impact interpretation and its success, and to futures studies academia by providing 
new insights about the practice of foresight creation at an individual level.  
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2 REVIEW OF EXISTING THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVI-
DENCE 
My objective is to explore how futures knowledge is interpreted by individuals in organ-
izations and how it is used for corporate strategizing. I pursue this goal by combining my 
new qualitative insights with existing theory and empirical evidence.  I break the objective 
into three main concepts that frame the review of relevant academic literature. Starting 
with futures knowledge, I discuss in detail the different types and definitions of 
knowledge and its relationship with foresight. Based on chosen scope and existing litera-
ture, I present a definition and understanding of futures knowledge. 
From futures knowledge, I move to discuss interpretation in general and futures 
knowledge interpretation in particular. To understand the individual practice of futures 
knowledge interpretation in organizations, I first review theories and empirical evidence 
from the field of foresight. Then I cover topics of organizational sense-making and sense-
giving, and organizational learning to complement the insights from the futures studies 
field.  To understand the reasons driving the ways futures knowledge interpretation is 
done the way it is, I review academic literature regarding the purpose and objectives and 
measurement of futures knowledge interpretation in organizations. Additionally, I ex-
plore the existing theoretical and empirical understanding of individual and structural ca-
pabilities, enablers and barriers related to and affecting foresight and interpretation, and 
as discuss different desired and real outcomes of futures knowledge interpretation. Fi-
nally, I suggest a definition of futures knowledge interpretation and argue how interpre-
tation can be viewed as a individual capability as well as an activity.  
As the third and last key concept, I explore the literature on strategizing. I briefly pre-
sent different definitions of corporate strategy, compare processes and approaches of 
strategy-making and the relationship of strategizing and foresight. To explore how strate-
gizing could impact the practice of futures knowledge interpretation, I discuss how these 
approaches vary in their demands for foresight and futures knowledge interpretation. I 
conclude this section with the definitions of corporate strategy and strategizing that I use 
in the empirical part of the thesis. 
2.1 Futures knowledge 
2.1.1 Types and definitions of knowledge 
In order to define futures knowledge, one must begin with a conceptualization of 
knowledge itself. At the outset, this invites one to ponder philosophical questions such as 
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the objectivity and subjectivity of knowledge and limits of human knowing and ability to 
know. Scholars and philosophers have presented a multitude of different typologies and 
perspectives of knowledge and its nature, such as positivist, rationalist, realist and post-
modernist (Fisher 2010, 17-26). While thoroughly covering a discussion about epistemol-
ogy ranging back thousands of years might risk becoming long-winded and something 
beyond the objective and limits of this thesis, some demarcations and decisions are re-
quired. The main context of this thesis is in organizational human behavior and it posi-
tions (a particular type of) knowledge as an input for this behavior, emphasizing the prac-
tical utility of knowledge. Knowledge is something that individuals operationalize and 
develop in organizations. Therefore, given these specifications, the thesis focuses on the 
practical application of knowledge and thus practice-oriented typologies of knowledge 
instead of the more deeply philosophical discussion of epistemology. This choice neces-
sitates a definition for futures knowledge as an input for behavior in organizations. In 
other words, what is knowledge in an organizational setting?  
Ackoff (1996) described a hierarchy of knowledge in which the level of refinement 
defines the mode knowledge or content of learning has. Data is the simplest, lowest form 
of what one can learn and consists of “symbols that represent objects, events, and/or their 
properties” (ibid., 2). Data is produced through observation, and data that is processed to 
be useful becomes information. Information, according to Ackoff, is contained in descrip-
tions and primarily answers to questions about what to do. Knowledge however is about 
knowing how to do something and thus is contained in instructions and learned particu-
larly through experience. At the next level is understanding – knowing why – that is con-
tained in explanations for knowledge, information and data. It is about assessing causes 
and factors and identifying the intentions or intended outcomes behind the behavior of 
entities that can display choice. Last, Ackoff defines wisdom as the “ability to perceive 
and evaluate the long-run consequences of behavior” (ibid., 4) or in other words, to un-
derstand the effects and effectiveness of one’s actions. While data, information, 
knowledge and understanding could be seen as value-neutral, wisdom-as-evaluation in-
cludes the notion of normativity and portrays wisdom as the making of value judgments. 
Ackoff suggests wisdom can be seen as action or an ability, whereas knowledge and un-
derstanding are ‘objects’. Similarly defining knowledge as an object, the so-called re-
source-based view on corporate management identifies knowledge as a firm’s resource 
and source of sustained competitive advantage (e.g. Barney 1991).  
An off-shoot of the resource-based view school of thinking is the dynamic capabilities 
perspective on corporate strategy, where knowledge is viewed as a firm’s asset, some-
thing that can be integrated, built and reconfigured by the firm to improve its ability to 
compete (Teece, Pisano & Shuen 1997, 515), while knowledge creation itself is a dy-
namic capability of the firm (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000, 1107). However, Moss (2001, 
219) posits that knowledge could be understood both as a static product (e.g. documents) 
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and as a dynamic process (‘know-how’ and routines). While explaining his view of sense-
making and its relationship with knowledge, he argues that meaning is produced as in a 
constant state of flux between the employed resources and capabilities. Here, capability 
and ‘dynamic process’ are not activities or behaviors per se, rather, knowledge about how 
to act, or in short, know-how. 
 Considering the resource and dynamic capabilities theories together with Moss’s 
views and reflecting back to Ackoff’s hierarchy, I suggest data and information can be 
considered as  ‘knowledge-as-resources’, whereas knowledge (learned through experi-
ence) and wisdom (an activity) can be seen as ‘knowledge-as-capabilities’. This separa-
tion is similar to Ancient Greek philosophers’ definitions of two main types of 
knowledge: episteme, translated roughly as knowledge, and technê, translated as skill, 
craft or art – knowledge-how (Fantl 2017). Interestingly, understanding, ‘know-why’ falls 
between the two definitions. In one hand, understanding consists of having knowledge 
why something is and thus exhibits the characteristics of being a resource. On the other 
hand it is a subjective interpretation and something akin to a capability because it by its 
nature facilitates the acquisition of knowledge (Ackoff 1996). Understanding, together 
with wisdom, per Ackoff’s definitions, are interpretations. However, if I intend to define 
futures knowledge as an input for behavior in organizations, such is what Ackoff would 
refer to as data and information. 
2.1.2 Futures knowledge: its nature and manifestations 
This thesis explores the use of a particular type of knowledge: of futures and uncertainties. 
But is futures knowledge an oxymoronic term? While there is no one determined future 
that can be known beforehand, people still imagine possible futures or future phenomena, 
discuss their plausibility, how they might emerge, and even consider the probability of 
different futures, and make decisions about their immediate actions based on such 
‘knowledge’ (Bell 1997, 73, de Jouvenel 2004, 12).  
When reflecting on this dilemma, Dufva and Ahlqvist (2015b, 252) consider futures 
knowledge to be about “justified contingent plausibilities”: justified by logical and ra-
tional analysis, being contingent on multiple interconnected factors and present actions, 
and deemed plausible by human perceptions and judgment. Furthermore, to them futures 
knowledge is perceptions of futures that emerge as clusters of connected concepts and are 
personal to each individual and dependent on the context in which the individual operates 
(Dufva 2015, 13, Dufva & Ahlqvist 2015b, 252).  
Because the future does not exist yet, knowledge about futures is particularly grounded 
upon and driven by human perception. In addition, that perception is not used to assess 
individual phenomena and factors in a vacuum. Instead, perceptions are knowledge of the 
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combination of factors, their uncertainty and forces that influence them (Tapinos & Pyper 
2018, 296-7). Ahlqvist and Uotila (2020, 10) propose a relational theory of futures 
knowledge: according to them, understanding weak signals (as a type of futures 
knowledge) is not only dependent on the context of the signal and factors that affect it, 
but also on the position of the person who generates and disseminates it and the mechanics 
how the signal transforms within and across contexts. Put differently, the content of 
knowledge about a futures object (e.g. weak signal, trend, or event) is determined in part 
by the bounded framing of the observer and by the boundaries and evolution of the con-
texts in which they are viewed.  
If futures knowledge can be characterized as position and context-dependent human 
perceptions of clusters of connected concepts, what types of futures knowledge exist in 
practice? How does organizational futures knowledge manifest itself? In his study of how 
organizations create knowledge, Nonaka (1991) popularized the concepts of tacit and ex-
plicit types of knowledge. Whereas explicit knowledge is formal, documented and easily 
communicated, tacit knowledge is its opposite: personal, difficult to formalize and com-
municate. It “consists of mental models, beliefs, and perspectives so ingrained that we 
take them for granted” (Nonaka 1991, 165).  Thus, concrete examples of explicit futures 
knowledge could be scenarios, images of the future, weak signal and wild card analyses, 
and megatrend analyses, competitor intelligence, or any documentation of future-related 
environmental uncertainty made using various tools of strategic foresight. 
But if tacit futures knowledge concerns personal, intangible mental models and beliefs, 
are they also ‘ingrained’ or rather, dynamic? When Dufva and Ahlqvist (2015b, 252) 
suggest futures knowledge to be ‘justified contingent plausibilities’, one can argue that 
cognitive schemes about the future cannot be fixed but by nature are in constant flux, not 
only because new understanding is constantly created through socialization, combination, 
internalization, and externalization (Nonaka & Toyama 2003, 4-5) but because future it-
self cannot be known. Of course, this flux can be affected – even clogged – by personal 
biases and information limitations. In addition to tacit and explicit types, knowledge could 
also manifest as self-transcending (Uotila and Melkas 2007). This type pertains to an 
“ability to sense the presence of potential, to see what does not yet exist” (ibid, 1120). 
The degree of novelty and articulation separate it from tacit knowledge: It is knowledge 
of the imagination, or tacit knowledge before it is embodied by an individual (ibid.), thus 
particularly relevant for foresight, where creativity is used to create futures knowledge. It 
is closely related to the what Dufva and Ahlqvist (2015b, 254) call ‘out-of-radar’ 
knowledge, a form of futures knowledge that is not activated through analytical reasoning 
but by speculative imagination and what might initially seem irrelevant but often is an 
important source for novel insights about futures. 
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2.1.3 Futures knowledge about environmental uncertainty 
When applying futures knowledge in the context of organizational and strategic decision-
making, it becomes crucial to define what futures knowledge concerns. Individuals im-
agine and analyze the future, but the future and uncertainty of what specifically? Part of 
strategic decision-making is to understand the environmental factors and related uncer-
tainties affecting the organization now and in the future. The environment can be defined 
as outside the immediate authority of the organization, such as institutions, other organi-
zations and individuals that the company cannot directly control, but only influence to 
various degrees (van der Heijden 2005, 113-5). This environment that is external to the 
company can also be divided into micro- and macro-environments (Vecchiato 2012, Tapi-
nos 2012). Micro includes elements such as competitors, customers, suppliers, and part-
ners, i.e. parties that the company has a tangible relationship with. The latter includes 
elements in the political, economic, social, legal and (natural-)environmental landscapes 
which can manifest themselves as organization and institutions but also as less tangible 
trends and phenomena. Naturally, a company with considerable monetary and social cap-
ital could consider e.g. legal institutions and national governments their micro-environ-
ment through their tangible relationships that are built on extensive lobbying and net-
working, but for the purposes of simplicity, I maintain this separation.  
Is it sufficient for strategic decision-making to then only understand the uncertainty of 
micro- and macro-environments and how these play out? Milliken (1987) argues that 
there are three types of environmental uncertainty that people in organizations experience 
as they aim to make sense of, and act based on, changing external conditions. First, people 
experience state uncertainty when their environment, a component of that environment 
or the relationship of environmental components is perceived to be unpredictable, in other 
words, the future state of their environment is uncertain. Second, even if an organization 
can moderate its state uncertainty, it might experience effect uncertainty. Here, people 
cannot sufficiently determine the implications of changing environmental factors to their 
own organization. They might be uncertain whether there is any impact, or about its na-
ture, severity, and timing. Finally, organizations can also experience response uncertainty 
when they must choose how to act based on changing external conditions. Here, the or-
ganization has a limited understanding of what response options are available to it, how 
useful or valuable each is and what are the internal and external consequences if they are 
implemented (ibid). In each case of uncertainty, I also note that challenge is not only 
people’s inability to estimate the probabilities of future possibilities, but also to imagine 
them in the first place.  
 
Differentiating between resource, capability and activity-based perspectives discussed 
in section 2.1.1 allows for a starting point for more specific definition of futures 
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knowledge, and I conclude this section with this. The definition includes its nature, types, 
different manifestations and what it concerns, as seen above. Put together, I view futures 
knowledge as an organizational resource, and knowledge of justified contingent plausi-
bilities (Dufva & Ahlqvist 2015b, 252) that exists as a cluster of connected concepts about 
environmental factors (Dufva 2015, 13; Dufva & Ahlqvist 2015b, 252; Tapinos and Pyper 
2018, 296-7) that are dependent on the position of the observer and the context in which 
the factors are perceived to exist (Ahlqvist and Uotila 2020). It manifests as tacit, explicit 
and self-transcending types of knowledge (Nonaka 1991, Uotila and Melkas 2007). Be-
cause future cannot be known, it is knowledge about uncertainty. In the organizational 
context, relevant futures knowledge concerns macro and micro environmental uncer-
tainty, especially the so-called ‘state’ uncertainty (Milliken 1987).  
If it is viewed a resource, its utilization could then be viewed as an activity or a capa-
bility. Utilizing futures knowledge emerges as a dynamic process, ‘know-how’, or Ackof-
fian understanding and wisdom. This leads to my discussion about interpretation of fu-
tures knowledge.  
2.2 Interpretation 
2.2.1 Futures knowledge interpretation as an activity 
Foresight as an activity is Ackoffian wisdom since creating knowledge about futures is 
among others to perceive and assess the long-time effects of human actions and their 
effectiveness. It has been defined as a type of practice or ability by several scholars and 
researchers of its field. For example, Malaska (2017, 19) simply considers foresight as 
“applied futures research carried out to provide tools for decision-making”, while 
Rohrbeck, Battistella and Huizingh (2015, 2) expand the definition for the corporate con-
text, describing foresight as “identifying, observing and interpreting factors that induce 
change, determining possible organization-specific implications, and triggering appropri-
ate organizational responses.” Foresight could even be seen as a dynamic, strategic and 
continuous practice that strives to create specific futures knowledge for different contexts 
and needs of an organization (Dufva and Ahlqvist 2015b, 264-5).  However, I am inter-
ested in the activity of and ability related to interpretation and contextualization of futures 
knowledge: these are components of Malaska’s, Rohrbeck et al.’s and Dufva and 
Ahlqvist’s broad definitions. If interpretation is part of foresight as an activity, what is it 
and how is it done? 
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2.2.1.1 Interpretation as part of foresight 
Futures studies literature has no lack of different processes and frameworks for futures 
knowledge creation and utilization1. Among this wealth of approaches, Voros (2003) pro-
vides a description of the generic, linear foresight framework (figure 1, left side). The 
process begins with intelligence gathering for analysis about the external environment 
from multiple sources. Analysis organizes the input data and seeks to answer the question 
‘what seems to be happening’. It is the starting point of what Voros considers foresight. 
Analysis is followed by interpretation, where the key question is ‘what is really happen-
ing’: here, the aim is to uncover deeper insights and structures via means of e.g. systems 
thinking and critical analysis. Third and last step in foresight is prospection, or purposeful 
forward looking, and answering the question ‘what might happen’. Different alternative 
views or scenarios of the future are created and examined. Outputs of foresight, i.e. anal-
ysis, interpretations and prospections, are then used to affect strategy-makers’ perceptions 
of the future and expand the range of strategic options. They assist in answering the ques-
tion ‘what might we need to do’. Finally, and separate from foresight, action decisions 




1 See e.g. scenario planning as the art of the long view (Schwartz 1998), peripheral scanning as an organi-
zational learning process (Day and Schoemaker 2005), the ‘rye bread model’ of knowledge creation (Uotila 
et al. 2005), future oriented technology analysis (Eerola and Miles 2011), horizon scanning and ‘facing the 
future’ (Könnölä et al. 2012), scenario planning with integrated perceived environmental uncertainties 
(Tapinos 2012, OODA model reinforced scenario planning (O’Brien and Meadows 2013),  Framework 
Foresight and ‘the Houston way’ of foresight creation (Hines and Bishop 2013), real options thinking based 
scenario planning (Dortland et al. 2014), futures knowledge creation as knowledge type conversions (Dufva 
2015), and the process model for corporate foresight (Dadkhah et al. 2018). 
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Figure 1. Foresight processes with different approaches to interpretation 
(adapted from Voros 2003 and Horton 1999) 
 
In Voros’s view, the sense-making of the underlying reasons and drivers of external phe-
nomena is emphasized. It is about understanding the what and why behind external un-
certainties. This is dramatically different to what for example Horton (1999) believes the 
purpose of interpretation to be. She too illustrates a generic and linear foresight process 
description (figure  1, right side).  
To Horton, interpretation of foresight inputs, i.e. summarized futures knowledge from 
the external environment, is about translating the inputs “into a language that is under-
stood by the organization” and “teasing out the implications of the various possible future 
views for a particular organization” (Horton 1999, 7). The purpose of futures knowledge 
interpretation, instead of uncovering ‘what is really happening’, is understanding ‘what 
does it mean for us’. Horton’s view of interpretation accurately portrays the analysis of 
‘effect’ uncertainties which Milliken (1987) point out and is similar to Hines and Bishop’s 
(2013) description of contextual implications analysis where one performs “a transition 
from the description of the world ‘out there’ to a focus on what it means for the client ‘in 
here’” (ibid., 46). 
‘Hortonian’ interpretation is also what Rohrbeck et al. (2015, 2) define as foresight’s 
task to determine possible organization-specific implications of change inducing factors. 
As highlighted by Rohrbeck et al. (2015) and Horton (1999), the interpretation of the 
implications of change or future-related uncertainty precedes considerations of suitable 
responses, whether they are changes to strategy or how the organization can prevent, di-
vert or facilitate the change in the micro- or macro-environment (Burt 2007, 733). In all 
cases, it is interpretation that produces the understanding of effect implications in order 
for individuals to determine whether a response is required. I find it notable, however, 
that Horton’s pragmatic framework disregards the prospection aspect of foresight, where 
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imagination and creativity are used to answer ‘what if’ questions and generate new op-
tions for strategic decision-making.  
By underlining the importance of recognizing implications and making it explicit for 
the foresight process, Horton unmasks a ‘black box’ element in the process that Voros in 
his model assumes exists and contributes to strategic thinking. By scrutinizing interpre-
tation, outcomes of foresight are not only disseminated forward and the focus is not on 
how to effectively communicate them to others, but rather on ensuring they are relevant, 
useful and valuable. The same black box is eloquently yet unwittingly pointed out by Burt 
(2007) who discusses Pierre Wack’s seminal articles on scenario building and planning: 
 
Wack argued that the process of identifying predetermined elements would help 
managers re-define their view of the business environment, by seeing new insights 
about such (previously hidden) systemic structures and relationships. If understood, 
these systemic structures and relationships would reveal specific challenges and 
opportunities which would then be the basis of [corporate] planning. (ibid., 734, 
italics added). 
 
But this begs the question, how does this ‘revealing’ happen and how individuals make it 
happen? Beyond offering very general questions for practitioners to uncover implications 
and encouraging the use of third parties when interpreting futures knowledge, Horton 
(1999) offers no practical guidance, tools and techniques that would assist in interpreta-
tion. While she argues that interpretation is the phase that produces most value to organ-
izations, she admits that interpretation as a process is poorly understood and suffers from 
a lack of theoretical techniques (ibid., 7). While analytical frameworks can facilitate ar-
ticulating sensed external change, future developments and their implications (Teece 
2007, 1320), comprehensive or structured bodies of insight for interpretation are far and 
between in futures studies literature.  
For example, while a variety tools and approaches for contextualizing the implications 
of external drivers exist, O’Brien and Meadows (2013) report that there exists little re-
search on their relative benefits and shortfalls. They simply suggest using the SWOT ma-
trix for imagining how futures can affect the internal strengths and weaknesses of the 
organization and opportunities and threats that external factors pose to it. Yet, as a frame-
work for causal thinking, SWOT simplifies issues and provides no ability to assess issue 
development across a timeline. It provides little support for in-depth, systemic interpre-
tation of issues and their implications, such as assessing the severity of threats, their tim-
ing and timescale, how important is the effect of a given threat, what affects the manifes-
tation of a given opportunity, or how they affect existing strategies or business perfor-
mance in detail, and so on. 
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Hines and Bishop (2013) present a detailed, technical description of a foresight crea-
tion and utilization process and provide another example from academic literature about 
performing foresight interpretation with the help of frameworks. When the process 
reaches a stage where the analysis of the implications of possible futures begins, they 
recommend first to determine the categories in which the implications are assessed, i.e. 
contexts such as firm functions, stakeholders or markets. The implications of alternative 
futures and changes they bring about are then analyzed using the Futures Wheel, which 
is a tool for brainstorming and documenting the first- and second order effects of future 
phenomena and trends. While the Futures Wheel can be used to assess both state and 
effect uncertainties, it sets the external driver as the center piece of analysis.  
The ‘Business Idea’, proposed by van der Heijden (2005, 63-90), is an example cog-
nitive framework that makes the organization the focus on the analysis instead and serves 
as a backdrop against which to perform interpretation of the external driver’s effects. The 
Business Idea is a combination of the essential elements that form the “success formula 
of the organization” (ibid., 60). These are the societal/customer value created by the com-
pany, the ‘Distinctive Resources and Competencies’ that the company owns and enable 
it to deliver its value, the unique competitive advantage the company exploits, and the 
reinforcing feedback loops where the aforementioned elements are configured and orga-
nized in a way that provides self-sustaining generation of resources and competencies, 
competitive advantage and ultimately societal and customer value. In van der Heijden’s 
approach, environmental uncertainty and change is then interpreted in the context of these 
elements and what their relationship is with change and alternative futures.  
2.2.1.1.1 Interpretation as part of scenario development 
Scenarios are a key method of foresight, and as socially built narratives about the future 
can provide a framework for interpretation (Wright 2005, 89-90). What kind of interpre-
tation insights, tools and techniques do different scenario approaches then offer to prac-
titioners? Below, I review and discuss several contributions.  
In his seminal book on scenario planning, Schwartz (1998) echoes Horton’s thesis 
about interpretation by arguing that ‘rehearsing the implications’, i.e. acting out the action 
options of the company in each scenario, is the most important step in the scenario devel-
opment process. To Schwartz, ‘rehearsal of the future’ is performing simulation, running 
through the imagined futures as if they were reality. Simulation is similar to what van der 
Heijden (2005, 119) calls ‘wind-tunneling’ where scenarios are used as test-beds for im-
agining how action alternatives would play out in different futures. However, simulation 
requires that people in the organization must believe the reality, that is, managers suspend 
their disbelief in foresight (Schwartz 1998, 193-7). By suspending disbelief, the managers 
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adjust their initial beliefs about the plausibility of future change and extend their willing-
ness to assess the implications of uncertainty their existing mental models do not allow 
for. To achieve suspension, Schwartz recommends using role-play: e.g. in a corporate 
setting, managers can represent different stakeholders of a market in an imagined situa-
tion, and in a game-theoretic fashion, strategize and act out their decisions in turn. Like 
in a simulation, the managers could then see how a situation or change-inducing factor 
‘plays out’ (and if it then leads to previously unthinkable outcomes) in market and what 
kind of effects it has on their organization.  
In another example of applying wind-tunneling to interpretation of external uncertain-
ties, Lehr, Lorenz, Willert and Rohrbeck (2017) propose a model for scenario-based 
strategizing. Here, scenarios of the company are based on exogenous factors whereas its 
strategy options are built from endogenous factors. The locus of interpreting the implica-
tions of scenarios is in evaluating the robustness of each strategy in each scenario. The 
intent is to understand which strategy is the best or worst in a given scenario, and the 
criteria used for evaluation are the strategy’s feasibility, suitability, and acceptability 
(Lehr et a. 2017, 218-9). While Lehr et al. do not offer further in-depth techniques and 
practical guidance for deconstructing the criteria and facilitating the strategic discussion 
where the shared views are created, their approach provides a general framework for sce-
nario/strategy simulation and wind-tunneling.    
Ralston and Wilson (2006, 139-40) suggest that the contributions and implications of 
futures knowledge (namely in the form of scenarios) for corporate decision-making are 
fourfold: they highlight opportunities for the company and alert about threats, they sug-
gest needs for new action options and changes to strategies, and they act as test beds for 
evaluating the resilience of existing strategies and possible alternative strategies. Like 
Schwartz, Ralston and Wilson instruct organizations to ‘rehearse the future’ with scenar-
ios. It involves visualizing the strategic implications of the scenarios by posing a number 
of questions to the management:  
• “In your capacity as a decision-maker, if you knew this scenario were going to 
occur, what opportunities and threats would you face”  
• “what strategies would you implement if you knew this scenario were going to 
occur in order to best take advantage of the opportunities and remove the 
threats” (ibid. 142)   
During scenario development processes, Ralston and Wilson recommend holding re-
hearsal workshops, where decision-makers are immersed in the scenarios and they iden-
tify opportunities and threats within each scenario and ideas for potential action options 
or strategies. After this, most salient opportunities, threats and action ideas are chosen, 
and the process moves to determining decision recommendations. Though Ralston and 
Wilson discuss scenario planning, the same approach could be applied in the implication 
analysis of any type of futures knowledge. However, I note this approach does not address 
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the issue of resilience of existing strategies and suffers from the same weaknesses as ge-
neric SWOT analyses mentioned above. Also, though scenarios act as a springboard for 
opportunities and threats, their approach relies on the creativity of the decision-makers 
without providing a mental framework for imagining implications to business, such as 
the ‘Business Idea’ proposed by van der Heijden (2005). 
In a theoretical paper, Tapinos (2012, 341) proposes that scenarios should be devel-
oped based only on macro-environmental uncertainties, whereas corporate strategies 
should consider both micro and internal uncertainties. Here, strategists should then con-
sider the implications of macro uncertainties on micro and internal environments using 
two simple impact matrices: the microenvironment is modelled and impacts assessed us-
ing the Five Forces industry structure logic, while the internal is examined through the 
sustainability of the most important resources the company uses to achieve competitive 
advantage. Based on this analysis, strategic options for action are then developed. Tapinos 
recommends using the TOWS matrix as a framework, where threats and opportunities are 
interpreted from scenarios. In addition, Tapinos suggests that micro-environmental im-
plications analysis and the strengths and weaknesses of the organization should not be 
based on the present but rather considered according to their future sustainability in each 
scenario. Like Lehr et al. (2017), Tapinos suggests using robustness analysis with the 
criteria of feasibility, suitability and acceptability to evaluate the fit between strategic 
options and different future scenarios. Compared to e.g. Ralston & Wilson (2006), Lehr 
et al. (2017),  van der Hejden (2005) and Hines & Bishop (2013), Tapinos’s proposed 
model provides strategists with more comprehensive approach to interpret all levels of 
perceived environmental uncertainty (Milliken 1987) with dedicated frameworks. Here, 
scenario development addresses ‘state’ uncertainty, implications analysis via models of 
micro- and internal environments help interpret ‘effect’ uncertainties, and strategy option 
robustness analysis interprets ‘response’ uncertainties.  
2.2.1.1.2 Interpretation as part of environmental scanning 
Experts on scenario thinking offer some insights on how to perform interpretation, but 
what practical contributions do practitioners of other widely used means of foresight of-
fer? Day and Schoemaker write extensively on environmental scanning and weak signal 
analysis, or ‘scanning the periphery’ of both the company’s current environment and its 
futures, as part of foresight (see e.g. Day and Schoemaker 2004, 2005). One of their key 
arguments for successful scanning for futures knowledge is asking the right questions that 
reveal hidden opportunities and threats. These questions should be open-ended and cover 
the past, present and the future. In addition, the organization should be willing to accept 
less precise answers (Day and Schoemaker 2005). 
21 
Day and Schoemaker (2004, 133-140) propose that peripheral scanning, i.e. understand-
ing weak signals, is a looped organizational learning process, where interpretation of 
weak signals drives action, which in turn generates learning and adjustments, which then 
have an impact on the mental models used in interpretation. They propose means to im-
prove the quality of weak signal interpretation, urging companies to develop both internal 
and external channels for dialogue and to aim to establish multiple hypotheses of the 
meanings of weak signals. The point is to suspend the urge reach a quick judgment and 
avoid trying to reach a consensus on one meaning and imposing “too much order on an 
inherently ambiguous picture” (Day and Schoemaker 2004, 138). This, according to Day 
and Schoemaker, helps challenge existing mental models and increase creativity in inter-
pretation. 
2.2.1.1.3 Empirical evidence of futures knowledge interpretation in practice 
As seen in previous two chapters, theoretical papers and contributions of experienced 
practitioners provide a starting point for examining and understanding futures knowledge 
interpretation in detail. Yet, the insights are brief and piecemeal: while some practical 
tools and techniques to facilitate interpretation are available, none provides a comprehen-
sive framework and they are often directly related to the used foresight creation method. 
Similarly, existing case studies and exploratory research yield only limited insight on the 
practice of futures knowledge interpretation in corporate contexts.  
Vecchiato and Roveda (2010) claim that the efforts of most foresight scholars focus 
on understanding the ‘state’ uncertainties or how the external drivers of change evolve.  
They argue that this is inadequate: companies’ future success depends as much on inter-
preting ‘effect’ uncertainties, that is, how drivers of change affect the companies. In their 
case studies of Starbucks, Luxxotica, Kodak Eastman and Nokia, one of their objectives 
is to uncover the most appropriate analytical framework for grasping the organizational 
implications of external drivers of change. Their scope of understanding implications is 
limited to two areas: the industry structure (as defined by Michael Porter’s Five Forces 
framework) and the value chain of the industry. In other words, the implications are ex-
plored by assessing how external drivers change the competitive landscape and position 
of the company, and how they affect the company’s and its competitors ability, including 
necessary resources and competences, and activities to create value to their customers.  
Other scholars have pointed out specific shortcomings of the Five Forces and industry 
structure as tools for analysis of dynamic, uncertain environments. First, the boundaries 
of the dynamic industry are blurred (Teece 2007, 1325) and constantly evolving and un-
certain themselves (Vecchiato 2012, 439-440), thus making scoping the analysis and 
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framing the context difficult. Second, Five Forces downplays the importance of new tech-
nologies as direct influencers of the industry structure and the role of innovation and 
learning in defining the structure itself (Teece 2007, 1325). Instead, in the Five Forces 
analysis technologies and innovations are relevant insofar they produce substitute prod-
ucts. How innovations and learning disrupt the “rules of the game” endogenously – from 
within the industry – in many possible ways is overlooked (Teece 2007, 1325). Never-
theless, when anticipating the ‘effect’ uncertainties, Vecchiato and Roveda (2010) argue 
that the real challenge is not to detect the drivers of change and to predict how they will 
evolve, but to “reshape the strategic beliefs of managers” (ibid., 1532). From these re-
shaped mental models emerge discontinuous strategies that are required to successfully 
respond to drivers that inflict discontinuity in the environment.  
‘Reshaping the strategic beliefs of managers’ resembles also what Ramirez, Österman 
and Grönquist (2013) illustrate in their study on how early warning scanning about 
changes in the environment together with scenario techniques can be used to frame the 
attention of top management to possible futures and how they might unfold. Ramirez et 
al. argue that sensing the business environment and its opportunities is one of three dy-
namic capabilities a company can have, and that sensing has six different cognitive as-
pects, i.e. six cognitive behaviors or acts that constitute sensing: imagining, experiencing, 
patterning, framing, reframing and highlighting. Framing is about the application of 
frames of shared understanding to making sense, whereas reframing is about “considering 
several meanings with parallel use of various frames” (ibid., 826). Arguably, these two 
aspects could be viewed as key tasks of interpretation, where the outcomes are develop-
ment of shared frames and creation of shared understanding – possibly even ‘reshaped 
strategic beliefs’ - through comparison and reflection of parallel frames and meanings. In 
their research of early warning scanning and scenario techniques in two global compa-
nies, Statoil and Nokia, Ramirez et al. (2013) find that futures knowledge and frames 
provided by scenarios and early warning signals enable and enhance strategic conversa-
tions about suitable responses to external change. Also, having multiple different scenar-
ios offer senior management the opportunity to reframe decisions about strategy for each 
specific scenario, and turn managerial attention to peripheral issues and frames outside 
the dominant frame of thinking. However, their case studies do not detail how framing 
and reframing are achieved in detail, i.e. how it is facilitated, and what are their success 
factors and necessary competences. 
Practical foresight research offers a number of different approaches for contextualiza-
tion, but very limited insight on their application. For example, Battistella and de Toni 
(2011) develop a methodology for assessing the company’s strategic fit with the future, 
called “the methodology for future coverage”. The approach measures the coherence be-
tween the company’s product and service offering, its vision, and the external change(s) 
relevant to the company.  Here, the vision implies the desired future state of the company 
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as articulated by the senior management and documented in internal and external docu-
mentation, while the future is mainly framed as weak signals and trends within the com-
pany’s industry and wider PESTE environment. The purpose is to understand how well 
equipped the company is to meet the imagined future. Battistella and de Toni’s analysis 
of coherence between trends and the company’s vision resembles closely what this thesis 
views as futures knowledge interpretation for the use of strategizing, particularly since 
the analysis is designed to measure “to what degree strategy is effectively aligned with 
trends and megatrends” (ibid., 1030). It is an application of two of the contributions of 
futures knowledge as noted by Ralston and Wilson (2006): it helps to analyze the resili-
ence of the company and understand needs to change strategies and adapt to changing 
conditions. However, Battistella and de Toni do not detail how to perform the coherence 
analysis. Coherence is determined by comparing “the different characteristics of the 
trends–vision - - relationships” (Battistella and de Toni 2011, 1037). Here, characteristics 
of the vision are somewhat ambiguous, whatever make up the desired future of the com-
pany, while characteristics of the trends are the possible developments in the company’s 
chosen environment. For the comparison itself, the corporate stakeholders provide the 
necessary expert input and this input is gathered in interviews that are either open-ended 
or supported by questionnaires. Battistella and de Toni do not share any tools, techniques 
or sets of questions, nor any discussion of factors that might affect the coherence analysis.     
A number of researchers examine the practice of corporate foresight and the value it 
can create. Hammoud and Nash (2014) explore qualitatively which foresight methods do 
foresight practitioners use and perceive as most successful in for-profit corporations. Five 
most cited methods are scenario planning, trends analysis, environmental scanning, weak 
signals analysis, and workshopping. Hammoud and Nash determine the general steps in 
foresight processes and identify what they call ‘anticipating change’ as the phase where 
observations and assumptions about the future are turned into meanings – what they mean 
for the company. Of how ‘anticipating change’ happens and how it is successful, the study 
offers only a few insights: recommendations include emphasizing “the outputs of the pro-
cess and ‘hide the machinery’ of foresight creation” (ibid., 9) to make it simpler and 
straightforward to analyze implications to the company, using ‘the same language’ as 
corporate managers to “translate foresight concepts and project results into action steps 
managers can understand and implement” (ibid., 18) and using visuals, such as models, 
images and videos when presenting foresight results to make the futures more tangible to 
managers. They report that corporate practitioners use PESTE or VSTEEP (where V 
stands for values) frameworks for as ways to gauge the impact of external factors to their 
and their customers’ businesses. Hammoud and Nash also categorize ways foresight ben-
efits the company, including e.g. future shaping, increased flexibility and challenging of 
existing assumptions, better awareness of business opportunities and risks, and thrusts to 
organizational realignment. These all indicate that futures knowledge interpretation – or 
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meaning creation – has successfully occurred. Yet, how practitioners have achieved to 
create these benefits is not studied. 
Peter and Jarratt (2015) examine how long-range planning is performed in two case 
companies. Their research provides general, technical descriptions of how foresight is 
created in both companies but does not investigate in detail how foresight is interpreted 
for the benefit of strategizing. However, they examine how corporate culture enables and 
hinders foresight use and its value to the organization. Based on findings in one of the 
companies, they identify flat hierarchies of management, a culture of openness to new 
ideas, top management encouragement and sponsorship, and the performance of internal 
futures agent networks as some of the key drivers of beneficial foresight practice. In the 
case company, the network has actors who are intimate with daily business, participate 
voluntarily and their participation is independent of other corporate hierarchies. It both 
formally and informally stimulates continual conversations and idea sharing about envi-
ronmental uncertainties which then feed into the company’s strategy development activ-
ities.  
 In a case study of a professional services company specialized in forward-looking 
analysis, Tapinos and Pyper (2018) investigate how individuals ‘do’ foresight and make 
sense of the future without formal foresight methods or tools. They define forward-look-
ing analysis (FLA) as a sense-making process, and sense-making as something that “fo-
cuses on the interpretation of uncertainty and explanation of how managers make sense 
of unexpected triggering events” (ibid., 293). In their study, they analyze different activ-
ities within FLA. After individuals have created foresight about the outcomes of uncer-
tainty, they interpret the impact of the outcomes by considering the factors affected by 
them. These factors are identified previously and described in a system of relationships 
affecting the central uncertainty and its outcomes. The interpretation itself – what the 
implications are – is a product of the individual’s experience and disciplined imagination, 
while the quality of the foresight output is “dependent on the capability of the analyst to 
create systems of relationships, and their access to information” (ibid, 299, italics mine). 
Given the nature of work of the interviewees in the case study company as it is described 
by Tapinos and Pyper, I view the approach they use for interpretation as more ‘Vorosian’ 
than ‘Hortonian’, that is, understanding the wider implications of uncertainties to their 
systems or relationships with other factors. Arguably, their insights about the factors of 
interpretation – experience and disciplined imagination together with analyst’s capability 
and access to information – are applicable to both types of interpretation. However, dif-
fering from both Voros and Horton, Tapinos and Pyper explain interpretation to be a part 
of continuous sense-making process instead of being an individual, non-recurring phase 
of a foresight process. They argue that interpretation and enactment constitute sense-mak-
ing and that both occur continuously in an iterative way every time information about the 
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uncertainty is captured, understood, and when foresight outcomes and impacts are as-
sessed. However, beyond using a systems analytical perspective in interpretation, the case 
study does not provide practical insights about how to perform interpretation and improve 
its quality.  
An alternative way to perform corporate foresight is to start by framing the questions 
about what implications future has for the organization as the basis for foresight work. In 
other words, the practical and often immediately business-relevant questions, e.g. a stra-
tegic decision needed to be made in the near future, scope the frame of foresight genera-
tion (Schwartz 1998, 100-101). Heger and Rohrbeck (2012) illustrate this with their case 
study about a telecommunications company exploring a new business-field in search of 
business growth. Here, starting point questions include e.g. what product properties and 
services the company should offer in the new field, who are the relevant actors in the 
value network and how might they behave in the future, how will the market of the busi-
ness-field evolve, and does it have the potential to be financially viable. Generating fore-
sight to answer these questions frames the entire process to the purpose of interpreting 
newly gained futures knowledge for decision-making about entering the new business-
field. Heger and Rohrbeck draw a map of the entire process, and specifically point out 
two steps where results of competitive and scenario analysis are interpreted. However, in 
their study, any practical insight on how interpretation and implications assessment occur 
is not shared. Instead, they discuss general antecedents of successful foresight work, in-
cluding having interdisciplinary working teams to ensure the process enjoys multiple per-
spectives. 
In conclusion I argue that a critical review of conceptual frameworks, practitioner ac-
counts and empirical evidence of foresight practice reveals that the futures studies field 
offers general and technical descriptions of foresight processes where interpretation – 
particularly the ‘Hortonian’ kind  –  is not studied in depth but rather superficially. While 
providing a handful useful approaches and tools, it is up to the interested to collect piece-
meal notes and advice to try to build a comprehensive, practically applicable view of how 
to perform interpretation successfully, especially in a way that is not dependent on what 
foresight technique was used to create the futures knowledge. Could other theories and 
studies in other fields assist in offering practical guidance, ways of working and tools for 
futures knowledge interpretation?  
2.2.1.2 Interpretation as organizational sense-making  
Organizational sense-making theory examines how people make sense of things and or-
ganize by interpreting ambiguity and rationalizing human behavior and enacting those 
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interpretations in a recurring cycle that happens episodically (Weick 1995, Weick, Sut-
cliffe & Obstfeld 2005, Weber & Glynn 2006, Sandberg & Tsoukas 2014). Sense-making 
is about putting stimuli into existing frameworks (Starbuck & Milliken 1988, 51), or link-
ing external cues with personal cognitive structures (Weick 1995, 49-54). It is about trans-
lating events and developing shared understandings and conceptual schemes (Daft & 
Weick  1984, 286). Events trigger sense-making as people notice ambiguity, surprises or 
discontinuities (Weick et al. 2005, 409-10, Sandberg & Tsoukas 2014, 11). In an effort 
to maintain order and make sense of what is happening, they bracket, label and categorize 
the events, guided by their existing and coincidentally evolving mental models.  This is 
not only for simplifying the world and making it understandable, but also to enable com-
munication of the events with others (Weick et al. 2005, 413).  
In his seminal, widely cited work (Weber & Glynn 2006, Sandberg & Tsoukas 2014), 
Weick outlines seven attributes that separate sense-making from other explanatory pro-
cesses: he argues that it is a process that is grounded in identity construction, is enactive 
of sensible environments, social, ongoing, focused on and by extracted cues, is driven by 
plausibility rather than accuracy, and is retrospective (Weick 1995, 17). Weick’s initial 
analysis and subsequent critical assessment and further development by other thinkers 
break down the act of sense-making to detailed components, but does this analysis pro-
vide insight how to perform and to improve futures knowledge interpretation, and if yes, 
what insights are they? 
Perceived identity, their current image of themselves and their future image are key to 
how people make sense and interpret issues (Gioia and Thomas 1996, 370, Weick et al. 
2005, 416). While mental models used in sense-making are part of one’s self-beliefs, 
sense-making affects mental models and subsequently one’s identity. Identity becomes 
particularly salient in sense-making where the triggering event challenges one’s self-im-
age, posing questions of who am I, who are we, what are we doing, and why does it matter 
(Weick et al. 2005, 416). When strategizing, imagining the futures of the organization 
becomes arduous unless people are able to connect the future with the present concerns 
and historical paths of the organization, and reinterpret and rethink who they are as an 
organization and how they have arrived at their current situation (Kaplan and Orlikowski 
2013, 975). Therefore, I claim that interpreting futures knowledge becomes a matter of 
not only definition of external cues, but also definition of self, as far as self is a perception 
of who we are now, what we are doing, and what has led us to this present. Interpreting 
effect uncertainties and resolving response uncertainties should not only be viewed as a 
technocratic pursuit of ‘hard’ answers about the futures, but a ‘soft’ act of social intro-
spection as well.  
Organizational sense-making is applying stimuli to mental frameworks. Weick argues 
that sense-making is part enactment, because “in organizational life, people often produce 
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part of the environment they face” (Weick 1995, p. 30). Consequently, people’s own ac-
tivity creates the stimuli they receive (ibid.). In a feedback loop, interpretation leads to 
action that leads to interpretation. I view Weick’s argument as social constructivist: the 
environment cannot be analyzed as a separate from the sense-makers: sense-makers, 
through their actions and interpretations, help create the environment they inhibit, but 
their perceptions and how they frame their understanding helps create it as well. For prac-
titioners interpreting futures knowledge, the insight is that knowledge of future possibil-
ities cannot be understood as an objective input only. Rather, it is constrained and con-
structed by human assumptions, perceptions and ultimately by their actions. 
This dynamic also highlights how sense-making is not solitary behavior but a social 
process (ibid., 39). Organizational sense-making is socially influenced, because interpre-
tations and decisions made by individuals are contingent on what on the actions and per-
ceptions of others (ibid., 39). Here, the social context does not only constrain individual 
sense-making. Instead, the organization itself primes, edits and triggers sense-making, by 
providing social cues, through social feedback processes, and  by “posing puzzles for 
sense-making through endogenous institutional contradiction and ambivalence”, respec-
tively (Weber & Glynn 2006, p. 1648). In an organizational context, sense-making can 
be seen to include sense-giving, where the sense-making and meaning construction of 
others is being influenced towards a specific end (Gioia and Chittipedi 1991, 444), which 
I argue is, essentially, social enactment. When coupled with sense-giving, sense-making 
becomes an iterative, sequential, and potentially reciprocal – social – process (ibid., 442, 
Sandberg and Tsoukas 2014, 24).  
Interpretation produces the understanding of effect implications in order for individu-
als to determine whether a response is required. Response uncertainty in turn relates to 
what the possible implications of certain responses are, and what the organization should 
then choose to do. If relevance of environmental factors that produce state uncertainties 
are determined through the act of contextualization, what determines which of the envi-
ronmental factors are contextualized in the first place? In other words, how do foresight 
practitioners and decision-makers both decide what is relevant enough to require inter-
pretation among all possible futures signals? How does one know what to contextualize 
if the act of contextualization itself reveals what is relevant and required further attention? 
Weick’s (1995, 49) argument that sense-making is focused on and by extracted cues ad-
dresses this dilemma, though does not answer it. ‘Focused on’ simply means that people 
notice cues from events and objects before making sense of them. ‘Focused by’ indicates 
how noticing is driven by the various properties of the cue that make them stand out in 
the first place, such as novelty, frequency, unexpectedness, extremity, and suddenness 
etc., or by cues that people are situationally or personally primed to be attentive towards 
(ibid., 50)  Furthermore, context “affects what is extracted as a cue” (ibid., p.51), but also 
how cues are interpreted. However, ‘context’ here can be thought to apply to the cognitive 
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frames individuals use in sense-making as well, and not only the organization or its envi-
ronment. 
Weick et al. (2005. 415) argue that sense-making is not about getting the truth right, 
but rather about building a plausible narrative of what is happening. Following Weick et 
al., I suggest plausibility, not accuracy, is what drives decision-making, even though e.g. 
Verity (2003, 193) points out that corporate managers typically want to base their deci-
sions on fact-based recommendations, accurate information and soundly estimated prob-
abilities. However, factual accuracy regarding an environmental uncertainty is relative 
and as argued previously, even subjective to individual perception. This is particularly 
salient to futures knowledge, where total accuracy is impossible to gain. To Weick, accu-
racy is a secondary importance to action, meaning that it is more important to begin in-
terpreting with limited information than to wait for “the” interpretation to emerge (Weick 
1995, 54-55). This way, I believe interpreting as a process produces both initial under-
standing of effect implications but also reveals further questions that require additional 
futures knowledge and further contextualization. Armed with such a mentality of on-go-
ing sense-making, foresight practitioners and decision-makers alike can also constantly 
maintain their focus on futures signals that are vital to the context of the organization.   
The final characteristic which Weick attributes to sense-making is that it is retrospec-
tive (Weick 1995, 24). I argue this is contradictory to the purpose and nature of foresight 
and futures knowledge interpretation, namely because futures have not occurred, and they 
cannot be experienced and retrospectively made sense of. Sense-giving however, when 
viewed separately from sense-making, has a future orientation insofar it aims to influence 
the sense-making and enactment of others (in the future) (Gioia and Chittipedi 1991, 433). 
Yet, I suggest sense-giving is more about influencing organizational response and less 
about understanding implications, which is in the realm of sense-making. Its purpose is 
not to analyze but to lead to action. Other scholars however argue that sense-making can 
be prospective when individuals and organizations try to understand the nature of change 
and impact of future actions and non-actions (Gioia and Chittipedi 1991, 433, Gioia, 
Thomas, Clark and Chittipedi 1994, 378). The question that arouses discussion in the 
academic field (Tapinos and Pyper 2018, 295) is then whether prospective sense-making 
is ‘future-perfect’ and a form of backcasting (retrospection of realized imagined futures 
or imagining that the future has happened and ‘retrospectively’ making sense of what has 
happened) or forwards looking, future-oriented sense-making where the future is invented 
instead of reasoned (Tapinos and Pyper 2018, 295, Gephart, Topal and Zhang 2010, 276, 
Kaplan and Orlikowski 2013, 967). Nevertheless, I suggest that to a practitioner, the ar-
gument about the “correct” direction of cognition (whether it is future perfect or future-
oriented sense-making) seems to be purely semantical. Rather, for foresight practitioners 
the most relevant is whatever perspective that works best in a particular context.   
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While organizational sense-making theory provides little insight into how to perform 
and improve futures knowledge interpretation in practice, it still sheds light into its core 
aspects. I argue that understanding these is critical to measuring and developing one’s 
interpretation capability and how one performs interpretation. Akin to sense-making, it is 
cyclical and continuous, it constructs identities, and it is social and political. Furthermore, 
it is focused on plausibility and action instead of accuracy. Finally, it is influenced by the 
actions and context of the organization and its members themselves and not only by the 
futures knowledge it is based on. When moving beyond organizational sense-making, 
what other theories and frameworks could provide insights into the practices  of interpre-
tation? 
2.2.1.3 Interpretation as organizational learning 
If an aspect of futures knowledge interpretation is sense-giving in a social setting, I view 
interpretation also as pedagogic, or striving for teaching and learning. By influencing and 
challenging personal frames of cognition of individuals and enriching knowledge for their 
use, it contributes to organizational learning (e.g. van der Heijden 2005, p.161). Organi-
zational learning is a diverse field that studies how organizations, through their members, 
acquire and use knowledge and alter their behavior, achieve transformation and affect 
their relationships with their environment (see e.g. Daft and Weick 1984, Huber 1991, 
Henderson 2002, Bontis, Crossan and Hulland 2002, Crossan and Berdrow 2003). I hy-
pothesize that how individuals and organizations learn could then provide insights on the 
activity of futures knowledge interpretation. 
What types of organizational learning exist? To Argyris (1977, 116; 1999), organiza-
tional learning can occur via single- and double-loop learning. Single-loop learning refers 
to the organization’s ability to detect and learn from its errors so it can maintain its current 
policies and its pursuit of its present objectives. When an organization questions and re-
vises the underlying policies and objectives  in the face of erroneous behavior that cannot 
be corrected using single-loop learning, it performs double-loop learning. Thus, when 
futures knowledge interpretation provides understanding, or “answers” and hypotheses, 
about future environmental uncertainties for strategic decision-making, in my view it is 
effectively providing single-loop learning. However, when foresight and interpretation 
pushes the organization to critical self-reflection about assumptions, beliefs and mental 
models, and facilitates critical thinking, it engages individuals in transformative learning 
(Henderson 2002, 203), akin to double-loop learning. Such learning leads to reframing 
which in turn helps develop totally new, insightful perspectives for interpretation. Thus, 
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I argue that interpretation contributes to both types of learning. Understanding interpre-
tation particularly as an effort at double-loop learning hints at why it can be so difficult 
for individuals.   
How does futures knowledge interpretation fit in with organizational learning? Cros-
san et al. (1999) develop a framework for organizational learning that describes it as a 
dynamic process. The dynamics are a result of assimilation, where what is learned feeds 
back from the organization toward individuals, and exploration,  where new insights and 
ideas are ‘fed-forward’ by individuals toward the wider organization. The concurrence of 
feedback and feedforward creates a tension between maintaining stability and inducing 
change (ibid.) which highlights why organizations struggle to renew themselves strategi-
cally as they face discontinuous change in their business environment (Crossan and 
Berdrow 2003, 1088). In their model, learning itself is comprised of four processes: intu-
iting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing and through these processes learning 
occurs across individual, group and organizational levels. They consider intuition as 
(past) pattern recognition (Crossan et al. 1999, 526). Personal experience is required for 
developing pattern recognition as experience is used to seeing patterns and foreseeing 
how the pattern develops. However, two types of intuition exist: exploitative, or past pat-
tern oriented, and explorative, or future possibilities oriented (ibid., 526; Crossan and 
Berdrow 2003, 1090). 
To Crossan et al. (1999, 526), explorative intuition is entrepreneurial, creation of new 
insight, new patterns, new connections, whereas exploitation is supported by expert intu-
ition providing insight for past pattern recognition. I argue this distinction is important 
for developing interpretation practices of futures knowledge, because it suggests that ex-
plorative, futures intuition is not an experience-based ability like exploitative, expert in-
tuition. Instead, exploration is about innovation and change, and its key abilities are mak-
ing novel connections and perceiving new and emerging relationships and discerning yet 
unidentified opportunities (Crossan et al. 1999, 526)2.  
Crossan et al. (1999, 528) view interpretation as a conscious process of learning and 
sharing of individual intuitions. When interpreting, “individuals develop cognitive maps 
about the various domains in which they operate” and interpret stimuli according to their 
cognitive maps (ibid., 528). This can result in different interpretations among individuals, 
 
2 This distinction raises the question about the importance of contextual experience in 
performing interpretation in a corporate strategizing setting: if novel, explorative intui-
tions are the aim of interpretation, does one require contextual experience e.g. about the 
industry or the company, or is it even harmful to the outcomes? I return to this dilemma 
in the analysis of the primary research of this thesis in chapter 5.4.2.   
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which are then shared in a wider group process (ibid., 528). However, viewing interpre-
tation as an act of sharing is markedly different to how other theorists see interpretation 
primarily as knowledge processing (see e.g. Daft and Weick 1984, Horton 1999). For 
them, sharing is an obvious by-product and part of the process and their emphasis is in-
stead on sense-making and determining implications of what is or can happen. It is then 
possible that intuition itself (as determined by Crossan et al. 1999, 526) includes some 
initial interpretation (when understood as sense-making and implications analysis), 
whereas interpretation-as-sharing (per Crossan et al. 1999) resembles more what Gioia 
and Chittipedi (1991, 446) describe as sense-giving. This poses two questions: is inter-
pretation inherently a personal learning activity, and does interpretation happen when in-
tuitions are shared or are the interpretations simply then only ‘given’? 
Crossan et al. (1999, 528) argue that when intuitions are shared and stimuli are inter-
preted, group interpretive processes resolve problems that result from equivocal interpre-
tations. But is the result a group interpretation, or an interpretation by an individual that 
was ‘given’ to others? I argue their argument does not point to a clear conclusion. Also, 
while Crossan et al. (1999, 528), like Daft and Weick (1984, 291), argue that group inter-
pretation decreases equivocality of individual interpretations by creating and refining a 
common language, I suggest it can also increase their equivocality by uncovering multi-
ple plausible explanations and perspectives and shedding light to differences between 
cognitive frames. It is therefore actually the process of integration, that follows interpre-
tation, where shared understanding and coherence required for further decision-making 
and action is developed (Crossan et al. 1999, 528-9). Integration resembles the concept 
of sense-giving, a separate aspect of sense-making. These suggest, in my view, that inter-
pretation, as far as they are part of organizational learning, ultimately is a personal activ-
ity, not shared.  
Furthermore, Crossan et al. (1999) point out two notable challenges that can affect 
interpretation and integration. First, shared understanding of novel ideas might not be 
achieved without shared action and common experimenting (ibid., 533). In other words, 
shared experiences might align cognition and mental frames and thus support achieving 
shared understanding and learning. For futures knowledge interpretation (and integration 
of interpreted implications) I feel this poses an interesting dilemma: how to mutually ex-
perience (and learn about) the futures, uncertainties and their implications before they 
have occurred? The second challenge affecting interpretation is how institutionalized 
learning can act as a barrier to both intuition and experimenting: to mitigate this, members 
of the organization should “step back from proven objective successes and allow un-
proven, subjectively based experiments” (ibid, 533).  Explorative learning can also thus 
require ‘unlearning’, i.e. intentional discarding of misleading, obsolete information and 
behaviors and constraints to behavior that can open the way for new learning (Huber 
1991, 102).  
32 
Finally, metaphors are valuable tools in translating and verbalizing individual intui-
tions, because they are means to transfer information from a familiar domain to new, 
unknown domains (Crossan et al. 1999, 527). Interestingly, Crossan et al. (1999, 527) 
hypothesize that metaphors are the only way of communicating explorative intuitions.   
  In summary, a brief exploration of the field of organizational learning provides the 
practice of futures knowledge interpretation with a number of concepts and notable con-
siderations. The dichotomy of single and double-loop learning (Argyris 1977, 1999) pro-
vides a helpful way of structuring the intention and depth of interpretation. The frame-
work of organizational learning (Crossan et al. 1999) offers a way to articulate the dy-
namic of interpretation: how it relies on the pattern recognizing, explorative intuition of 
a foresighter or a manager, and notes that this is an ability not honed by experience but 
rather a creative skill. Albeit intuition is creative, interpretation however is about devel-
oping mental models in a specific context (ibid., 528), which indicates how developing 
intuitions into interpretations requires both creativity and context awareness and 
knowledge.  The framework illustrates how interpretation occurs at individual and group 
levels, and how integration (developing shared understanding) is a connected but separate 
process from interpretation due to its social nature and due to how interpretation itself 
does to necessarily lead to coherence and consensus. Theories of organizational learning 
also highlight how important metaphors, shared experiences and unlearning are to fore-
sight contextualization (Crossan et al. 1999, Huber 1991).  
 
In this section, I’ve attempted to answer the question if interpretation is part of fore-
sight as an activity, what is it and how is it done? Based on the critical review of theory 
and empirical research of fields of foresight, sense-making and organizational learning, I 
have developed a view of the core characteristics of foresight interpretation. Instead of 
identifying a process, I have distinguished a number of attributes that characterize it as an 
activity. These are included in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Summary of core characteristics of futures knowledge interpretation 
Uses cognitive frames, assumptions and beliefs  
Starbuck & Milliken 1988, 
Weick 1995 
Aims at sense-making & sense-giving  
Weick 1995, Gioia & Chittipedi 
1991 
Social and participatory  
Weick 1995, Burt et al. 2017, 
Chermack 2004 
Intuitive and experience-based  Crossan et al. 1999 
Creative, using ‘disciplined imagination’  
Wack 1985, Crossan et al. 1999, 
Weick 1989 
Combines futures with present concerns and his-
torical paths of the organization  
Kaplan & Orlikowski 2013 
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Grounded in identity construction  
Weick 1995, Weick et al. 2005, 
Gioia and Thomas 1996 
Enactive of sensible environments  Weick 1995 
Focused on and by extracted cues  Weick 1995 
Driven by plausibility rather than accuracy  Weick 1995 
On-going  Weick 1995 
 
An important aspect of how interpretation is done is what tools individuals use. Based on 
the review I have compiled a summary of tools foresight practitioners and managers can 
utilize when performing interpretation in practice (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Summary of tools for futures knowledge interpretation 
FRAMEWORKS  
SWOT  e.g. O’Brien and Meadows 2013 
TOWS  e.g. Tapinos 2012 
The Business Idea  van der Heijden 2005 
Five Forces  e.g. Tapinos 2012 
Value chain  e.g. Vecchiato and Roveda 2010 
PESTEC  Hammoud and Nash 2014 
Futures Wheel  Hines and Bishop 2013 
Company’s vision statements and strategy 
documentations  
Battistella and de Toni 2011 
TECHNIQUES AND TOOLS FOR FREE-FORM IDEATION 
Interrogation, asking questions  
e.g. Day and Schoemaker 2005, Ral-
ston and Wilson 2006 
Simulation, wind-tunneling & roleplay  
e.g. Schwartz 1998, van der Heijden 
2005, Lehr et al. 2017 
Coherence analysis  Battistella & de Toni 2011 
Visuals  e.g, Hammoud and Nash 2014 
Metaphors and analogues  Crossan et al. 1999 
Shared experiences to learn about the future  Crossan et al. 1999 
 
These tools are used and recommended by various scholars particularly from the field of 
futures studies, but they include also ideas from the field of organizational learning. In 
the review I identify two different approaches to futures knowledge interpretation and 
divide the tools into two classes: ‘hard’ frameworks that structure thinking and ‘softer’ 
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techniques for free-form ideation that facilitate the use imagination. In my view the dis-
cussion on interpretation as part of scenario development (chapter 2.2.1.1.1) and environ-
mental scanning (chapter 2.2.1.1.2) highlights two approaches for interpretation of ef-
fects: first, using frameworks to conceptualize the business and/or strategy and pinpoint 
and determine the effects with their help (van der Heijden and Lehr et al. as examples) 
and second, using freeform ideation to explore possible effects (Ralston and Wilson and 
Day and Schoemaker as examples). Frameworks help structure thinking and conceptual-
ize all relevant aspects of the business, while freeform ideation might lack the structure, 
but through use of creativity can uncover areas and forms of effect that preset frameworks 
do not include. This separation, I argue, provides a helpful perspective to understanding 
different tools available for practitioners. Of course, the separation of the tools does not 
imply only one should be used at a time: in a case-by-case basis, practitioners must choose 
between framework-based interpretation or freeform ideation, or use their combination, 
as they perform interpretation of effects.  
2.2.2 Drivers of futures knowledge interpretation 
After exploring what foresight interpretation is and how is it performed from the perspec-
tives of theory and empirical evidence in futures and organizational studies, the focus 
turns to discussing why is interpretation performed the way it is. What affects the nature 
and style of interpretation, based on existing understanding of theory and practice?  
When answering this question, I first consider the purpose and objectives of futures 
interpretation and how it is measured. My logic is that the reasons why interpretation is 
performed will determine its nature and content in part, as does the perception and opinion 
of what constitutes ‘successful’ or ‘valuable’ interpretation. As the context of foresight 
and interpretation in this thesis is corporate strategy and strategy formulation, purposes 
and objectives of corporate strategy formulation affect those of interpretation, but I ex-
plore this perspective in detail in chapter 2.3 (Strategizing). However, given that futures 
knowledge interpretation is a part of foresight creation and utilization, understanding why 
foresight is created and how ‘good’ foresight is evaluated in corporate settings can pro-
vide insight into what makes ‘good’ or ‘ideal’ futures knowledge interpretation. 
2.2.2.1 Purpose and intended use of interpretation       
The general purposes, objectives and measurement of foresight have been extensively 
discussed in academic futures studies literature (see e.g. Bell 1997, Hines 2003, Piirainen, 
Gonzales & Bragge 2012, van der Steen and van Twist 2012, Rijkens-Klomp 2012, 
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Rohrbeck 2012, Rohrbeck and Schwarz 2013). In a corporate setting, van der Heijden  
(2005, 160) argues that the first and probably the most critical question for scenario plan-
ners and foresighters is determine the purpose of foresight: why are we doing it? The 
intended uses of foresight could be summarized in three main areas: increasing awareness 
of external change, problem-solving and problem-finding (Hines 2003, 32).  Interpreta-
tion, when framed as answering the question “what does the futures uncertainty mean for 
our company”, is loaded with the objectives of raising awareness and increasing manage-
ment understanding. However, such a purpose is vague, and while it can help produce 
valuable insights in itself, it is disconnected from any specific, pre-existing need of the 
organization. As discussed previously, questions of strategic decision-making that explic-
itly require contextualization can act as a launch pad for corporate foresight creation, e.g. 
how will a new market evolve or how customer needs change in the future (see e.g. 
Rohrbeck 2012, Heger and Rohrbeck 2012, Ruff 2015) and what are their implications to 
our current and future business. This represents the problem-solving value of foresight 
interpretation. Being practice-oriented than academic, foresight done for corporate strat-
egy-making is generally case-specific and its purposes thus vary based on corporate ob-
jectives. However, there is also the art of problem-finding which involves asking the right 
(open-ended) questions about the futures of the company and its environment instead of 
focusing on finding the right solutions to pre-determined problems (Hines 2003, 32). 
Here, interpretation is key as it translates nice-to-know knowledge about futures into un-
expected insights about the implications of futures to an organization.  
Furthermore, purposes and intended uses can be also examined from organizational 
learning perspective, as discussed in chapter 2.2.1.3: the aim can be to reshape mental 
models or provide ‘answers’ (e.g. van der Heijden 20005, Rohrbeck 2012, Heger and 
Rohrbeck 2012, Ruff 2015), or in other words, to achieve either double or single-loop 
learning (Argyris 1977; 1999). In addition, the aim can be to build necessary decision-
making coherence and consensus among individuals or instead to encourage equivocality 
of views and breadth of action options (e.g. Crossan et al. 1999).  
Of course, the purpose of interpretation could also be examined from the perspective 
of the types of implications to the business (i.e. effects; opportunities, threats and posi-
tives, or consequences to organizational resilience), as I note in chapter 2.2.3 (Outcomes 
of futures knowledge interpretation) . However, performing interpretation to uncover cer-
tain types of implications does not exclude performing it for different intended uses. Quite 
oppositely, each intended use area can include any type of implication, and vice versa. 
Answering “why are we doing it” does not necessarily determine the answer to the ques-
tion “what are we getting out of it”!  
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2.2.2.2 Quality and utility of interpretation 
If desired outcomes of foresight and interpretation are case-specific or even unexpectedly 
found, but one wants to understand what makes ‘ideal’ interpretation, could one deter-
mine general yet measurable aspects in the nature and content of foresight and interpre-
tation work?  Piirainen et al. (2012) propose a comprehensive framework for evaluating 
foresight. The main dimensions regard the utility of foresight, how it is delivered, its 
technical quality and ethicality. These dimensions are observed from the perspectives of 
inputs to the foresight process, the process activities, its outputs and its sustained impact. 
It is worth noting that the measurement framework implies that foresight is an activity 
performed through projects and not a capability. Regardless, their model (that includes 
66 individual metrics) has at least three questions that I argue can be used to help define 
generally ‘valuable’ futures knowledge interpretation. First, is the interpretation of the 
analysis plausible and does it allow for further prospection, in other words, does the con-
textualization of environmental uncertainty allow for imagining sensible strategic options 
for the organization or can the contextualization logically lead to option definition? Sec-
ond, have the often-hidden assumptions that limit sense-making and imagination been 
identified? Third, does the interpretation inspire trust among stakeholders and decision-
makers? These questions should help practitioners measure their interpretation work qual-
ity, but they do not provide a comprehensive framework. Complementary perspectives 
are required.  
Rollwagen, Hofmann and Schneider (2008) present a practitioner-based point of view 
on delivering impactful foresight results and suggest criteria for foresight’s success in 
business. These include a number of content and process related principles, of which sev-
eral are relevant for measuring and enabling successful foresight interpretation. The first 
criterion for content is the plausibility of futures knowledge in the eyes of foresight users. 
Rollwagen et al. argue plausibility requires rigorous and systematic scrutiny of uncer-
tainty, even if it becomes time-consuming. To achieve plausibility, they give following 
recommendations:  
1) look for quantitative data such as indicators to support the conclusions in foresight 
statements;  
2) establish internal consistency of futures knowledge with systematic cross-checking 
of results, e.g. using cross-impact matrices;  
3) use ‘real world’ cases close to the users’ expertise areas as convincing examples 
of futures knowledge and its relevance; and  
4) present the gradual materialization of change and its effects to foresight users by 
specifying timelines and paths instead of presenting changes as a simplistic on/off, 
unrealized/realized dichotomy  
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The second criterion is convenience and how futures knowledge should be delivered 
in easily understandable way, e.g. by using language and terminology that the organiza-
tion uses in their daily operations. The third is inspiration and how futures knowledge 
should have novelty value and inspire frame-breaking thinking. Final fourth criterion for 
foresight content is using appropriate time horizons: even if the organization tends to 
view its operations only in short term, foresight practitioners should cover short, medium 
and long-term changes and uncertainties to understand their business-relevant implica-
tions more fully and to be able to challenge the present logics of the organization. Put 
together, futures knowledge that is plausible, convenient, inspiring and uses appropriate 
time horizons should provide the best possible soil for fruitful interpretation.  
As for process-related criteria, Rollwagen et al. offer seven principles. Delivery of 
futures knowledge should be structured, e.g. by using conceptual tools such as mental 
maps, to allow for transparent examination of the logic and assumptions that produced 
the results. Impactful foresight requires highest possible level of interaction between fore-
sight practitioners and rest of the organization, both through process integration and or-
ganically. This way foresight ‘comes alive’ in the organization and practitioners have 
constant awareness of the needs of the decision-makers and can deliver futures knowledge 
that has strategic fit. Furthermore, networking is required to identify and include individ-
uals on the business side to act as promoters of futures knowledge and foresight activities. 
Networking is also required for ideational entrepreneurship, where foresight practition-
ers market their ideas in and outside the organization so that people become interested in 
futures knowledge and are integrated into foresight work. Communication of futures 
knowledge should be innovative in two ways. First, despite using language that the organ-
ization easily understands, foresighters should use new expressions and words to describe 
external change and their implications. This way, knowledge gains stickiness among peo-
ple and provokes and reframes thinking. Second, in order to be more memorable, futures 
knowledge should be communicated in novel forms and mediums, e.g. using sounds and 
visuals, blogs, videos, virtual reality etc. instead of relying on written reports. Practition-
ers must also remain persistent even if business executives seem uninterested in futures 
knowledge, and they must synchronize their work with the schedules and calendars of the 
organization so the insights support business activities when they are most needed. In 
summary, delivery of futures knowledge in accordance with above seven principles 
should ideally enable successful interpretation. 
While Rollwagen et al. offer means to develop the groundwork for foresight interpre-
tation, Van der Steen & Van Twist (2012) provide a deeper, complementary view of the 
concept of fit between decision-making and foresight. In practice, they argue, while de-
cision-makers desire clarity, simplicity and solutions, foresight instead delivers complex-
ity and reframes and uncovers problems. Furthermore, they argue that (public) policy-
making is influenced by various political and organizational cues, such as tacit 
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knowledge, expectations, norms, assumptions, and ambitions that people observe and ad-
here to as they make policy. Foresight often lacks appropriateness to the reality of poli-
cymaking and its complex, mutually influencing organizational and political processes 
and thus is disconnected with said reality. In response, van der Steen and van Twist (2012, 
482) suggest that foresight should answer to political cues: it should be e.g. helping win 
political battles, putting issues to political agenda, and identifying potential political risks. 
They argue it should also fit with organizational cues: for example it should amend or 
falsify existing policy theory, provide arguments for policy selection, and allow reflection 
on and reframe existing policy theory and organizational paths. Here, foresight is instru-
mental: it is measured by its value-in-use and by its connectivity and ‘fit’ to decision-
making, however pragmatic and political both literally and figuratively. In my view, the 
implications of this to futures knowledge interpretation are stark. If companies’ strategiz-
ing is affected by similar cues, interpretation naturally should not be considered to be a 
simple exercise in cognition and causal and systemic thinking, rather, it should adhere to 
whatever political and organizational cues exist in the company. Paradoxically while it 
should be used to reframe existing theories and beliefs, identify risks and expand thinking, 
to be useful, interpretation should fit with the company’s political and organizational 
cues. The emancipating activity itself becomes very much bound and directed by these 
cues.    
As a final example of applying foresight measurement to understanding ideal foresight 
interpretation, Rijkens-Klomp (2012) argues that foresight measurement should also con-
sider the experienced added value for foresight users that is driven by their motives. In 
addition to raising awareness of implications of future uncertainties, manager use fore-
sight to set the agenda for strategic decision-making on one hand and on the other to 
increase rational thinking and transparency of the assumptions that affect strategic option 
formulation and decision-making. Following Rijkens-Klomp’s findings, I argue ‘good’ 
foresight interpretation should then help determine the agenda by informing the discus-
sion about which uncertainties and their implications require response(s) or continued 
monitoring. Furthermore, just as Rollwagen et al. (2008, 342) call for structured ways of 
working in generating and delivering foresight results, as a sense-making exercise that 
includes causal and systemic thinking and strives for shared understanding, foresight in-
terpretation should increase the rationality and transparency of decision-makers’ cogni-
tion in the process.   
In this chapter I’ve reviewed different academic contributions to the measurement of 
foresight in an attempt to uncover drivers that impact how futures knowledge interpreta-
tion is performed. My logic here is that measurement highlights critical and valuable 
characteristics of the interpretation activity. While ‘valuable’ and ‘ideal’ futures 
knowledge interpretation and contextualization is ultimately defined by the case-specific 
objectives of corporate strategizing, in Table 3 below I provide a summary of its ideal 
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qualities identified by research, when it is primarily understood as an activity and not as 
an output (i.e. interpretations) for corporate decision-making. I propose such metrics can 
serve as a mirror to reflect how interpretation succeeds and how to develop it in practice. 
 
Table 3. Desirable qualities of futures knowledge interpretation as metrics for 
success and performance development 
‘Fit for purpose’: business need driven  
e.g. Schwartz 1998, 
Rohrbeck 2012 
Plausibility of the futures knowledge which the pro-
vides the basis for interpretation  
Rollwagen et al. 2008 
High level of convenience and innovation in and the 
ability to inspire of its communication to decision-mak-
ers  
Rollwagen et al. 2008 
Level of analytical structure of the futures knowledge 
and the interpretation  
Rollwagen et al. 2008 
Extent of interaction between foresighters and decision-
makers during interpretation  
Rollwagen et al. 2008 
Support in imagining sensible strategic options  Piirainen et al. 2012 
Ability to inspire trust among stakeholders  Piirainen et al. 2012 
Ability to increase stakeholder rationality and transpar-
ency and identify their oft-hidden assumptions  
Rijkens-Klomp 2012, 
Piirainen et al. 2012 
‘Fit’ with political and organizational cues and pro-
cesses – the social boundaries – of decision-making  
Van der Steen & Van 
Twist 2012 
2.2.2.3 Barriers and enablers of interpretation 
Notions of social boundaries raise the question what individual and structural enablers 
and barriers relate to and affect foresight and its interpretation. I argue understanding 
these is important because it helps uncover reasons why contextualizing, prospective in-
terpretation is performed the way it is and provides means to determine how to improve 
the chances to succeeding in interpretation in practice. In this chapter, I explore these 
individual and structural factors that earlier academic literature has identified. Table 4 





Table 4. Summary of systemic factors (enablers or barriers) affecting futures 
knowledge interpretation 
Access to information  Tapinos and Pyper 2018 
Available technologies for communication  Sandberg and Tsoukas 2014 
Cognitive biases, incl. Bounded rationality, attribute 
framing, risky framing, overconfidence, creeping de-
terminism, groupthink & peer pressure, confirmation 
bias  
Meissner and Wulf 2013, 
Day and Schoemaker 2004, 
Mackay and McKiernan 
2004 
Emotions and issues of self-image, incl. perceptions 
of competence, strength, and long-term security  
e.g. Siilasmaa and Fredman 
2018, Wack 1985, Schwartz 
2018 
Existing frames of thinking in the organization  e.g. Weick 1995, Day and 
Schomaker 2004, Hines 
2003 
Foresight’s correct ’distance to business’  Hines and Gold 2013 
Flatness/rigidness of hierarchies of management  Peter and Jarratt 2015 
Incentivization of futures thinking  Rohrbeck 2010 
Management’s curiosity towards the periphery  Rohrbeck 2010 
Management’s need for solutions vs. uncovering op-
tions  
Hines 2003 
Overall mood in the company, incl. crisis, devolu-
tion of cognition and scapegoating  
Pergel and Psychogios  
2013, Siilasmaa and Fred-
man 2018 
Politics and power dynamics among stakeholders  e.g. Sandberg and Tsoukas 
2014 
Providing management with uncertainty and possi-
bilities vs. certainty, risk and probabilities (manage-
ment dislike for ambiguity) 
Day and Schoemaker 2004, 
Verity 2003 
The openness to new ideas in the organizational cul-
ture  
Peter and Jarratt 2015, Burt 
et al 2017 
Time, money & stakeholder attention  Verity 2003, Raspin and Ter-
jesen 2007, Hines and Gold 
2015 
Top management encouragement and sponsorship  Peter and Jarratt 2015 
 
Like all activities in an organizational context, foresight and subsequently futures 
knowledge interpretation compete for, and are often in short supply of, key organizational 
resources, namely time, money and attention (Verity 2003, 192; Raspin and Terjesen 
2007, 120; Hines and Gold 2015, 103). When foresight is applied and interpretation is 
performed, they are challenged by a number of organizational and individual, behavioral 
and attitudinal hindrances as indicated by a number of scholars and practitioners. 
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Rohrbeck (2010, 157) points out three organizational barriers to applying foresight in 
strategic management and decision-making: First, the nature of futures knowledge is 
highly uncertain, whereas top management often wants empirical evidence and data-
based, accurate forecasts and probabilities (Verity 2003, 193), leading to situations where 
the utility of futures knowledge is questioned from the get-go. This can result in that 
interpretation is never made. Second, managers are expected to make fact-based deci-
sions, whereas futures knowledge uncovers possibilities and its interpretation increases 
the number of strategy options available to the company. Instead of having one common 
view, having multiple views of futures and potential strategies may reduce clarity and 
commitment to strategy choices and thus threaten coherence among senior management 
and the entire organization (Raspin and Terjesen 2007, 121). Furthermore, for managers, 
having alternatives instead of determined best courses of actions, and admitting uncer-
tainty instead of having clarity can be a sign of incompetence in decision-making  (Wack 
1985, 139-140). Allowing equivocality and uncertainty when interpreting the organiza-
tional implications of evolving environmental factors can even be identified as a personal 
weakness among corporate top management teams (Siilasmaa and Fredman 2018, 81). 
Third and last, futures knowledge is seen as just another input and type of information, 
and its importance is overlooked (Rohrbeck 2011, 157).  
Academic literature provides a number of psychological hurdles to interpretation. In-
terpretation is an exercise in identity construction (Weick et al. 2005, 416), both at per-
sonal and organizational level. As futures knowledge is interpreted in organizations, peo-
ple can view it as intangible, abstract and even threatening to themselves (Hines and Gold 
2015, 103). People’s self-images are a basis for their performance and professional suc-
cess, so if futures knowledge and its implication interpretations challenge their self-im-
ages, the contradiction can lead to resistance (Schwartz 1998, 236) and anxiety about 
whether or not one can survive and thrive in the future. When an individual or an organ-
ization strives to learn about futures with considerable implications to themselves, other 
negative psychological hurdles can include simple denial of presented knowledge, disre-
gard of information sources which are not considered to be within the organization and 
over-reliance on (perceived) expertise within the organization (Pergel and Psychogios 
2013, 194). Furthermore, when an organization is facing a potential crisis, analytical in-
terpretation and response decision-making can be disrupted, leading to failures in identi-
fying real threats and their implications, and the discussion can devolve into blaming and 
scapegoating (Siilasmaa and Fredman 2018, 83-103; Pergel and Psychogios  2013, 194).    
In addition to cultural and psychological barriers, interpretation of futures knowledge, 
especially its quality, can be affected by a multitude of different cognitive biases (Bootz 
2010, 1589). Meissner and Wulf  (2013, 802) define cognitive biases as “deviations from 
rationality in human thinking that result from specific heuristics used for information pro-
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cessing - - that lead to suboptimal decisions, which in turn have a negative effect on per-
formance”. When discussing futures thinking related biases, they highlight the framing 
bias or framing effect that “describes a reversal of preferences depending on the way in 
which a decision problem is presented” (ibid., 802). They discuss two types of framing 
bias: attribute framing, where the way a situation or a decision is framed (positively or 
negatively) affects the whether or not one takes action, and risky choice framing, where 
framing that focuses on gains increases risk aversion, and focus on losses increases risk 
seeking to avoid losses. To a rational decision-maker, the way situations and options are 
presented should not matter (Meissner and Wulf 2013, 802-3). Yet, I note that if all deci-
sion-makers suffer from bounded rationality, interpretations are never free of framing or 
risky choice biases. To the contrary, as seen before, sense-giving is an aspect of interpre-
tation and it explicitly relies on mechanisms of framing and reframing. Therefore, I pro-
pose that absolute rationality might not be the objective, but rather having multiple, com-
peting and complementing frames and interpretations.   
Day and Schoemaker (2004, 138) also highlight behavioral and cognitive blinders that 
affect how individuals interpret futures knowledge, including mental filters, dislike for 
ambiguity, overconfidence, confirmation bias or penchant for confirming as opposed to 
disconfirming evidence, and groupthink. When thinking about futures, having multiple 
individuals provide inputs, interpret implications and craft narratives yields improved, 
wider understanding, yet at the same time peer pressure can make individuals conform 
their cognition style to fit with the that of the organizational culture (Verity 2003, 194) 
and thus facilitate groupthink. When interpreting implications, confirmation bias is harm-
ful as it confounds rationality and limits thinking of alternative explanations while provid-
ing potentially false sense of security in one’s own interpretations. Overconfidence bias, 
or ‘hindsight bias’, describes how believing strongly in one ‘truth’ of the future decreases 
the individual’s ability to argue for other alternatives (Mackay and McKiernan 2004, 70). 
When interpreting, such a bias can make decision-makers jump to conclusions and disre-
gard analysis of effect uncertainties in favor of response uncertainties.  
Along with hindsight bias, Mackay and McKiernan (2004, 71) point out another “fore-
sightful thinking flaw”: creeping determinism. This refers to biased causal thinking of a 
chain of events that leads an individual to believe ‘it could not have gone any other way’ 
(Mackay and McKiernan 2004, 71). In other words, the individual dismisses alternative 
paths that might have emerged, or alternative ways certain events might have unfolded. 
Response-limiting path dependencies that might not actually exist are identified, or the 
relevance and rigidity of other path dependencies are overstated. Creeping determinism 
shows why narratives of the past and future are so powerful – once information is inte-
grated into a plausible narrative, it is difficult to discount the information should further 
contradictory information emerge. I suggest that while creeping determinism is particu-
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larly notable to interpreting environmental state uncertainties, the bias poses a risk to ef-
fect interpretation as well, because a misguided narrative of the future provides it with a 
weak, misleading knowledge basis. Furthermore, I suggest creeping determinism can in-
terfere with both effect interpretation and strategic decision-making by sidelining novel 
futures knowledge and interpretations. If strategic decision-making in general and driving 
change in particular requires the ability to connect the future with the present concerns 
and historical paths of the organization (Kaplan and Orlikowski 2013, 965), creeping de-
terminism excludes the imagining of alternative accounts of histories and subsequently 
hinders the organization’s ability to build cohesive narratives of the past, present and fu-
ture that could argue for new strategies and change. 
As seen above, many different organizational-cultural, psychological and emotional 
barriers along with various cognitive biases hinder successful futures knowledge inter-
pretation. If analytical interpreting and strategizing – defining effect implications and 
evaluating and defining response options – is time-constrained, managers tend to “rush 
into actions based on simplification of the complex situation and be unaware of the unin-
tended consequences of such actions” (Burt et al 2017, 23). Instead, managers should be 
more ‘disposed to openness’ (ibid., 22-23). Openness disposition “refers to the tendency 
to seek either to hold open ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty, or look for closure, 
simplification and surety when engaging in strategic conversations” (ibid., 16) and. helps 
avoid “premature rejection of options and requires a managerial mind-set that understands 
that knowledge arises out of interaction rather than on the basis of preconception and pre-
planning.” (ibid., 23). By engaging in scenario conversations, Burt et al. (2017, 23) found 
that managers become “more disposed towards holding multiple views, remaining more 
fluid about timescales and being open to multiple modes of responding to insights yielded 
by strategic dialogue with colleagues”. Of course, such conversations where interpreta-
tion also occurs and where openness disposition is cultivated, cannot take place if man-
agers do not have the necessary time to share their views! This highlights how important 
reserving the necessary time, means and attention is for successful futures thinking and 
contextualization.  
How can one mitigate the challenges posed by different organizational-cultural, psy-
chological and emotional barriers along with various cognitive biases, and cultivate an 
openness disposition? Based on a review of relevant academic literature in this and pre-
vious chapters, I suggest that practitioners can acquire and utilize several different skills 
and capabilities, which Table 5 summarizes. (Please note that the  table includes findings 




Table 5. Summary of the means and enabling capabilities of futures 
knowledge interpretation 
Ability to feed others’ curiosity  Hines 2003 
Articulation skills, storytelling  e.g. van der Heijden 2005, 
Miller 2007, Schwartz 1998 
Cognizance of stakeholder values and views   e.g. van der Heijden 2005 
Conversational skills  e.g. Burt et al 2017, Ruff 2005, 
Schwartz 1998 
Counter-factual reasoning  Mackay & McKiernan 2004 
Critical thinking and self-reflection  e.g. Henderson 2002 
Fluency in the language of colleagues  e.g. Rollwagen et al. 2008 
‘Hiding the machinery’ of foresight  Hammoud & Nash 2014 
Individual’s experience and ‘disciplined imagina-
tion’ or ‘rigorous imagining’  
Tapinos & Pyper 2018, Miller 
2007 
Natural curiosity about a broad range of issues 
and sensitivity to change  
Savage & Sales 2008, Miller 
2007 
Networking internally and externally  Ruff 2005, Peter & Jarratt 2015, 
Rollwagen et al. 2008, Hines 
2003, Rohrbeck 2010 
Openness: using multiple sources of information 
receptively, multiple concepts when developing 
ideas and sense-making, viewing situations from 
multiple perspectives and considering alternative 
action options openly   
e.g. Montuori 2000, Burt at al. 
2017 
Positioning of foresight and foresighters in organ-
izations  
Hines and Gold 2013 
Reframing to manage negative emotions and 
turning attention to opportunities  
Savage & Sales 2008 
Systems thinking  Savage and Sales 2008, 
Montuori 2000, Tapinos & 
Pyper 2018 
 
Having decision-makers engaged in structured foresight is a first step in ensuring suc-
cessful interpretation. The ability to engage decision-makers is affected among others by 
how the individuals performing interpretation are positioned in the company as foresight 
practitioners (Hines 2003, 23-24). Positioning refers to how these practitioners and their 
work are viewed by others in the organization, and what kind of approach they assume 
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when presenting futures knowledge to others. For example, they could be politically 
savvy insiders who are well-networked internally and who have evolved into futurists due 
to their own interests, or are can be ‘inside-outsiders’, employees who are curious and 
externally networked and strive to challenge thinking and mental models in the company 
(Hines 2003, 23-24). Positioning affects the tactics and means practitioners can use to 
engage their colleagues and decision-makers into futures thinking and strategic conver-
sations, as does how institutionalized foresight is in the organization and what is the fore-
sight practitioner’s ‘distance to business’ (Hines and Gold 2013, 102). Distances to busi-
ness is defined as how involved foresight practitioners are with the daily operations of the 
company, e.g. are they integrated into business units or functions with roles that demand 
a major share of their time and attention, or are they independent of line business, not 
committed to the interests of any particular unit or function (Hines and Gold 2013, 102). 
Institutionalization refers to how embedded foresight, and subsequently moments of in-
terpretation, are into the organizational structure: are they in the management’s regular 
meeting agendas, is foresight designed to feed insight into other company processes such 
as R&D and marketing, and are there employees whose role is to perform foresight and 
facilitate interpretation (Hines and Gold 2013, 102). 
In terms of engaging decision-makers to structured foresight and interpretation, I argue 
that there is no one best positioning strategy, or distance to business. Rather, context mat-
ters: While closeness to business might make practitioners experts on the substance of the 
business and the industry, in strategic conversations covering business units and functions 
beyond those where practitioners are embedded, their closeness might be considered a 
source of bias to people from other units. And while distance to business might provide 
objectivity to foresighters and facilitators, it creates a knowledge gap with the needs and 
realities of business that can particularly hurt interpretation efforts. 
To manage the dilemma of proper distance, Ruff (2015, 46) suggests practitioners who 
work inside the companies to participate in parallel foresight projects serving different 
internal customers. This way, they can maintain intellectual and professional flexibility 
and share best practices and insights across projects. While positioned as an independent 
team of experts, Ruff (2015, 46) also suggests practitioners to maintain close relationships 
with internal customers to build their industry substance expertise. Yet, the dilemma of 
proper positioning is not to say foresight should not be institutionalized in companies. As 
part of developing the dynamic capabilities required to create sustainable competitive ad-
vantage, Teece (2007, 1323) recommends embedding scanning, interpretative and crea-
tive processes  that make up foresight inside the organization, rather than relying on the 
cognitive and creative skills of a few individuals. Beyond building essential processes, 
ways of working and structures, enabling valuable foresight and interpretation in organi-
zations requires a particular culture (Rohrbeck 2011, 79-81), where individuals are both 
motivated and able to share futures knowledge internally and to listen to external sources, 
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to diffuse ideas and insights informally (ibid., 79-81). In such a culture, top management 
is curious towards the periphery of their business environment and they are willing to test 
and challenge their assumptions (ibid., 79-81). Key in building such a culture and insti-
tutionalizing foresight and interpretation is incentivization, i.e., tangible and intangible 
rewards provided by the organization to individuals that encourage and motivate futures 
thinking, environmental scanning and creative futures knowledge contextualization.  
Sandberg and Tsoukas (2014) critically review a substantial body of sense-making 
literature and list major constituents of the sense-making perspective and identify a num-
ber of situational factors that can affect sense-making either positively or negatively. 
First, the social context in which sense-making occurs “binds people to actions that they 
must justify … affects the saliency of information, and … provides the norms and expec-
tations that constrain explanations” (Weick 1995, 53). Second, language, including dis-
course, narratives, rhetoric etc. is both a tool for and a factor of sense-making. The other 
factors are the identities of individuals in organizations, cognitive frames, emotions, pol-
itics and power dynamics in the organization, and technology that is used for knowledge 
management and communication within the organization. While their review provides no 
practical insights for developing futures knowledge interpretation, it offers practitioners 
a framework for piecing together a bigger picture of various systemic factors affecting 
interpretation and its success. 
Individuals who perform foresight and interpretation successfully have certain ena-
bling meta-skills and characteristics. To be able to adjust to change, manage environmen-
tal uncertainty and thus ensure organizational resilience, organizations require ‘concep-
tually complex’ managers with sharp anticipatory and interpretive skills (Montuori 2000, 
69; Savage and Sales 2008, 28-29). Such managers use multiple sources of information 
receptively, use multiple concepts when developing ideas and sense-making, view situa-
tions from multiple perspectives and consider alternative action options openly (Montuori 
2000, 69). To build sharp anticipatory and interpretive skills, three competences should 
be developed: sensing the future, whole systems thinking, and reframing (Savage and 
Sales 2008, 28-31;  Montuori 2000, 68-69). Future-sensing requires natural curiosity 
about a broad range of issues and having constant open dialogue about ideas and strategic 
alternatives that integrates futures thinking into the organization’s method of operation 
(Savage and Sales 2008, 31). Systems thinking as a mechanism for sense-making and 
interpretation focuses the attention to understanding wholes and mutually affecting rela-
tionships between factors that make up the system instead of individual factors and can 
illuminate driving forces and their effects to the organization that might not be identified 
via causal thinking (ibid., 31; Montuori 2000, 68). Finally, leaders use reframing to man-
age negative emotions – fear, apathy and cynicism about the future and its implications – 
and turn attention and attitudes towards unperceived opportunities for innovation and ac-
tion (Savage and Sales 2008, 32). Such leaders also are strongly networked to insightful 
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individuals inside and outside the organization and this way expand their issue-broad and 
substance-deep knowledge base of their external and internal environments (Rohrbeck 
2011, 77-78).  Management’s capability for futures thinking can also be referred as fu-
tures literacy (Miller 2007). Being futures literate involves having the ability to be sensi-
tive to external change over time and to articulate explicitly one’s assumptions about 
change (how and why is it happening) and being proficient in ‘rigorous imagining’, i.e. 
being logically consistent in building futures knowledge but not letting preference and 
probability constrain the imagining of possibilities (ibid., 348). 
In addition to developing a number of meta-skills and characteristics, individuals per-
forming futures knowledge interpretation can utilize supporting means and techniques to 
improve its quality and process.  
First, interpretation benefits from dialogue and participation with others. These de-
crease bounded rationality among individuals and help create shared mental models and 
language which to use in framing and understand issues in the organizational collective 
(Chermack 2004, 304-5).  
Second, individuals should be cognizant of their dialogue partners and how they think 
and what they value. Van der Heijden (2005, 163) suggests a list of questions to consider 
when preparing to convene with decision-makers, including for example: 
• Are they analytically and quantitatively oriented? Do they come from an engi-
neering culture? Or are they intuitive and qualitative, with a background possibly 
in history, philosophy or psychology?  
• Are they optimists or anxiety ridden? 
• Are they linear or systems thinkers? Do they think in terms of events following 
each other in a sequence, or do they look for causal interlinkages?  
To a foresight practitioner, such understanding helps to reframe management thinking 
and facilitate constructive dialogue about implications of external uncertainty.  
Third, they should feed the decision-maker’s appetite for curiosity for futures 
knowledge during the dialogue, especially with decision-makers inexperienced with fu-
tures thinking (Hines 2003, 30). Here, simplifications of reality and simple foresight tools 
should be utilized initially when presenting futures knowledge and framing and reframing 
issues. Only as further follow-up questions arise and management begins to appreciate 
the complexity that the knowledge presents, more complex foresight and interpretation 
tools and approaches should be used (Hines 2003, 30).  
Fourth and final, to combat cognitive biases, namely overconfidence and creeping de-
terminism, that hinder interpretation and identification of outcomes and implications of 
uncertain factors, practitioners can use counter-factual reasoning. When engaging in 
counter-factual reasoning, individuals consider alternatives to an outcome by asking 
what-if and if-then questions, imagining both positive (comparatively better outcome) 
and negative (worse) counter-factuals to outcomes, and elaborating the reasons for their 
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views (Mackay and McKiernan 2004, 72-3). As the purpose is to prevent hindsight bias 
and creeping determinism, counter-factuals are used to “reduce the causal potency of an-
tecedents leading to an outcome” (ibid., 72) Counter-factual thinking should be deliber-
ate, self-conscious and rigorous and expose ‘comfortable, stereotyped’ thinking (ibid., 
74). Here, analogies to other past or present outcomes used for argumentation and per-
suasion are particularly useful for influencing thinking and perceptions (ibid., 74).     
2.2.3 Outcomes of futures knowledge interpretation 
In the review of existing literature, I’ve examined the theory and empirical evidence about 
interpretation as a part of foresight, sense-making and organizational learning. I’ve dis-
cussed futures knowledge interpretation both as an activity and a capability, and I’ve ex-
plored the existing literature of individual and systemic enablers and barriers to successful 
interpretation in an attempt to provide a basis for understanding the wider systemic whole 
of the activity and capability. At this point it is valuable to ask: what types of implications 
to business should managers and foresight practitioners aim to uncover through interpre-
tation, and more generally, what are the desired outcomes futures knowledge interpreta-
tion? What are the practical outcomes that managers expect to get when they ask “what 
does this mean for our business”? 
Opportunities and threats, pointed out by SWOT analyses and similar frameworks, are 
implications that constitute a possible effect on an organization and call the organization 
to action if they are deemed relevant to the organization’s objectives. Issues only become 
opportunities or threats when applied to the context of an organization, so determining 
them as such implies that their immediate effect is recognized and thus contextualization 
has occurred. For example, for a meat producer, the trend of decreasing pork consumption 
constitutes a threat to its pork sales and production. However, focusing on opportunities 
and threats alone does not allow for comprehensive understanding of the effects of 
change, because opportunities and threats by their nature imply that a response is required. 
All contextualized issues are relevant if they either have a positive or negative effect to 
an organization, since logically no effect implies no relevance, or put differently, an issue 
is meaningful for the organization. Therefore, all contextualized issues can be defined as 
opportunities, threats or, what I suggest, positives. While an issue might be seen as an 
opportunity to the organization, by definition it must be seized. This in turn implies that 
the organization must be proactive. Threats can realize themselves and their impact 
whether one acts or not. However, positives do not imply proactiveness since the benefits 
can manifest without action by the organization. For example, the increasing consumption 
of pork might present the meat producer with the opportunity to increase their revenues, 
but it also has the (quite) possible positive effect where the producer’s current levels of 
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revenue are secured in the future and taking action or revising strategy might not be nec-
essary. Yet, this positive might hide a risk to the meat producer: increasing demand might 
attract new competitors that challenge the organic business growth. Thus presumed effect, 
not need for action, is what ultimately determines the relevance of an issue for an organ-
ization, especially if action is assumed to imply a change to what the organization is, to 
its existence and how it operates.   
Interpretations of the opportunities, threats and positives for an organization provide 
understanding of the resilience of the organization and its chosen strategies. However, it 
can also provide understanding of future resilience and robustness of future strategies, 
namely by what e.g. Schwartz (1998, 192) and Ralston and Wilson (2006, 151) refer to 
as ‘rehearsing the future’ and ‘using the futures as test beds’ for strategies and strategy 
alternatives, respectively. In such cases, the effects of futures to one or many imagined 
states of the company can be speculated upon.   
Following the environmental uncertainty logic presented by Milliken (1987), in addi-
tion to effects, another type of implication that futures knowledge interpretation can pro-
vide is a response implication. Here, evaluating the relationship of strategy alternatives 
and potential futures not only provides understanding of the resilience and robustness of 
the company and/or its strategy alternatives in the future, but also of the outcomes and 
consequences of the strategies, i.e. responses, to the company itself and to the external 
macro- and micro-environment. Even though response implications are based on evalua-
tions of strategy and are not about interpreting futures knowledge per se, response impli-
cations require a context of the futures, or understanding of the futures, to be justifiable. 
In other words, strategy alternatives cannot be evaluated without futures knowledge and 
how futures influence a given alternative. In conclusion, effect and response implications 
are equally relevant in the framing of this thesis as both can be scrutinized when answer-
ing the question “what does this futures knowledge mean for our business”. 
In addition to immediate practical and tangible outcomes such as intended uses of in-
terpretation and different types of implications discussed above, should the outcomes be 
understood in other ways as well? What should managers and foresight practitioners aim 





Table 6. Outcomes of interpretation 
The products: Types of implications pro-
duced 
 
Effect implications: Opportunities, threats and 
positives; understanding of current and future 
resilience of the organization and its strategy 
e.g. Day and Schoemaker 2004, 
2005, Ralston & Wilson 2006 
Response implications: assessment of strategic 
options and their robustness  
e.g. Ralston & Wilson 2006, van 
der Heijden 2005, Lehr et al. 2017 
Outcomes and benefits  
Learning and unlearning e.g. Crossan et al. 1999, van der 
Heijden 2005, Huber 1991 
Challenged cognitive frames e.g. Day and Schoemaker 2004, 
Hines 2003 
Shared understanding e.g. Daft & Weick 1984, Crossan 
et al. 1999, Weick 1995, Ramirez 
et al. 2013 
Coalescence to one view or expanded horizons 
of many views 
Crossan et al. 1999, Weick 1995 
 
When answering this question, academic literature suggests multiple outcomes that go 
beyond the practically valuable products of interpretation. These are shown in Table 6 
above together with types of implications interpretation produces. While it should lead to 
decision-making and action, many scholars argue that its primary contributions are shared 
understandings of issues and concepts. Weick however recommends practitioners to “be 
cautious about overestimating the extent to which social sense-making means simply 
shared understanding.” (Weick 1995, 42).  Some argue that individuals should learn 
while the perform interpretation, while others suggest that its desired outcome are re-
newed mental models. Interestingly, and potentially paradoxically, there are those who 
argue that interpretation as a process should generate multiple interpretations by facili-
tating framing and reframing, even though some coherence and consensus are required 
before managers can progress to decision-making. However, could maintaining multiple 
(even contradictory) frames and interpretations of state and effect uncertainties be defined 
as consensus, or is establishing one particular shared frame and interpretation required?  
In my view, this dilemma of coherence and clarity vs. variety and ambiguity is particu-
larly salient in the context of strategizing, where the managers of a company must define 




2.2.4 Futures knowledge interpretation as an activity and a capability 
As a conclusion to this section, I define to futures knowledge interpretation primarily as 
the human activity that contextualizes futures knowledge about environmental state un-
certainty for the benefit of knowledge users (Horton 1999, 7). Futures knowledge inter-
pretation does this by creating understanding (in the literal Ackoffian sense) of effect 
uncertainties (Milliken 1987, 137; Vecchiato and Roveda 2010, 1527) as far as they are 
connected with and based upon related state uncertainties. Interpretation in the context of 
futures thinking can also be used for creating understanding of response uncertainty that 
concerns the effects and outcomes of strategic actions taken by an organization (Milliken 
1987, 137-8; Vecchiato and Roveda 2010, 1531-2). When defining interpretation more 
generally, it is about individuals linking external cues with personal cognitive structures 
(Weick 1995, 4) and translating events, giving interpretations to others, and developing 
shared understandings and conceptual schemes (Daft & Weick 1984, 286; Gioia & Chit-
tipedi 1991, 444). It is also a conscious process of learning where intuitions as products 
of individual interpretation are explained to one’s self and others (Crossan et al. 1999, 
528). 
However, is the definition of interpretation as an activity sufficient? I’ve examined the 
concept of futures knowledge interpretation from the perspectives of foresight, sense-
making and organizational learning. These all include the concept of interpretation as part 
of their processes, but these process descriptions are generally conceptual and abstract. 
The lack of comprehensive understanding of futures knowledge interpretation as a struc-
tured, practical process in existing literature poses the question: is it futile to try to de-
scribe interpretation as a formal, rigorous process, and is it simply applied intuition? Or 
should interpretation be viewed as a capability rather than activity? Would such a per-
spective yield more insights on how to interpret futures knowledge in a way that creates 
value for strategizing? And would such a perspective be more of utility when investigat-
ing how to improve interpretation in companies? 
The capability perspective in corporate management and strategy development has 
been extensively discussed in the field of management theory. It emerged from the re-
source-based view of companies and their competitive advantage (e.g. Barney 1991), and 
gained further recognition from the concept of corporate core competences (e.g. Hamel 
and Prahalad 1994) and the learning and emergent schools of strategic thought (e.g. Quinn 
1980 and Mintzberg et al. 1998, 189). The capability perspective is used to understand 
how companies utilize and manage their assets to their benefit, such as to grow, compete 
or maintain resilience. When companies operate in dynamic markets, where technologies 
rapidly change and the behavior of stakeholders is volatile, they require particular capa-
bilities to maintain their competitiveness, called dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997, 
1319). These are the capacities “(1) to sense and shape opportunities and threats, (2) to 
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seize opportunities, and (3) to maintain competitiveness through enhancing, combining, 
protecting, and, when necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s intangible and 
tangible assets” (Teece 2007, 1319).  Because foresight by its definition is integral for 
sensing and shaping opportunities and threats and it enhances and combines an intangible 
asset, knowledge about futures, to sustain an organization’s competitive advantage, it is 
unsurprising that many academics and practitioners of the field have referred to foresight 
as a capability (see e.g. Rohrbeck 2011, 2012, Rhisiart, Miller & Brooks 2015, Järvi 
2019). Therefore, interpretation itself could be viewed as an aspect of a dynamic capabil-
ity, or a capability. My review of existing theory around foresight, sense-making and or-
ganizational learning has provided insights about skills, practices and capabilities around 
successful futures interpretation. What then specifically constitutes the capability to in-
terpret futures knowledge? What are the ‘building blocks’ of a capability to contextualize 
effects of state uncertainties and assess implications of strategic responses?   
Based on review of existing theories and empirical research on necessary individual 
capabilities to enable futures knowledge interpretation (see chapter 2.2.2.3), I define the 
futures knowledge interpretation capability as a combination of the abilities to imagine, 
think critically, reason causally and think in systems. It is the capability to imagine and 
identify and gauge the interconnections of factors, and articulate the relationship of inter-
connected factors to the company and its strategic choices and communicate them in a 
way that facilitates in turn the imagination, critical thinking, causal reasoning and systems 
thinking of others. Imagination and systems thinking are required for intuition, creativity 
and making novel connections between concepts. Critical thinking both creates the ur-
gency to be curious, creative and motivated to interpret and renew own assumptions, be-
liefs and cognitive frames and as a practice enables interpretation and renewal. Causal 
reasoning is required to building logical narratives of how implications emerge and re-
sponses can unfold and for sense-giving, i.e. reframing, influencing and constructing co-
herence among individuals.   
2.3 Strategizing 
Corporate strategizing or strategy making provides the context in which I study the activ-
ity and capability of futures knowledge interpretation. While the (positive) impact of fore-
sight to strategic decision-making has been widely studied (see e.g. Rohrbeck 2012, Vec-
chiato 2015, Ruff 2015, Rohrbeck and Kum 2018), I am interested in the opposite: how 
strategizing determines and affects futures interpretation through scoping, requirements 
and by its way of manifestation. In the following literature review I first discuss defini-
tions of corporate strategy and strategizing, and then move on to examining the relation-
ship between futures knowledge interpretation and strategizing and futures knowledge 
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and strategy. When strategizing provides a context in which futures interpretation occurs, 
questions of how does strategizing affect futures interpretation and what should interpre-
tation take into consideration to be valuable for strategizing arise, and I intend to explore 
these. 
2.3.1 Definition of corporate strategy 
It is no small task to try to exhaustively define what is strategy in the corporate context, 
and it is not in the scope of this thesis to attempt it. However, I pursue to understand 
different theoretic conceptualizations of corporate strategy and the act of making corpo-
rate strategy to conclude on a working definition of strategy and strategizing that I can 
operationalize in the empirical section of this thesis. My aim is also to find out if the 
different definitions set differing demands on foresight in general and futures knowledge 
interpretation in particular. In other words, if my aim is to explore futures knowledge 
interpretation in the context of corporate strategizing, I have to ask do the different ways 
and approaches to strategy and strategy making affect interpretation differently, or require 
different means and approaches of interpreting futures knowledge. If yes, the act of fu-
tures knowledge interpretation and the practice of interpretation capability should then 
take them into close account. 
Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998) provide an in-depth overview of major  
schools of thought that have defined Western-led strategy management since the end of 
World War II. Each of the ten schools offer a different, if not fully unique, perspective 
into strategy formation. Mintzberg et al. analyze each according to their root dimensions 
(e.g. their sources, base disciplines and intended and realized messages), basic process 
characteristics, and how they view change and the nature of strategy. The schools of 
thought Mintzberg et al. discuss are what they call design, planning, positioning, entre-
preneurial, cognitive, learning, power, cultural, environmental and configuration schools. 
They describe the first three as being more focused on how strategy should be formulated, 
whereas the next six are more concerned with how strategy is formulated in reality. The 
tenth, configuration, is school that integrates many aspects of all the other schools and 
views strategy formation as transformation, where the strategy formation process takes 
whatever form is most suitable for the lifecycle of the company in question. French (2009) 
also reviews the main approaches to business strategy making, pointing out seven differ-
ent schools, but classifies them into three groups according to their epistemological par-
adigms: to him, planning, design, positioning, resource-based and contingency have mod-
ernist epistemologies, whereas learning school has post-modernist and the emergence 
school has critical epistemologies.  The variety of strategy schools illustrated by 
Mintzberg et al. and French indicates that strategy, neither as a concept, or as an activity, 
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has no single clear definition. For example, Mintzberg et al. (1998) list how strategy has 
been seen as a plan, pattern, position, perspective and ploy.  
While I do not aim to apply any specific school of strategy formation or strategic think-
ing as a context for studying futures knowledge interpretation, but aim to conceptualize 
and study strategy-making in various real-life cases, it is necessary to try to identify some 
core characteristics of strategy formation. These are characteristics that I view to be com-
mon to all schools or that can be used to define strategy in all different real-life cases. 
First, Rumelt (1979, 196) argues that the focus of strategy is on the relationship between 
a firm and its external environment. Here, the strategy resolves the relationship by finding 
a fit between them (e.g. Wilson 2000, 28-9; Battistella & De Toni 2011, 1029-30; Lehr 
et al. 2017, 214). Second, strategy involves not only change, but also reproduction and 
maintenance (Jarzabkowski 2005, 5). Third and last, Chandler (1962) describes strategy 
as the outcome of intentional behavior: as the determination of the goals and objectives 
of a company, selection of actions  to reach said goals and objectives, and the allocation 
of resources required for carrying out the actions. Similarly, direction setting for a com-
pany, resource allocation, and monitoring and control of organizational action are what 
Jarzabkowski (2005, 47) calls conventions of strategy or rules and guidelines for formu-
lating and implementing strategy. Strategy is reduced to formulation and implementation 
also by Eisenhardt (1999, 65) who, quoting the Economist, sees strategy as strategic de-
cision-making, answering the organization’s questions of “where do we want to go” and 
“how do we get there”. While some strategy schools such as emergence might deny the 
intent in strategy formation and downplay the significance of direction and goal setting, 
and learning schools might deny the linearity of strategy making such definitions imply, 
these characteristics are specific yet general enough, thus actionable, when scoping the 
concept of strategy for my purposes.   
Having established a working definition of strategy for the use of the empirical study, 
the question remains: do the different schools pose differing demands for foresight in 
general and futures knowledge interpretation in particular?  
2.3.2  Strategy, foresight and futures knowledge interpretation 
Do different conceptualizations of strategy demand different logics or approaches to fu-
tures knowledge interpretation? Discussion in the field of corporate strategy seems to 
show that the questions boil down to two: can one perform foresight as part of strategy 
formation and should one do it.  
Literature provides multiple potential reasons why adopt futures thinking as part of 
strategy making. For example, scrutinizing possible future opportunities allows firms to 
gain first-mover advantage should they attempt it (Vecchiato 2015) and to develop blue 
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ocean strategies and foresee and innovate markets where no competition exists (Kim & 
Mauborgne 2005). Companies should become ‘strategically agile and practice ‘strategic 
sensitivity’ that involves anticipating change together with experimenting, using futures 
knowledge to gain perspective to one’s own business and constantly engaging in dialogue 
about the need for strategic renewal (Doz and Kosonen 2010). Furthermore, futures 
knowledge interpretation contributes to effective strategic decision-making: better inter-
pretation capability develops collective intuition among management teams that in turn 
enhances their ability to see opportunities and threats sooner and more accurately (Eisen-
hardt 1999, 72). Investment in futures thinking as part of strategy making can also help 
by stimulating strategic creativity and innovation (Peter & Jarratt 2015, 57), providing 
triggers that require response by the company, assisting in identifying new resources and 
promoting strategic discussions that can lead to strategic changes (Rohrbeck 2012, 443).  
In addition, futures thinking as part of strategic decision making is shown to overcome 
cognitive biases. For example, based on empirical evidence, Hillman et al. (2018, 482) 
argue that scenario thinking mitigates the managerial bias of overt focus on positive de-
velopments and dismissal of negative possibilities. In addition, when engaging in shared 
sense-making of futures possibilities, people reduce their perceived uncertainty of the 
future (ibid., 483) However, Bukszar (1999, 107) claims that inherent biases in futures 
thinking decrease the perceived uncertainty of the environment more than what its actual 
uncertainty is, and argues that by emphasizing the role of foresight in strategizing, the 
role of flexibility and adaptability is overlooked. Thus, he promotes strategy as a “balance 
between foresight and flexibility” (ibid, 105).  
However, if adaptability and flexibility are prioritized instead, and executives under-
stand strategy-making more as emergence and retrospective learning rather than planning, 
design and positioning, do such executives have a role for foresight and futures 
knowledge interpretation? The design and positioning schools view environment as 
something to be analyzed and objectively understood in order to determine how to create 
competitive advantage, while the learning and emergence schools view the external en-
vironment with an inside-out perspective where the environment can be socially con-
structed and reinterpreted and the future can be created (McKiernan 2006, 10,13). This 
difference in perception of the external environment naturally reflects in the role of fore-
sight and the underlying purposes for its use: the emergence school downplays anticipa-
tion of environmental implications, emphasizing reaction and reality construction instead. 
The emergent school emphasizes how learning through action produces the (winning) 
strategy instead, or at least is the method for developing strategic thinking that leads to 
best outcomes. In other words, trial and error leads to learning which leads to success, 
making the strategy ‘emerge’ from practice. Foresight from the outset seems more suita-
ble for the planning/positioning schools of strategizing, because foresight is not necessary 
for emergence. Quite the contrary, foresight is unhelpful, even harmful if it uses resources 
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required elsewhere, and its role is questionable. Here, foresight, as far it pertains to at-
tempts at planning and forecasting, should not be performed. It is useful only as far as it 
helps the desired future to emerge.  
However, while planning and positioning schools can be criticized for inflexibility and 
overt reliance to plans and intentions that rarely become reality, emergence and learning 
schools have their own points of critique. For example, “[the emergence view of strategy] 
does not address why managers select some experiments or directions over others, when 
the tactics might work and when they might not, or how managers decide what other 
tactics might be useful” (Kaplan & Orlikowski 2013, 991). Fidler (2011, 541) argues if a 
company accrues talent and strategizes on the basis of what it has experienced and learned 
alone, there is “no inherent capacity for foresight build into the system” . While he calls 
utilizing hindsight as insights for future action laudable, he also points out focus on this 
makes the firm vulnerable to discontinuous change where past learnings are made useless 
(ibid., 541). I can point out other challenges of the emergence approach as well: How 
does a company practicing emergent strategizing ensure a cohesive strategy emerges? 
What if experiments and reactions do not lead to sustained high business performance, 
and resources run out? And what if a collective process of emergence produces unwanted 
or even destructive outcomes?    
Still, in real life practice, I argue that strategy making often strikes a balance between 
different approaches and schools. Mintzberg et al. (1998, 367) admit that “every strategy 
process must combine various aspects of the different schools” . Other scholars agree and 
present ideas how to achieve a balance: Similarly to Bukzsar’s (1999, 106) recommenda-
tion of ‘balance between foresight and flexibility’, Cunha et al. (2006) present a mode of 
foresight called ‘planned emergence’ that assumes companies can “combine high levels 
of flexibility with structure necessary to avoid chaos” (ibid., 948). Hamel and Prahalad 
(1989), discussing the success of Japanese manufacturers in their competition versus US 
manufacturers in the 1980s, argue that companies should determine their strategic intents 
but at the same time keep their strategies, i.e. means, flexible.  Finally, Meissner and Wulf 
(2015) propose the ‘strategic scenario approach’ as a practical example of the role of 
foresight, when integrated into linear strategizing, shows how to combine the planning 
and environmental schools of strategy and embed increased flexibility into strategies. 
These examples are blends of the thinking of emergent and non-emergent schools. In such 
strategy making contexts, futures knowledge is created and interpreted through a mixture 
of low-cost probes into the future, using strategic alliances with partners and clients, fu-
turists and other experts, frequent internal meetings and launching experimental products 
(Brown & Eisenhardt 1997, 16-21). Thus, I argue futures knowledge creation and inter-
pretation as part of strategizing are both induction and deduction: both direct, hands-on 
experience based learning and indirect, cognition-based imagining. Ultimately, futures 
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knowledge and its interpretation provide the significant content for planning based ap-
proaches to strategizing, while inspiring learning and providing direction and coherence 
for emergence.  
2.3.3 Strategizing and futures knowledge interpretation 
After establishing the main characteristics of strategy and discussing the role of foresight 
and futures knowledge interpretation with strategy and strategic thinking, I turn to strate-
gizing, strategy making and strategy as activity. Given that I focus on futures knowledge 
interpretation as an activity, to relate it with strategy, strategy making and strategizing I 
have to conceptualize them as activities as well.  Here, Jarzabkowski (2005, 3) proposes 
strategy to be viewed as practice, by focusing on human action and how strategists “think, 
talk, reflect, act, interact, emote, embellish and politicize, what tools and technologies 
they use, and the implications of different forms of strategizing for strategy as organiza-
tional activity” (ibid., 3). To her, strategy is an activity that is context-specific and diffi-
cult to generalize and arises from the actions and interaction of people at many levels, not 
only by or among top management. Viewing strategy as practice can settle many key 
contradictions of different schools of strategy if strategy is understood as “a flow of or-
ganizational activity that incorporates content and process, intent and emergence, think-
ing and acting - - as reciprocal, intertwined, and frequently indistinguishable parts of the 
whole” (ibid., 8). 
What role does foresight and futures knowledge interpretation have in strategizing, 
when the latter is viewed specifically as human action and as a flow of organizational 
activity? While Jarzabkowski (2005) does not articulate their relationship, a study of tem-
poral work in strategy making by Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013) offers a perspective. In 
their study, they discuss “how do managers negotiate and resolve differences in interpre-
tations of the past, present, and future to make strategy” (ibid., 968). Based on their find-
ings, they argue that managers “could not enact new visions for the future without con-
structing strategic accounts that articulated how such futures connected meaningfully to 
a history of the company and to current internal and external pressures. This process in-
variably comprised not only reimagining the future but rethinking the past and reconsid-
ering present concerns” (ibid., 966, italics added). They view these as a set of practices 
and call them ‘temporal work’. In addition to reimagining, it requires negotiation and 
tension resolution among individuals and their interpretations of past events, present 
stakes and future possibilities (ibid., 978). Strategic accounts, even provisional, are nec-
essary for decisions and action, and they are settled upon by linking “interpretations of 
the past, present, and future in ways that appear coherent, plausible, and acceptable” 
(ibid., 965). Settled upon does not infer consensus, rather, accounts are stable enough to 
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allow for definitive action while remaining open to later reinterpretation (ibid., 978). 
Kaplan and Orlikowski highlight the role of influencing in temporal work when they re-
port that strategic accounts of interpretations are achieved only through skilled action 
involving mobilization of collective action and convincing others about a particular artic-
ulation of temporal interpretations (ibid., 980). Thus, as a part of strategic decision-mak-
ing and driving action, not only does interpretation of future knowledge involve imagin-
ing and elucidating future possibilities and influencing the interpretations of others, it 
concerns the interpretations of the past and the present, and arguably, not only those of 
the company but also the relevant external environment. Role of futures knowledge in-
terpretation is therefore central in both strategy making and its enactment. 
If futures knowledge interpretation has distinct core characteristics, is there a process 
or flow of interpretation describing how it happens and specifically how it integrates with 
strategic decision-making in practice? As interpretation is on-going and iterative by na-
ture, I consider depicting it as a linear process as impractical. Combining the levels of 
perceived environmental uncertainty proposed by Milliken (1987) with the general defi-
nition of strategy this thesis uses (Rumelt 1979, Chandler 1962, Eisenhardt 1999) pro-
vides a foundation for illustrating the flow of interpretation and its connection with strate-
gizing. The model I construct for this purpose is cyclical, illustrating the on-going and 
iterative nature of both interpreting and strategizing and it has no single starting point: 
interpreting as part of strategizing can begin from either futures or business contexts, and 
at each step, interpretations from other steps can be revisited and reimagined. However, 
the flow follows a line of reasoning with a clear direction, where interpretations are made 
in a way that promotes logical thinking, objectivity and deliberation. The model is visible 





Figure 2. Flow of futures knowledge interpretation as part of strategizing 
 
In the flow, interpretation can begin from the futures context or the business context. In 
the model, “what is happening” illustrates the interpretation of state uncertainty, or un-
certainty related to macro- and micro-environmental factors, their path dependencies, cur-
rent states and possible futures. This represents the futures context. Effect interpretation, 
i.e. posing the question “what does the state uncertainty mean for us” and arriving to the 
answer(s) about the implications, follows the state uncertainty interpretations.  Effect in-
terpretations should then inform the question “what can we do”, where answering the 
question provides the strategy alternatives, whether these concern objectives and vision, 
action options or resource allocations. This represent the business context as a starting 
point for futures knowledge interpretation. In an emergence school fashion, a company 
can choose to dismiss state and effect interpretations and step into the flow here by imag-
ining desired futures for itself. Whatever the approach, discussion of the options, even if 
it is superficial, should then flow into response interpretations, where (future) outcomes 
of alternatives are assessed and compared with or without the support of a futures context 
(e.g. a scenario of the micro or macro environment) and the strategists ask “what should 
we do” and make the final strategic decisions. These decisions have intended and unin-
tended outcomes and effects in the macro and micro-environments, and thus the flow 
links back to the act of interpreting state uncertainties. For emergent strategic thinking, 
this loop also illustrates how organizations can learn by doing and experimenting. This 
conceptualization aims to combine the activity of futures knowledge interpretation with 
the main, generic components of strategy and the activity of strategizing. Critical is the 
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direction of the flow and how understanding of different types of uncertainty informs and 
reasons strategy-making in a specific, logical order. I examine how the reality of futures 
knowledge interpretation in practice applies and affects the flow in chapter 4.4.2.       
In conclusion, for the purposes of this thesis, I loosely define Strategy as decision or 
decisions about the company’s objectives, actions to reach the objectives and how it al-
locates organizational resources across a range of options (Chandler 1962) that involve 
change, reproduction and maintenance (Jarzabkowski 2005, 5) and are focused on the 
relationship of the firm, its environment and the fit between them (Rumelt 1979, 196; 
Wilson 2000, 28-9; Battistella & De Toni 2011, 1029-30; Lehr et al. 2017, 214). Strate-
gizing is the flow of human activity in organizations of making strategy (Jarzabkowski 
2005, 7), where decisions require strategic accounts based upon interpretations of the fu-
tures, present and past of the company and its environment (Kaplan and Orlikowski 2013, 
965).  
Also, in this chapter I posed the question of do different conceptualizations of strategy 
demand different logics or approaches to futures knowledge interpretation. While the 
choice of strategic school or perspective to strategy and strategy making might increase 
or temper managers’ willingness to utilize foresight as part of strategy making, I claim it 
does not affect the mechanisms or practice of futures knowledge interpretation itself: stra-
tegic decision-making requires settled upon strategic accounts, built using interpretations 
of the future, present and past. However, different approaches impact the purpose and 
objectives of both foresight and interpretation: strategizing involving ‘problem-solving’ 
has different types and levels of strategic questions (e.g. should we enter the new market 
next year) than strategizing involving ‘problem-finding’ (e.g. what drives our business 
success in the next five years). Of course, the choice of approach also determines whether 
they are done at all. 
2.4 Key definitions and summary 
The literature review has produced definitions for the key concepts of the thesis. In this 
thesis, I define futures knowledge as an input and organizational resource, and knowledge 
of justified contingent plausibilities (Dufva & Ahlqvist 2015b, 252) that exists as a cluster 
of connected concepts about environmental factors ((Dufva 2015, 13; Dufva & Ahlqvist 
2015b, 252; Tapinos and Pyper 2018, 296-7). It manifests as tacit, explicit and self-trans-
cending types of knowledge (Nonaka 1991, 165; Uotila and Melkas 2007, 1120). Because 
future cannot be known, it is knowledge about uncertainty. In the organizational context, 
particularly relevant futures knowledge concerns environmental uncertainty, especially 
so-called ‘state’ uncertainty (Milliken 1987). Subsequently, I define futures knowledge 
interpretation as the activity that contextualizes futures knowledge of environmental state 
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uncertainty for the benefit of knowledge users (Horton 1999, 7). Interpretation does this 
by creating understanding (in the literal Ackoffian sense) of effect and response uncer-
tainties (Milliken 1987; Vecchiato and Roveda 2010, 1531) as far as they are connected 
with and based upon related state uncertainties. In synthesis, I define futures knowledge 
interpretation, when applied for strategizing, as contextualization of perceived state un-
certainties and imagining effect and response uncertainties that are systems of concepts. 
It is both an act of sense-making and sense-giving (Gioia and Chittipedi 1991, 446).  It is 
an integral element of the generation of shared understandings (Daft and Weick 1984, 
286) - strategic accounts – of future uncertainties, present conditions and past trajectories 
that occurs as part of an organization’s temporal work during strategy making (Kaplan 
and Orlikowski 2013, 965).  
By putting together the literature review and key concepts of the thesis, I propose a 
theoretical model, if not a comprehensive theoretical framework, that presents futures 
knowledge both as an activity and capability in the context of corporate strategy making. 
In this model, the central elements are the core characteristics of futures knowledge in-
terpretation and the means – frameworks, tools and techniques – necessary for practicing 
interpretation. Around them are the both the purpose, intended uses and the actual out-
comes of futures knowledge interpretation, the systemic factors that either enable or hin-
der it, and the meta-capabilities required to practice it successfully. Futures knowledge is 
included in the model as an input for interpretation activity, while corporate strategizing 
provides the organizational context for the activity itself. The model (Figure 3) is illus-
trated below and it provides a starting point for the empirical half of the thesis. 
 
Figure 3. Summary of literature review: Understanding futures knowledge in-
ter-pretation: a model of an activity and a capability 
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The literature review of fields of foresight, sense-making and organizational learning re-
veals that the theory and empirical evidence around futures knowledge interpretation is 
fragmented and has gaps in understanding the practice in detail from the perspective of 
individuals. The following section covers how I aimed to help overcome these gaps and 
challenges. I begin with the articulation of the purpose, objectives and research questions 
of the thesis. I then discuss the research aim and methods, present the analysis strategy 
and discuss the quality and limitations of the research. 
3.1 Purpose, objective and research questions of the thesis 
In my research, my purpose was to explore and describe the behavior and reasons behind 
the behavior of foresight practitioners as they respond to their colleagues’ question “what 
does this futures knowledge mean for us and our organization” and “how should we act 
accordingly”. By doing so, I strove to provide new understanding of how practitioners 
interpret futures knowledge for their colleagues’ use as the make strategy. I scoped ‘use’ 
to consist of the context of strategizing or strategy making, and ‘strategy’ to cover any 
type such as business, corporate, marketing, supply chain, customer or brand strategies, 
or any school such as positioning or emergent. As  interpretation is participatory and not 
a matter of linear sense-making and sense-giving, thus the foresight users, ‘colleagues’ 
of practitioners, can be involved in the interpretation. Ultimately, I strove to use the em-
pirical study together with the literature review to provide an initial exploratory model 
for understanding, performing and succeeding in futures knowledge interpretation that is 
practically relevant and helpful for both foresight practitioners and managers as they 
strategize.  
The main research question of the thesis was how foresight practitioners interpret fu-
tures knowledge for the use of strategizing.   
However, there is value in understanding the reasons why interpretation occurs as it 
does. To explore these, I posed the following sub-questions 
1. How is successful interpretation defined (in terms e.g. of its purpose, content, 
process & means, quality, utility, impact) and why? 
2. What individual and structural characteristics and capabilities support or hinder 
interpretation and its success, and why? 
3. Ideally, how should interpretation happen according to practitioners themselves? 
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Sub-question 1 explored the purpose and measurement of interpretation from the per-
spective of practitioners themselves and the customers of their futures knowledge and 
interpretations. 
Sub-question 2 explored the different personal and structural factors that might play a 
role in the interpretation activities and their success. In addition, it uncovered reasons 
why interpretation in practice takes the forms it does. 
Sub-question 3 built upon the main question and previous three sub-questions. Its pur-
pose was to uncover insights about interpretation that the previous sub-questions have not 
been able to do through means of comparison. 
My research plan gave secondary attention to the topic of content of interpretation. 
This is because the exact nature of the content – futures knowledge – is confidential due 
to its strategic importance or to being part of customer projects and thus is not shared 
even if data is reported anonymously by external 2nd or 3rd party researchers. Where in-
formation about what specifically is being interpreted was shared by research participants, 
I took it into account, but I did not investigate it in any structured way. Ultimately, given 
the gaps in current theoretical understanding, it was my view that how interpretation oc-
curs and what affects it was is more essential to be scrutinized than what is interpreted. 
3.2 Research method and data collection 
My thesis utilized a qualitative, exploratory research method, primarily because my aim 
was to understand the behavior of foresight practitioners and the reasons behind the be-
havior. Due to the nature of the research questions, the depth and breadth of information 
required to answer them and lack of existing holistic, tested and applied theoretical frame-
works, a quantitative research method was not sufficient nor suitable for this study, even 
if it would have included mostly open-ended questions. Such method would have to be 
supported by some pre-defined variables that describe and structure the researched be-
havior and its antecedents and affecting factors. Instead, the thesis had the so-called 
grounded approach that allows for theories and issues to emerge from the research itself 
(Fisher 2010, 63). Furthermore, to maintain theoretical flexibility, I did not have initial 
hypotheses or theoretical or conceptual models that I tried to deductively prove or dis-
prove or test in a real-life context. (The model of futures knowledge interpretation as an 
activity, presented in the previous section, served rather as a summary of the literature 
review and also a source of inspiration for the empirical half of the thesis.) The results 
were allowed to generate new evidence for the assumptions and posits of previously pre-
sented theories or challenge them.   
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Even though this thesis was an open-ended exploration of a phenomenon of human 
behavior, how it occurs, and the different reasons behind it, it was not purely an interpre-
tative research, i.e. one that discounts objectivity and notions of objective reality alto-
gether (Fisher 2010, 58-60). While I adhered to views of pluralism and complexity and 
agreed that a phenomenon can have multiple interpretations, my purpose was not only to 
dissect and compare interpretations, but rather to construct a kind of holistic interpretation 
from the different views that is useful to readers and practitioners as they pursue to reflect 
upon, understand and develop their own behavior. I had this goal despite having a limited 
data set and recognizing that my own subjectivity will compromise the thesis’s objectiv-
ity. It should be noted that my attempt at objectivity here was not a stepping stone to 
reductionism, rather, it was about aggregating different views into a fuller image of reality 
that incorporates multiple, mutually complementary views. Arguably, some reduction 
was bound to happen. In a realist sense of research that strives for verifiability and gen-
eralizability of theories (Fisher 2010, 50-2), I aimed to provide results – though subjective 
and limited - that could be inductively generalized and whose prevalence could be quan-
titatively tested in later studies. Thus in summary, the methodological background of my 
thesis can be best described as a mixture of realist and interpretative research, the former 
due to its strategic objective of equipping practitioners with useful, potentially general-
izable tools, and the latter due to its chosen data gathering and analysis methods. It ap-
preciated a nominalist perspective, which might view objects as real and existing in real-
ity, but considered their interpretations – how they are understood and defined – as so-
cially constructed (Fisher 2010, 257). At the same time, my thesis examined whether or 
not a shared understanding of its unit of analysis, the behavior and capability of how 
foresight practitioners contextualize futures knowledge for the benefit of corporate strate-
gizing, exists, and if yes, what it is.  
For data collection, the study included ten qualitative, semi-structured interviews with  
organizational analysts/futurists and external consultants who have more than five years 
of experience in strategic foresight and futures interpretation. I chose this approach for a 
number of reasons: First, given that the study focuses on the behavior and expertise of 
practitioners, interviews provide me the opportunity to create rapport with them and 
spend necessary time to explore the topic together with the experts. Second, experts of 
the practice, given that they are the object of analysis of the study, can be expected to 
provide data of utmost relevance for the study and its questions.  Third, the face-to-face 
qualitative interview method better allows for in-depth discussions and exploration com-
pared to quantitative surveys, where the responses are limited by how respondents inter-
pret the intention of the questions and cannot be iterated or supplemented with additional 
comments. Fourth, due my personal time and resource constraints, performing  observa-
tional research, e.g. a longitudinal study, such as using ethnographic or action research 
methods, was not viable, though such a method could have e.g. alleviated the bias and 
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subjectivity problems of interviewee commentary that can compromise data accuracy and 
especially its reliability. Last, as the study did not build upon a pre-defined research 
framework or theory, I opted to a semi-structured interview method to allow for flexibility 
in data gathering instead of using a structured survey or interview design.  
My intention was to increase both data accuracy and reliability with the number of 
interviews so that the study does not rely on only a few experts. I estimated that ten inter-
views  were necessary for reaching data saturation, where researchers identify that having 
further interviews would not produce new valuable evidence. However, I adapted a type 
of Delphi research principle, where same experts are interviewed twice or more to co-
develop the findings iteratively. Here, eight of the ten first round interviews were com-
plemented with a second round of meetings, where I presented the initial findings to the 
interviewee and they had the opportunity to validate and build upon their earlier com-
ments and responses, thus increasing the accuracy of the data. As a result, the number of 
discussions totaled eighteen. Also, the limit of three years of personal experience was set 
to ensure the participants have necessary experience to provide insightful commentary. 
For time and resources purposes, the study did not include the commentary of corporate 
managers, who could’ve provided complementary insights about how interpretation by 
futurists occurs and what makes ‘valuable’ or ‘useful’ futures knowledge interpretation. 
For the first-round interviews, I provided the interviewees with the main research ques-
tions and definitions of each key terms in advance. Each interview lasted between 45 and 
90 minutes and was supported by an interview guide (see Appendix 1) and visualization 
aids (pen and empty paper for the interviewee, and flip charts wherever they were avail-
able). The interview guide included six main questions that were all presented to inter-
viewees, and several topics and viewpoints derived from existing literature that were pre-
sented as stimulating or follow-up questions whenever necessary. However, the aim of 
the interviews was to probe into the behavioral and cognitive processes of the respondents 
in-depth and let answers to ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions emerge un-structurally and 
naturally. 
 I sought the interviewees from Finnish and international companies that perform fore-
sight as part of their strategic decision-making processes using my own professional con-
nections and LinkedIn social platform. To manage the bias of my own background, the 
search also benefited from snow-balling, where interviewees themselves suggested addi-
tional interviewees for the study. 
I conducted the face-to-face interviews between December 2019 and February 2020, 
in Finnish, and recorded them per the interviewees’ agreement (one interviewee denied 
the permission for recording). The interviews in total lasted for 680 minutes and produced 
roughly 90 pages of transcriptions. To allow for open discussion, I handled the data from 
interviews anonymously, therefore each interviewee is identified in the analysis by their 
gender, title, role as an internal practitioner or external consultant, type of industry their 
66 
company operates in, years of experience in foresight, and the length of the interviewee 
Table 7). It should be noted that I engaged as a consultant working for one of the inter-
viewees, the Head of Capability Development, in the summer and autumn of 2019. This 
project included foresight creation and interpretation, and while documents or results 
from the project are not part of this analysis, the analysis still benefited from the shared 
experience of me and the interviewee: I was familiar with the real life cases the inter-
viewee used to illustrate his points, the management practices of the company, the results 
of the project, and some of the managers who had engaged in futures knowledge inter-
pretation in said project.    
 
Table 7. Interviewees of the study 






Male Research  
Scientist 
External Research and in-
novation services 
10+ 1h 20min 




5+ 1h 31min 
Female Foresight  
consultant 
External Strategy, design, 
and technology 
services 
5+ 1h 19min 
Female HR Manager Internal Motion and con-
trol technologies  
5+ 59min 
Male Head of Strate-
gic Foresight 
External Business design 
services 
20+ 52min 




Male Head of Capa-
bility Develop-
ment 
Internal Construction 5+ 1h 
Male Information 
Specialist 
Internal Insurance 15+ 50min 
Female Head of  
Strategy 
External Business and ser-
vice design ser-
vices  
15+ 1h 14min 
Female Partner, Lead 
Business  
Designer 
External Business and mar-
keting consulting 
13+ 1h 30min 
3.3 Data analysis 
The analysis considered results from different interviewees as one cumulative set. I did 
no quantitative analysis, nor did I regard the interviewees as cases that could be analyzed 
individually or comparatively. My strategy was instead to construct a logical, evidence-
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based narrative that provided answers to the questions posed by the research plan. In this 
setting, I pooled together individual interviews to represent an equivocal image of the 
perceptions, beliefs and experiences of foresight practitioners. In such an analysis ap-
proach, individual interviewees are only visible when they illuminate a certain topic or 
perspective or provide a case example. Despite aiming to provide a full if equivocal nar-
rative of the results, wherever there emerged noteworthy contradictions and points of dis-
agreement among the views of interviewees, I highlighted and discussed these. Points of 
disagreement and issues where multiple, complementary or contradictory views were pre-
sented also offered me fruitful opportunities to speculate on the “mechanisms” or causes 
(Fisher 2010, 261) affecting the perceptions, experiences and behaviors of different prac-
titioners.      
After the first round of interviews had taken place, I transcribed the commentary of 
the interviewees and cleaned it of filler words, so that all I could review and code com-
ments of significance. From the 680 minutes of first-round interviews, I ultimately coded 
almost 400 ‘datapoints’: comments, quotes and insights that provided the basis of the 
analysis. I organized the data into main areas according to the research questions of the 
study and the model of futures knowledge interpretation that I had built based on existing 
theory and empirical evidence. Inside these areas, I grouped the data further into themes 
that had emerged organically, e.g. by grouping together multiple comments from different 
experts that covered the same topic or represented a similar point-of-view. Given how the 
nature of the research was exploratory, the organic emergence of themes was both natural 
and fruitful  The second round of meetings with interviewees aimed to validate the initial 
insights and increase the robustness of the findings and conclusions. Interviewees could 
elaborate on their own comments that the analysis has raised as noteworthy and provide 
input on the general insights and comments of other practitioners. I did not record their 
additional commentary, but I took notes and adjusted the initial analysis and conclusions 
accordingly.   
3.4 Quality of the research 
3.4.1 Quality considerations 
Quality in qualitative research is assessed especially by looking at the validity of the re-
search. As my thesis used exploratory methods, the notion of construct validity, i.e. en-
suring the research can actually measure what it tries to measure, is not relevant in the 
specific quantitative sense: the research did not aim to measure its units of analysis. How-
ever, the analysis must still evaluate whether or not the concepts, terms and constructs I 
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presented to the interviewees were understood and perceived in a way the researcher in-
tended, in other words, that the interviewees have actually provided commentary during 
the interviews that illustrates the researched concepts and behavior, and not something 
else. This evaluation can be done post facto, as the recordings of the interviews are re-
viewed, and data is managed and grouped for further analysis.     
Being partly realist in nature, my research must consider its internal validity. As Fisher 
points out, “internal validity is concerned with whether the evidence presented justifies 
the claims of cause and effect” (Fisher 2010, 273). I could not use statistical means to 
prove the credibility and significance of causal relationships, but I instead intended to use 
logical argumentation and systems analysis principles to gauge the effect and systemic 
relationships between the concepts and factors that my study examined.  
In addition to construct and internal validity, the thesis must consider population va-
lidity, or transferability, as part of its quality. “Transferability questions whether the gen-
eralizations or interpretations that a researcher has proved in a particular context apply 
equally well to other populations or other contexts” (Fisher 2010, 274). I defined the main 
research “population” or unit of analysis rather loosely, as corporate professionals in-
volved or responsible for foresight contextualization in companies as they strategize, and 
this provided both benefits and challenges to generalizability. In one hand, loosely de-
fined populations allow for investigating a wide group of individuals, making the results 
potentially relevant and personally applicable to a wide ‘user’ audience or wider base of 
‘use cases’. On the other hand, specificity of the results can suffer, and the results of the 
analysis can be argued to be too ‘general’ and not detailed enough to be practically appli-
cable and useful to any specific user audience or use case. I evaluate the realized trans-
ferability issues of my research later in chapter 6.2.2.     
Human nature had to be addressed in the research. In particular, I had to be aware of 
the fact that, as I investigate human behavior through first-hand accounts and not through 
direct observation, individuals tend to rationalize their choices and behavior when they 
explain it to others. To assess their truthfulness, I considered repetition of a point or an 
insight across different interviewees as an initial sign of its credibility. Additionally, I 
reflected individual commentary to other interviewees’ views, findings from other studies 
and my own experience as a management consultant. 
Given different quality considerations, how did I aim  to strengthen the research valid-
ity and general quality of my thesis? Fisher (2010, 276) lists Winter’s principles for im-
proving the validity of research findings: these are reflexive critique, dialectical critique, 
collaborative resources, risk to one’s own values, plural structure, and theory, practice 
and transformation.  
Reflexive critique concerns the researcher’s transparency and objectivity, and the abil-
ity of the researcher to recognize how their own values and pre-existing beliefs affect 
their interpretation, and flesh these out for the reader (Fisher 2010). To enjoy its benefits, 
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I had to practice the principle during the analysis. This is true also to dialectical critique, 
which is about finding contradictions a) in the research findings between categorizations 
used to neatly structure things, and details of the things that challenge the structures and 
b) what studied individuals intentions and purposes and their actual behavior (Fisher 
2010, 276). Both reflexive and dialectical critiques are principles that I intended to use 
when investigating the findings.  
Collaborative resources mean involving multiple human perspectives into the research 
(Fisher 2010, 277), i.e. by having them provide research input or validate results. I de-
signed this thesis with collaboration in mind, as findings and conclusions regarding the 
units of analysis, foresight practitioners, were validated with them.  
Risks to one’s own values is about the researcher’s willingness to let the research pro-
cess challenge the views and values they had when starting the process, including e.g. 
assumptions about the research material, the purposes of the research, and the original 
research plan (Fisher 2010, 277). I address these issues in chapter 6.2.2 of the thesis.  
Plural structure means recognizing that the research question can be understood and 
the responses be given from multiple perspectives (Fisher 2010, 277), especially when 
studying an organizational context with multiple different actors and stakeholders, and 
this multiplicity should be recognized and reflected in the analysis. I have discussed the 
plurality of perspectives in a previous chapter (see 4.2) and I further cover the topic in the 
following chapter (4.4.2.).  
Sixth and final of Winter’s principles is theory, practice and transformation, and this 
refers to the need to have business and management theory with practical applicability 
and to have new theory tested in real life. Notably, the original and leading purpose of 
this thesis was to produce theory and insight that practitioners can directly utilize in their 
work, and I discuss the results post facto in chapter 6.2.2.    
3.4.2 Limitations of the research 
This research, like any, had its initial limitations. Its primary evidence, generated by ex-
ploratory research, cannot on its own argue for generalizable descriptions of its units of 
analysis. That is why in the synthesis I rely heavily on the comparison of new primary 
research evidence and pre-existing evidence from other, sufficiently related research. 
While my thesis aimed to understand behavior of foresight practitioners and people 
involved in futures knowledge interpretation, due to its resource limitations and chosen 
research method it could not measure and study the actual behavior of individuals. I relied 
on first-hand accounts and reporting of individuals under scrutiny and cannot assess their 
behavior directly. Thus, so I cannot apply aforementioned dialectical critique in full: I 
was  unable to critically compare what people say and what they do. 
70 
Another important limitation driven by resource limitations related to the principle of 
plural structure. The research of my thesis did not include the opinions and views of man-
agers and other strategic decision-makers, who also are involved in futures knowledge 
interpretation. Further research supported by additional resources could pose the same 
research question and use the same methodology but focus the interviews on managers to 
produce complementary and possibly contradictory findings.  
The research included experts from Finland, albeit with often very extensive global 
working experiences. It still is notable that the findings cannot be stated to be directly 
transferable to other cultures. Individuals working in other cultural spheres could have 
different views of the researched topics. However, transferability can be assessed when 
previously unearthed empirical evidence, collected from organizations around the world, 
was compared with the primary research of this thesis.  
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4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
I begin the analysis of empirical evidence collected from expert practitioners with a re-
view of the starting point, purposes and objectives of futures knowledge interpretation. 
Here, I analyze drivers that affect how contextualization is made. I follow with the find-
ings related to the different outcomes of interpretation, in other words, what it produces 
for companies as part of their strategy making and how it benefits them. Then, I analyze 
the practitioners’ notions of the core characteristics and different forms of interpretation. 
My intention here is to understand how practitioners define what foresight interpretation 
really is and how it happens as part of strategizing.  
After building an understanding of the purposes, outputs and form of foresight inter-
pretation in practice, the I move on to consider the organizational, personal and input-
related factors that affect the performance and success of interpretation in corporate con-
texts. Finally, I assess the practitioners’ views of how to perform valuable futures 
knowledge interpretation. Here, my analysis focuses on ideal capabilities, expertise and 
traits of individuals that perform interpretation, and the practical tools, techniques and 
frameworks that experts use as they interpret or facilitate it.   
4.1 Starting point, purposes and objectives of futures knowledge in-
terpretation 
The interviewees shared a striking unanimity about the starting point and purpose of in-
terpretation. Clearly echoing the importance of understanding effect uncertainties and 
performing ‘Hortonian’ interpretation, all experts commented that needs and strategic 
objectives of the organization should drive both interpretation and futures knowledge cre-
ation at large. As a Lead Business Designer, who worked in a consulting role, said:  
 
“I don’t really believe in developing an image of the future first, and then thinking 
about what the implications of the future could be. For example Sitra’s [The Finnish 
Innovation Fund] megatrend reports fall too far from industries and companies. The 
analysis has to be more tailored from the outset because without tailoring, you can-
not get into business-critical issues.” (Interviewee, Lead Business Designer) 
 
It was recognized that interpretation is always context based, and as a Head of Strategy 
elaborated, it can flow from business, futures, or problem contexts, meaning that the issue 
that requires interpretation, although relevant for the organization’s future, might stem 
from inside or outside the organization. The context in which the interpretation is done 
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ultimately determines its value-in-use. A Director of Insight, responsible for market in-
sight and foresight in a major consumer durables company, summed the thoughts of all 
interviewees as he pointed out that interpreting external factors and implications of fu-
tures produces only nice-to-know information, if there is no motivating use case for fu-
tures knowledge within the organization. 
Futures knowledge creation and interpretation was performed as part of various busi-
ness needs and use cases. Examples included turnaround strategy development for re-
cently acquired businesses and brands, strategic organizational and competence develop-
ment, and business vision development, strategic option formulation and strategic initia-
tive planning. Interpretation was required in defining actions how to implement strategies, 
not only in defining strategies themselves. They were part of growth and new business 
opportunity search, but also of testing and anticipation (preparation), teaching (and learn-
ing), and making uncertainties visible and more tangible to managers. A Head of Strategic 
Foresight, who worked as a consultant, argued that “a company can manage only a few 
trends at a time and it has to make a decision what to focus on among untold hundreds of 
options”. For example, an energy company has to choose whether to focus on electric 
vehicles or solar panels, and whether it wants to become a hub of an electricity ecosystem 
or remain as an simple utility company.  As part of foresight creation and use, interpreta-
tion plays a key role when a company makes such decisions: it has to interpret the effect 
uncertainties of different trends in a way that it identifies the most meaningful opportuni-
ties and risks to itself. Also, while some interviewees commented how company manage-
ment might not be inclined or willing to invest time for foresight and interpretation, one 
consultant noted how having a clear business need as the starting point actually motivates 
management to engage in interpretation and futures knowledge creation.  
Gap analyses that compare present and the future are types of interpretations. An HR 
manager, leading an internal foresight process in a multinational motion and con-trol 
technologies company, pointed out how futures knowledge is used to gauge the gap be-
tween the company’s existing human resources and level of capabilities and those the 
imagined futures could require. However, a Head of Strategic Foresight noted that his 
clients do less and less such analyses. Instead of analytical comparisons, the purpose of 
interpretations is to effect change and drive decision-making.   
 
“If management starts out from the current situation [in their company], they can’t 
observe what the future holds. That’s why you need a creative perspective of 
change; what new can we create to the present, and what do we maintain and 
remove [from the present]. Based on this, we can then think about a value propo-




In discussions with a few interviewees, the issue of problem-solving and problem-
finding as a dichotomy of purposes for foresight and interpretation was brought up. A 
Head of Strategy, who acted as a consultant, commented how the needs for foresight and 
abilities of companies to utilize it along this axis is market-specific: in Finland, there is 
much more problem-solving, because it tends to be more concrete, management thinking 
is more short-sighted, and the focus of management teams is in near-term profits and 
productivity.  She also noted how the purpose (whether problem-solving or finding) de-
pends on available resources, especially management team’s time, because problem-find-
ing usually is more time-consuming than problem-solving.  
As a Foresight Consultant from a major strategy, design, and technology services com-
pany indicated, foresight and interpretation have different roles vis-a-vis different ele-
ments of corporate strategy:  
 
“For vision development, foresight is a source of inspiration and sense of urgency 
and a way of expanding thinking. For strategic decision-making, futures 
knowledge is a context where to test different options. And in strategic initiatives 
and during execution, futures knowledge can provide the right timing to act.” (In-
terviewee, Foresight Consultant) 
 
In other words, interpretation of futures knowledge aims to provide the WHAT of the 
corporate vision, the HOW of strategic options, and the WHEN of strategy execution. 
Going even further, a Head of Strategic Foresight, who spoke of effecting change instead 
of analyzing the present, summarized his thoughts about the purpose by stating that the 
end objective of sense-making is to build a narrative of change. Beyond developing an 
inspiring, engaging narrative for change, what other outcomes and products did the inter-
viewees identify for futures knowledge interpretation? 
4.2 Outcomes and products of futures knowledge interpretation 
Presenting a very pragmatic view, a Research Scientist working as a consultant in a re-
search and innovation services company concluded that interpretation expands a com-
pany’s understanding of possibilities and opportunities the future holds, adding that good 
interpretation provides the 'extended present', and at least one new idea about future op-
portunities and other implications of external factors to the organization. But beyond sup-
porting corporate decision-making processes and strategizing, interpretation was seen to 
have other products as well.   
According to the experts, interpretation as a managerial activity, when it is successful, 
reveals personal assumptions, values, identities, and grows hunger for change. Through 
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affecting the culture of the organization, it helps promote futures thinking for the entire 
organization. Beyond increasing awareness of the environment and its changes, it also 
has an emotional impact by increasing optimism and open-mindedness and breeding 
courage and willingness to act and experiment with strategic options based on insights. 
It also produces negative if useful emotions by provoking irritation at organizational 
and/or industry-wide slowness to act, break path dependencies and change.  
Several interviewees emphasized that interpretations (as products) should be linked to 
existing corporate processes and be actionable, that is, lead directly to action.  As a Lead 
Business Designer commented:  
 
”The outcome should be that the manager feels the thing [they’ve learned] is so 
important that it awakens a natural desire to act. That they see opportunities and 
how they somehow challenge the status quo. And this isn’t easy!” (Interviewee, 
Lead Business Designer)  
 
A Head of Strategic Foresight added:  
 
”Foresight interpretation should kickstart immediate execution. And the interpre-
tations should made in a way that indicate which corporate processes they con-
cern.” (Interviewee, Head of Strategic Foresight) 
 
Such ambition for futures knowledge interpretation goes beyond the issues of conven-
ient and effective communication and how interpretations should be formulated in a way 
that allows for easy sharing within the organization and among its stakeholders, even 
though one interviewee highlighted this as well. If action – or at least provoking action – 
is one of the key products of interpretation, this only helps to highlight how crucial de-
signing foresight work from the basis of business needs and use cases in the organization 
is.  
However, does action require consensus when it comes to the interpretations? A Di-
rector of Insight admitted that interpretation, when performed as part of foresight and 
strategy processes as a distinct phase, rarely creates consensus, especially beyond the 
confines of the teams that ran the processes: outcomes are not always set in stone but are 
scrutinized after being made, as they are shared and when actions based on them are taken. 
Usual doubts include fears of actions being too radical, or oppositely, too limited to mat-
ter. Settling upon a shared interpretation and making a subsequent action decision can 
even be harmful, as an HR manager told:  
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“Due to all the challenges [affecting interpretation and decision-making], there’s 
a risk we choose a diluted option, the middle option, because we don’t dare to act 
differently.” (Interviewee, HR manager) 
 
A number of interviewees stated that consensus about the implications of external fac-
tors is not a requirement, at least initially. The HR manager, coordinating an on-going 
foresight and strategy process, commented that:  
 
“We can have multiple views about the future. We won’t necessarily reach one. I 
want that thinking is challenged and options are presented, and we won’t be sat-
isfied with the first easy answer.” (Interviewee, HR manager) 
 
In her case, dialogue about state and effect interpretations should instead lead to new 
questions for iterative futures knowledge creation and interpretation, and ultimately to 
defining a strategic direction for the company and a shared view of the desired future state 
of the company. But the commentary of the experts in general did not provide evidence 
or strong indication if converging on one shared interpretation is required or even prefer-
able. While maintaining several interpretations of effects can educate the management 
about contingencies, one interpretation is easier to communicate and can be used to create 
cohesion in organizations, particularly in such where teams and functions have suffered 
from lack of futures knowledge or where teams and functions have dissimilar futures 
thinking abilities and access to futures knowledge. Similarly, no conclusion could be 
made whether maintaining alternative strategies, due to multiple alternative interpreta-
tions or one equivocal interpretation, is preferable or not. Though if action is the preferred 
product of interpretation, this implies that consensus at least on the strategic decision-
making level is required, even if decisions and knowledge that has provided the reasoning 
for them is scrutinized and challenged at implementation stages.  
4.3 Core characteristics and forms of futures knowledge interpreta-
tion 
How do practitioners define what foresight interpretation really is and how it happens? 
I probed the core characteristics of interpretation by letting interviewees describe real-life 
cases and instances where they had performed foresight and interpretation, with the in-
tention of trying to understand what issues seem to make up interpretation as an activity 
and behavior. Various views raised by the interviewees shed light into what futures 
knowledge interpretation is and more specifically what are its core characteristics. The 




Table 8. Summary of core characteristics of futures knowledge interpretation 
Based on trust 
Combination of intuitive, creative and analytical thinking 
(Concerns) interpretation of effects 
Critically reflexive 
Dialogic, individual and social 
Every-day behavior 
Inspires personal responsibility 
Involves multiple disciplines and personalities 
Made ideally at the right time, when and where it can affect decision-making 
Part of management processes and cycles 
Participants approve uncertainty 
Performed one truth at a time 
Produces actionable results 
Rethinks the past and present 
 
Opinions included no-nonsense, pragmatic views, including how it is contextualization 
of trends and phenomena and understanding what is happening and what does it mean for 
us.  Interpretation is about turning perceived threats into opportunities, both concretely in 
terms of taking action and figuratively in terms of adjusting how to view issues. A Head 
of Strategic Foresight offered a very simple definition: 
 
“It is about answering the question ‘what phenomena and services design your 
customer's life in the future?’” (Interviewee, Head of Strategic Foresight) 
 
When describing her cognitive process when interpreting, an HR manager admitted 
that she analyzes the implications of one external factor at a time, as if the knowledge of 
the future of said factor was “true”, already happened, and then trying to imagine the 
implications to whatever context she was considering, e.g. the employee and competence 
base of her company. Supporting how interpretation happens “one truth at a time”, a 
Foresight Consultant described her methods when facilitating the interpretation of factor 
implications during scenario development work: she reported that in her experience, it 
was easiest for individuals to consider the implications of one set of drivers, a scenario, 
or one driver at a time, instead of trying to imagine the implications of alternative scenar-
ios at the same time. In the latter situations, people tended to produce similar implications 
for considerably different scenarios! 
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Several practitioners talked about interpretation as a specifically personal competence 
and activity that is highly subjective, even though it requires organizational and structural 
support in the form of proper tools, forums and processes to be useful for individuals 
themselves and the organization at large.  
Many also highlighted how interpretation is about intuition and is a creative process, 
and a capability to imagine the implications. It regards the question of innovation and 
how imagination can create value for the organization. As a Head of Strategy put it: 
 
"You can't innovate by analyzing." (Interviewee, Head of Strategy) 
 
However, some pointed out that interpretation is a combination of intuitive thinking 
and analytics. Analytics refers to structured methods of thinking and how information 
and data is utilized in general and to support intuitions in particular. Here, the purpose is 
about creating both creative and logically sound interpretations. Interpretation being a 
highly contextual, intuitive activity means also that its quality and processes used for it 
vary considerably from case to case and from person to person. Yet, and despite all its 
creative and intuitive core characteristics, practitioners still argued that it is at its best 
performed deliberately and diligently.  
Interpretation is not only about simply making sense of implications. A few practition-
ers discussed how interpretation is an act critical self-reflection and thinking about sub-
jective things objectively, or in other words, an attempt to step out of one’s own ‘box’ of 
assumptions, values and role in the organization. A Head of Strategy described it as a 
practice of  “changing meanings or strengthening existing meanings”. Talking about how 
difficult the attempt is and at the same time highlighting the personal, reflective aspect of 
interpretation, a HR manager remarked how she sees people go through an “internal strug-
gle” during processes of interpretation where people are faced with the task of recogniz-
ing and adjusting their previously held beliefs, redefining their professional identities and 
compromising between their own interests and those of the organization.  
The struggle is made evident by other comments about the nature of interpretation. 
Several noted that contextualizing implications of the future is also about rethinking and 
reimagining the present and history of the self and the organization as well: as part of 
contextualization of futures knowledge, perceptions about present should be reviewed as 
well. Furthermore, it was stated that interpretation reveals path dependencies and ways 
how decisions had been made previously. A Director of Insight was happy to report that 
a successful round of foresight interpretation helped his colleagues redefine their under-
standing of the history of the company, and apply learnings gleaned from the “new” his-
tory to future actions. 
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If interpretation of futures knowledge is a creative and structured act, an attempt to 
step out of one’s own box that involves rethinking the past and present as well, when and 
in what instances does it happen in practice? 
Several practitioners highlighted that interpretation is ideally made in time and space 
where it can truly affect decision-making, preferably so where the time and space are  
built into strategy making processes. As an insight reflected on a past strategy process, 
foresight creation and interpretation were timed well because they enjoyed from a sense 
of urgency among top management: knowledge of what was happening and what it meant 
for us was required immediately. Sense of urgency is also a matter of being of being 
timely: a Head of Strategic Foresight reported that he regularly turns away potential cli-
ents because he feels changes in the clients’ macro and micro-environments are already 
at a stage where interpretations and organizational reactions come too late. In other words, 
interpretation requires a motivating sense of urgency but also correct timing. Ideally, 
many practitioners would like to see foresight and interpretation done as a continuous, 
cyclical process. Here, performing the act of contextualization and having the mindset 
required allows for constant, iterative generation of new questions, futures knowledge 
and interpretations. In a same continuous fashion, previously made interpretations are 
reflected upon for learning purposes as futures emerge. Arguably, when an organization 
has a constant sense of urgency for generating foresight and interpretations, a continuous 
process can help in delivering outputs that are timely. However, all practitioners admitted 
that such a case is an ideal situation, and very few of them and their clients are able to 
achieve this. 
Contextualization as part of strategizing is not naturally consigned to processes, were 
they formal or not, or ad hoc or cyclical, even though almost all practitioners reported 
strategizing as a major instance where interpretation of futures knowledge occurs. Prac-
titioners listed a number of other different spaces and times as well. A Head of Strategic 
Foresight told he facilitates dialogue about key trends and their strategic implications to 
business with his clients in regular, quarterly top management sessions that usually last a 
day or a half. An Information Specialist, who worked in a major insurance company, 
shared how his top management gets quarterly strategic updates and foresight reports, and 
how during their brief reviews, the implications and whether or not external development 
requires action are discussed. In such cases, interpreting futures knowledge has become 
an integrated aspect of top management’s meeting cycle, which based on other comments 
from experts, is hardly the norm. The Information Specialist also noted that market and 
competitor intelligence is also presented along with futures knowledge. Here, analysis of 
the present environment is reported together with analysis of the futures, which has both 
positive and negative effects. While top managers gain a fuller picture of the business 
environment, futures knowledge has to compete for their attention during a very limited 
timeframe when intelligence is discussed. In such situations, exposing top management 
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to both past and futures-based insights, those highlighting more current matters tend to 
overcome futures-based matters.    
More mundanely, practitioners report that interpretation happens when individuals 
meet and group, whether live or online. This means among others lunch breaks, office 
spaces, workshops, meetings, and digital environments such as online discussion forums. 
The ‘every day’ nature of interpretation only highlights the fact that interpretation should 
not be understood rigidly as a process, or especially a stage within another process, but 
rather as behavior. Interestingly, while several experts felt that interpretation as cognition 
is very much personal, or made by individuals, the instances where it is reported to occur 
are all social. As a Head of Strategy said: 
 
“I don’t believe in acting like a futurist guru. No one can define a future 
alone.”(Interviewee, Head of Strategy) 
 
Echoing her, a Lead Business Designer argued: 
 
“It’s not lonely work. It’s part of creating the future together.”(Interviewee, Lead 
Business Designer) 
 
Based on commentary from all practitioners, it became evident that they see dialogue 
at the core of performing interpretation. An HR Manager described how sense is made 
during a shared journey. It was widely accepted that it is a participatory, joint effort that 
involves more than less stakeholders of the company, not including only top management, 
but middle managers, employees, owners, customers and others from the micro-environ-
ment of the company. However, whereas especially customers were used to validate in-
terpretations, and the organization at large was able to provide input in the form of futures 
knowledge and its interpretations, consensus building about contextualizations happened 
in limited circles, particularly in management teams. This serves to illustrate the contin-
uing contradiction between the drive for increasing participation and sense of commit-
ment and the history of maintaining a culture of top-down decision-making in many or-
ganizations. An Information Specialist, responsible for producing strategic updates for 
top management, hinted at this reality when talking about how interpretations ideally hap-
pen: though senior managers are responsible for them, he felt it important that the results 
are shared widely in the organization, and are not limited to senior management’s eyes, 
as the rest of the organization provides input to the strategic updates in form of futures 
insights and recommendations. Moreover, in this case top management can be active in 
determining the content of strategic updates, if they so choose. Top management is ex-
pected to be able to interpret changing situations and react to them immediately on their 
own as they are presented with the strategic updates. 
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The reality begs the question, who then creates the interpretations, and subsequently, 
the future, in organizations? This is not an unimportant question, since a Director of In-
sight, when describing his view of how interpretation happens ideally, told that interpre-
tations and decisions made based on them all enjoy shared commitment throughout the 
organization because they inspire personal ownership of the interpretations. Such own-
ership, according to the Director of Insight, is critical for successfully sharing the under-
standing inside the organization. Taking this logic further, I argue the actionability of 
interpretations, or the importance of linking interpretations to immediate action men-
tioned earlier, is also a function of personal sense of ownership of said interpretations.   
Actionability and sense of ownership is closely related to another core characteristic 
of interpretation identified by the practitioners. As a Head of Strategic Foresight com-
mented, making sense of futures knowledge requires people with different expertise ar-
eas, and in his case, a “top team of surgeons”, i.e. business consultants, visual designers, 
digital experts and service designers, working together with their direct counter-parts 
within the client organization, such as strategy directors, marketing managers, chief in-
formation officers  and chief digital officers. Working in such a dynamic, foresight and 
interpretations are made with and instilled to key people inside the organization, making 
them more actionable, and a sense of personal ownership of the understanding of the 
implications is created as they are developed in their personal professional contexts.  
Several interviewees felt interpretation should always be multidisciplinary, involving 
people with different expertise areas, but also different mental models or ways of thinking. 
This doesn’t only help in interpreting often peripheral futures knowledge, that requires 
specialized subject matter expertise to be analyzed, but in breaking biased thinking.  How-
ever, a Head of Strategy pointed out how successful interpretation requires a shared sense 
of trust, how it happens in open and transparent discussion, in states of flow where people 
are relaxed, free on inhibitions and have fun doing it. They are willing to be conversa-
tional, have open minds and develop ideas instead of only criticizing them. Thus, while 
interpretation seems to ideally involve people with differing mental models, they still 
must get along or even enjoy each other’s company. 
Trust is a subject that did not only come up in relation to personal relationships, but 
also in relation to mutual decision-making and the futures knowledge they are working 
with. A Director of Insight commented how in best cases, individuals choose to live with 
the natural uncertainty of the external environment and its implications, and rather aim 
to identify important contingencies that they must look for as futures emerge, and recog-
nize that interpretations and decisions have been made with the best futures knowledge 
available.  
Aiming for actionability, continuity, participation, sense of ownership and trust, 
among other core characteristics of interpretation, help understand why an Information 
Specialist argued that interpretation along with futures knowledge creation is ideally built 
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as an integral part of strategic decision-making. As a Head of Development working in a 
major construction company admitted, when they lack these characteristics, they are used 
to sub-optimize the performance of parts of the business and drive the interest of individ-
ual teams, functions or managers, instead of optimizing the whole company. However, 
before discussing the findings that concern the capabilities, means, techniques and tools 
to perform good or even ideal interpretation and ensure that all the core characteristics of 
interpretation come to life, the practitioners’ views of the factors that impact the success 
of interpretation as an activity and its outputs are analyzed.  
4.4 Factors impacting futures knowledge interpretation 
The interviewed practitioners provided a total of 127 comments and opinions of different 
factors that in their view have an impact on performance and success of futures 
knowledge interpretation in corporate contexts. These findings are summarized in Table 
9 below. The factors are summarized into three main themes: organizational factors, per-
sonal factors and input related factors. Organizational factors refer to structural, cultural, 
resource and space and time related issues affecting the performance of futures interpre-
tation. Personal factors include emotional, cognitive and behavioral issues, while input 
related factors concern the quality, availability and organizational distance of futures 
knowledge to business and both perceived and actual path dependencies affecting fore-
sight interpretation and subsequent strategic decision-making.  
Table 9. Classification of factors influencing interpretation in companies 





The ways the organization’s structure, culture, man-
agement, routines and processes impact individual and 
social futures knowledge interpretation  
Resources Different resources and their availability 
Space and  
timing 
Intangible and tangible spaces available for interpreta-
tion and its timing 
Personal Emotional  Factors related to emotions  
Cognitive  Factors related to ways of thinking and rationalization 









Real and perceived path dependencies and histories of 
the organization and the external environment as an 
input to interpretation 
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4.4.1 Organizational factors 
Though based significantly on individual capabilities, the results suggest futures 
knowledge interpretation is heavily impacted by the organizational structures, processes 
and cultures in and by which professionals operate.  
 
Table 10. Organizational factors impacting futures knowledge interpretation 





• Integration with other structures and pro-
cesses,  
• incentive systems,  
• top management encouragement and sup-
port,  
• top management ways of working,  
• cultural focus on the short term,  
• freedom to think differently 
Resources • Available time and funding,  
• managerial attention 
Space and  
timing 
• Correct timing and demand for interpreta-
tion,  
• available forums and channels,  
• performing interpretations in correct 
‘spaces’ in the organization 
 
The structural-cultural sub-theme of organizational factors includes a variety of different 
issues, which were not put into any order of importance by practitioners. These are listed 
in Table 10. General lack of organizational processes to which tie-in results of interpre-
tation, or the inability to integrate foresight into existing processes, is a major hurdle. A 
Director of Insight from a large consumer durables company illustrated: 
 
“The company doesn’t have a process for [adopting the results]. If the good work 
takes place where there is no process in which they can be used, the benefits are 
lost. The receiving processes are absent. The mandate to act is absent.” (Inter-
viewee, Director of Insight) 
 
An Information Specialist from a major insurance company added:  
 
“Environmental scanning is often done as an afterthought, and linking it to organ-
izational routines and cycles is difficult.” (Interviewee, Information Specialist) 
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Furthermore, the lack of integration to business processes might not be the only barrier, 
but there can exist gatekeepers, individuals with organizational power, who block futures 
knowledge and interpretations from flowing to processes and forums where action could 
be taken. The reasons for such behavior are manifold (and are discussed in the next chap-
ter), but one of its structural drivers is incentivization. 
Several interviewees talked about incentives, mainly how lack of incentivization hin-
ders futures thinking. This lack discourages middle and senior managers from engaging 
in scanning of their changing business environment and making sense of its strategic im-
plications. Incentivization can take tangible (e.g. money) and intangible (e.g. praise) 
forms to encourage behavior, but it can also be used to obstruct behavior. A Head of 
Development spoke of his corporate culture where short term thinking, cost managements 
and sub-optimization of operations are actively incentivized, due to a historical shared 
trauma of a near-bankruptcy over two decades prior, which in turn poses a serious barrier 
to long-term, explorative futures thinking. Similarly, lack of support and encouragement 
from top management can limit individuals to undertaking scanning and interpretation 
and worse yet, actively scope managers’ and employees’ attention to other areas. As an 
Information Specialist lamented, instead of providing even a little attention to imagining 
the futures, in his organization, day-to-day operations planning and ‘putting out fires’ 
come before everything else. 
Part of top management encouragement is also whether or not it allows the freedom to 
think differently. An HR manager celebrated the situation in her company: 
 
“That we’re allowed to question in our organization is exhilarating… and 
 uncomfortable!”  (Interviewee, HR manager) 
 
A Director of Insight noted how a fresh management team, having just replaced the 
previous team, was free to think beyond path dependencies and previous decisions and 
their logics. This allowed for objectivity not only in the management team, but also 
throughout the process which created a turnaround strategy for a brand the previous team 
had acquired.  
Top management attention and ways of working affect how management contextual-
izes futures knowledge, and how practitioners are able to engage with them in dialogue 
about external changes. As a Head of Development pointed out, if top management meet-
ing agendas do not include any time for in-depth discussions about the long-term future 
of the environment of the company, any interpretation cannot happen. However, other 
interviewees presented two examples of opposite cases where foresight (if not interpreta-
tion in depth) was on the executive agenda. An Information Specialist indicated that, in 
his company, top management has strategic updates quarterly. A Head of Strategic Fore-
sight organized quarterly sessions with his client top management teams. In these cases, 
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time and space had been carved into the top management agenda. The level of integration 
of futures thinking and contextualization of implications into top management strategic 
agendas has a major impact, and it is closely related to the topic of resources, particularly 
available time as a factor. Carving some time out of the busy schedules of senior manag-
ers still might not be enough to fully benefit from foresight and interpretation.  The In-
formation Specialist complained: 
 
“The higher you go in the organization hierarchy, the less you have time. Time is 
the most important resource.” (Interviewee, Information Specialist) 
 
The Head of Development shed light on the reality of trying to help top management 
make sense when meeting them:  
 
“Explaining the entire trail of thought [of interpretation] takes so much time, that 
you never have it. People literally have a fifteen-minute window of time to pitch 
their ideas.” (Interviewee, Head of Development) 
 
Even a Head of Strategic Foresight, who reported to have considerable access to the 
management teams of his client organizations, noted how short on time management 
teams and boards of directors are when reviewing futures knowledge and contextualizing 
its implications. 
 
“People have an attention span of eight seconds, so you have to tell things very 
briefly if you want to make them happen.- - You talked about key moments in 
your question: When meeting Boards of Directors I’m usually given fifteen 
minutes, or maximum thirty minutes, to present conclusions.” (Interviewee, Head 
of Strategic Foresight) 
 
While financial resources were mentioned only as means to hire both internal talent 
and external support, available time was mentioned by all interviewers as a critical suc-
cess factor for futures knowledge interpretation. Another resource, closely related to 
available time and at the center of making or breaking interpretation, is managerial and 
organizational attention. Attention can be understood as general attention towards fore-
sight and the act of interpreting, and attention to specific factors and issues, or futures 
knowledge. While the above quote from a Head of Strategic Foresight serves as an illus-
trative example of the latter, an HR Manager shed light on the former definition, worrying 
about her top management’s ability to disconnect from their daily worries and tasks and 
to focus on futures thinking as she prepared a day-long futures workshop for her senior 
managers. 
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In addition to available time as a resource, a key time-related factor is the organiza-
tional demand and timing for interpretation. As already discussed in previous chapters, 
if there is no real demand for foresight for whatever reasons, or if the correct time to 
interpret, react and/or pro-act to changing environmental drivers has passed, interpreta-
tion has little to no value, or faces outstanding difficulties to prove its value. Whereas if 
the timing is correct and the demand exists, these bolster the interpretation effort mas-
sively. Here, both management attention towards interpretation and interpretation’s per-
ceived relevance as a task are magnified as well.  
Space, both physical and figurative, where interpretation happens, was among the 
mentioned organizational factors. These include forums and channels in both the real and 
digital worlds where people engage and communicate with each other. Having them, and 
how well they served their purpose, determined whether they were an organizational en-
abler or a hindrance. For example, an Information Specialist regretted how increasing 
remote working had seemed to decrease the amount of live interactions between people, 
and how in these idle interactions, futures knowledge and interpretations were both made 
and transmitted. On the other hand, several interviewees noted how they’ve successfully 
used digital foresight tools to gather and crowd-source futures knowledge and facilitate 
joint sense-making.  
4.4.2 Personal factors 
In an attempt to classify and analyze different personal factors affecting interpretation 
activities in corporate contexts, I split them into three main groups: emotional, cognitive 
and behavioral, or those based on emotions, thinking, and action. Though inter-connected 
and impacting and driving each other in a systemic fashion, I cover these three separately 









Personal Emotional  • Emotions,  
• attitudes (incl. openness), 
• self-interests,  
• company politics  
Cognitive  • Skepticism,  
• experiences and education,  
• biases,  
• cognitive frames and abilities,  




• Engagement with others and ways of communica-
tion, 
• level of involvement (of self and others),  
• jumping to conclusions 
  
Emotions and emotional responses were a major talking point with almost all interview-
ees. When futures knowledge and interpretations are presented to managers, the emo-
tional responses can range from fear, anxiety and anger to irritation, excitement and even 
hype. Several interviewees noted how fear and uncertainty emerge especially as doubts 
about manager’s own future in relation to the presented foresight and its interpretations. 
Here, own future concerns especially own role and capabilities to perform in the future. 
In these cases, doubts can also concern one’s personal capability to engage in futures 
thinking and perform interpretation in general. As a Head of Strategy commented: 
 
”Personal attitudes and emotions have a considerable influence in futures thinking 
and contextualization. If you’re for example afraid of robotization, you don’t want 
your company to invest in robotics, and you see only threats and no opportunities 
in it.” (Interviewee, Head of Strategy) 
 
Furthermore, the discussion with a Head of Development revealed how futures 
knowledge can create anxiety among the management audience if it is not presented in a 
way where its implications cannot be directly linked to a personal level, or interpreted at 
a personal level. Such cases highlight how uncertainty about manager’s own position, 
role and success outweigh those of the organization’s. Furthermore, if personal fears and 
doubts arise as a response to futures knowledge and its interpretations (that still could be 
elaborated at organizational level), managers can communicate those fears and doubt as 
being organizational in nature. For example, technological advances that drive  changes 
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in processes and business models of a company might require personal capability devel-
opment for manager, or worse yet, lead to a situation where the manager no longer can 
perform effectively. This fear for one’s personal future is framed as a notion that the 
organization around the individual manager does not have the ability and/or readiness to 
adjust to said technological developments. Personal negative emotions are shrouded with 
organizational excuses, and this impacts how managers and management teams make 
sense, assess action options and their outcomes, and decide how to act.  
If emotions hamper a manager’s cognition, and his/her peers observe this, it disrupts 
mutual trust necessary for successful interpretation and joint decision-making. An HR 
Manager commented how in her globally operating company, a restructuring and merger 
of different regional offices had  also created a new management team for the new re-
gional business unit. The people in the team were unfamiliar with each other and their 
motives, thus the team suffered from lack of trust. Furthermore, some managers seemed 
to ‘hide’ behind their roles and positions, creating uncertainty among others whether such 
managers truly thought about the good of the whole unit, or merely looked after their 
functions. According to the HR Manager, the lack of transparency and trust posed a seri-
ous challenge to having open discussions about changes in the business environment and 
the future of the company.    
Interpretation can lead to emotions that from the outset seem negative but can be con-
structive in terms of corporate resilience. For example, interpretation can fuel a sense of 
urgency to act. A Foresight Consultant referred to a project where her client team devel-
oped a set of scenarios for the future and assessed their state and effect implications. One 
client in the team was visibly motivated about the results, calling loudly for the company 
to take any measures possible to ensure that one of the scenarios would never happen. In 
another example, a Head of Development noted how an interpretation process had bred 
irritation among top management, exasperation about what the future could hold for the 
company and the company’s inability to take prompt, decisive action accordingly. In oth-
ers, the same process bred excitement: the futures knowledge and interpretations con-
firmed their assumptions and supported their long-held arguments that changes had to be 
made in the company.  
According to the experts, emotions, particularly negative, were not something to be 
avoided. To a Head of Strategy, an emotional response from her client was at best a cue 
for further dialogue and fruitful interpretation. A Lead Business Designer welcomed an-
ger, saying: 
 
“Every now and then you should get a bit angry when you think about the future, 
because then you’ve reached a point where something reveals itself in your thinking 
and awakens a process. That something collides with an existing assumption and 
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makes you wonder [about both].” (Interviewee, Lead Business Designer, emphasis 
by the interviewee) 
 
Using emotions to spur interpretation and drive organizational change can naturally 
backfire. As a Foresight Consultant pointed out, her clients often tend to get over-excited 
about individual trends, calling this ‘hype’. Here, over-excitement leads to situational 
blindness, narrow views and narrow interpretations about implications: individual trends 
become over-deterministic and the inter-relationships of external factors and the influence 
of other trends and anti-trends becomes less observed. Implications of ‘hype’, when they 
are identified, are exaggerated, and implications of other factors are downplayed. The 
consultant provided a practical example, where hype directly lead to jumping into con-
clusions, and the client team was unable to properly assess the business opportunities and 
implications to their customers the ‘hyped’ trend had. In this case, emotions fed biases. 
An HR Manager shared another example of how emotions fueled biases. Her organization 
had enjoyed several years of continued growth and good business results, and it had lulled 
the organization into a sense of security. Everyone was “going with the flow”, as she put 
it, and this had made especially senior managers uninterested in imagining alternative 
futures and their implications. This shows how contentedness with the current company 
trajectory and past results may encourage the desire to preserve the status quo and creates 
blind spots to factors that threaten the business.  
Some interviewees talked about how some managers tended to hide behind their roles 
and positions, but how moments of foresight interpretation were fruitful when they chose 
to ‘come out of hiding’ and be open and transparent. As a Research Scientist put it, the 
manager’s persona matters much when interpreting, and has direct impact on how much 
the manager is willing to speculate. Openness concerns the manager’s willingness to lis-
ten to others, specifically outsiders and subordinates, and admit that they do not know 
everything that is relevant. It also concerns their readiness to consider breaking path de-
pendencies and do things differently. When interpreting, a Lead Business Designer be-
lieved one of the main hurdles in interpretation was if her clients were willing to be play-
ful, referring to using imagination instead of being content with the immediately credible, 
plausible possibilities that the future might hold. In such situations, to use imagination 
openly meant taking a risk of losing credibility in the eyes of others. Subsequently, the 
fear of losing credibility kept managers behind their professional roles.   
 Openness is not the only attitude affecting sense-making of futures and their implica-
tions. Along with openness, curiosity was named by many interviewees as a key attitude. 
How curious managers are about the future and the context from which changes emerge 
reflects in their ability and willingness to engage in interpretation. Closely related to cu-
riosity is the pro-activeness of managers to change and develop themselves and their or-
ganizations. Several practitioners had identified that proactive managers were the most 
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fruitful dialogue partners when producing foresight. Such managers have what an HR 
Manager called a ‘winning attitude’ and are inherently motivated to improve themselves, 
think about futures and are willing to challenge existing ways of thinking and acting in 
the organization. Oppositely, other interviewees described their experiences with passive 
leaders to whom futures did not feel relevant, because the organization’s operations were 
focused on short term results, or the industry was so stagnant and slow that change would 
come only when said managers thought they’d already be retired, as a Head of Develop-
ment elaborated. Some might be generally change resistant: a Lead Business Designer 
commented how she tended to believe that only a quarter of managers were open to 
change, while the rest were resistant by nature. This was also evident in the ways practi-
tioners had experienced general hostility towards foresight as a practice: a Head of Strat-
egy reported sometimes being hesitant to call her work foresight, due to attitude problems 
among her clients.  
Another attitude that adversely affects interpretation is what A Director of Insight 
called the ‘not invented here’ attitude: knowledge and interpretations made by others, 
often by outsiders or people in other parts of the organization, is disqualified and over-
looked for simply being made by someone other than the managers themselves or for 
whatever, usually irrational, reason. The ‘not invented here’ attitude can also manifest as 
a credibility risk: A Head of Strategic Foresight noted how if the same people are not 
involved in foresight creation, interpretation and strategic decision-making, the ones re-
sponsible for decisions and strategy execution tend to easily disqualify foresight and 
doubt interpretations.    
When summing up the discussions of emotions and attitudes, the notion of self-interest 
in general and pursuing one’s own interests in strategic decision-making emerges as a 
major emotion-based factor. While serving one’s own interest is only natural, the com-
mentary of the interviewees paints a stark picture of how assessing futures knowledge, 
making interpretations of its implications and deciding upon actions all become entangled 
with organizational politics. A Head of Development explained his recent experience of 
providing futures knowledge interpretations and action recommendations, noting how 
much he and his team had to tailor the approach used in the private presentations to suit 
the needs and personality of the individual stakeholder. In situations where his interpre-
tations and action recommendations overlapped with action plans of other stakeholders, 
he had to go to great lengths to manage the conflicting interests and prove that his pro-
posal actually served the stakeholders’ own interests better. His and the Director of In-
sight’s experiences show how internal developers want to take responsibility of overall 
business and operations development and how in their hands effect interpretations serve 
best as arguments for strategic action recommendations. Interpretations become increas-
ingly political when a developer consciously makes the choice how to use effect interpre-
tations in their narratives for change, in other words, whether they want to interpret effects 
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as possibilities or as risks and ‘sell hope or fear’. For such proactive, curious and ambi-
tious leaders, interpretations serve their interests as well: specific implications become 
vehicles for driving change which is in their own interest.    
Along with a sleuth of emotional factors, the interviewed practitioners identified sev-
eral personal factors influencing interpretation related to cognition. While many are con-
nected to emotions, these are characterized by how directly they affect thinking.  
While none of the interviewees shared any experiences about management skepticism 
and disregard towards futures knowledge per se, a few highlighted skepticism and how it 
manifests as doubt about the relevance of futures knowledge. Even though determining 
relevance is critical for allocating precious time, resources and attention when performing 
foresight and interpretation, two interviewees shed light on how skepticism had warped 
cognition negatively. A Director of Insight described a case where his management was 
analyzing trends and signals and reimagining industry boundaries and their brand’s role 
in a future scenario where markets were dramatically redefined. Here, the management’s 
view of the company’s ability to influence trends and signals and their ability to compete 
against major global competitors in such a situation was hindered by their skepticism. 
Furthermore, considerations of business opportunities in such redefined markets were 
dismissed because some in the management felt their business was not in those or com-
parable markets today. In other words, skepticism, driven by perceptions of the current 
capabilities and realities of the company, actively bound management’s futures and stra-
tegic thinking. In another example, a Research Scientist told of a case where his clients 
had been engaged in futures thinking: after identifying a number of trends most relevant 
to the company and its industry, the client team decided to disregard trends that they 
believed the company by itself or through its connections could not affect. While it is 
seemingly pragmatic to focus efforts on matters one can try to manage, such practice 
leaves the company vulnerable to influences which the company cannot block but only 
react to, especially if they are not even monitored.     
Skepticism is but one example of threats to cognition that affect interpretation. The 
Director of Insight elaborated on top management skepticism and how it blows over and 
becomes a bias: he noted how while management can recognize that a trend exists, they 
can still dispute its relevance by claiming it is happening to other companies and indus-
tries, and it doesn’t concern us because “our industry is different”. The ‘hype’ mentality 
mentioned previously is a type of overconfidence and another example of biased thinking. 
The Research Scientist, when going through another real-life example with a client team 
in the banking sector, mentioned how they felt Brexit to be an impossibility, or a wild 
card at best. Their light-heartedness blinded them from imagining the possibility of Brexit 
and its implications.  
Several interviewees talked about how a person’s own culture, languages they speak, 
educational background and experiences all are ‘soft’ factors that influence how foresight 
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and its results are perceived and how one makes sense of their implications. As an HR 
Manager commented, personal background and the world one has grown in determines 
ways of thinking. As a top management futures workshop was approaching, she worried 
if senior managers could think openly and expansively enough, even though there was a 
general will to think differently: 
 
“We’re in a traditional industry that’s now facing massive changes… can we think 
wildly enough?” (Interviewee, HR Manager) 
 
A Foresight Consultant also pointed out how considerable the differences between 
personal capabilities in futures thinking and contextualizing implications were among her 
clients. For some managers, the terminology of the field, along with techniques and tools 
are already familiar, while for many others they are not. A Head of Strategic Foresight 
regretted how low the maturity level in foresight capability is in Finnish companies. A 
Head of Development didn’t spare his words criticizing construction, his own industry, 
noting how low the futures thinking capability was in general and how difficult it was to 
consider and discuss even one potential future, never mind several concurrently. When 
interpreting futures knowledge, foresight is not the only useful expertise. An HR Manager 
doubted that in her organization, senior managers’ substance expertise about issues at the 
periphery of their industry was sufficient and felt this posed a challenge to interpreting 
their implications. Discussing the same dilemma, a Head of Development felt pleased that 
his top management team, being a combination of leadership from two recently merged 
companies, included people from different industries and with vision and capability to 
interpret peripheral factors. 
Capabilities in foresight and interpretation however are not only a matter of personal 
experience and expertise, but also a function of organizational support and maturity in 
futures thinking. As a Foresight Consultant argued, an organization exposes individuals 
to different frames of thought and use cases, such as service development, strategy, mar-
kets and products, which are then applied for and by foresight and contextualization. She 
noted how organizational maturity in futures thinking can vary significantly between 
companies, and if the organization lacks experience, processes and tools for facilitating 
futures thinking, an individual might find it hard to know how and where to begin.      
Just as harnessing emotions as a factor to impact interpretation, foresight and industry 
expertise emerged as a contradictory topic in the study findings. Referring to foresight 
subject matter and methodology specialists with limited industry expertise, a Head of 
Strategic Foresight outright claimed that: 
 
“The time for generalists is over.” (Interviewee, Head of Strategic Foresight) 
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He argued that in order to be an equal and credible dialogue partner with business 
managers, foresighters had to be well-versed with the business realities of their counter-
part’s industry and company. By providing a cognitive framework, ample industry exper-
tise allowed for foresighters to do their own contextualizations on behalf of their clients 
and provide immediate action recommendations. Given the time and attention restraints 
of senior managers, this is a strong argument, as evidenced by also a comment from a 
Head of Development, albeit from an opposite perspective, when discussing the difficul-
ties of interpreting when both sides lack the same situational awareness: 
 
“If over the past fifteen years you’ve developed the understanding of the system 
and what’s wrong with it, go ahead and try to explain it in fifteen minutes to a 
manager who lacks the same understanding.”  (Interviewee, Head of Develop-
ment) 
 
 When time is increasingly short, pragmatism requires all sense-making participants to 
have an equal understanding of the internal business context in order for them to contrib-
ute. “I’m given three days instead  of thirty”, the Head of Strategic told about his consult-
ing assignments. Yet, the argument downplays the participatory, dialogic aspect of fore-
sight interpretation by pushing the cognitive responsibility to the foresighter instead of 
sharing it equally among them and the senior managers. From a consultant’s perspective, 
an emphasis on ‘sense-giving’ is not a problem since they are hired and expected to create 
value rapidly.  However, while industry expertise allows foresighters to help managers to 
pose relevant questions for futures knowledge that lead to insightful interpretations, the 
question boils down to who provides the answers – the interpretations: the foresighter, or 
the manager. Other interviewees were not as absolute as the Head of Strategic Foresight, 
but instead believed foresight subject matter expertise and industry expertise are both 
required, or required at equal measure. “It is situational”, as a Head of Strategy com-
mented, saying projects where the outputs must solve very practical problems, more in-
dustry substance knowledge is required. 
Of course, the Head of Strategic Foresight either did not dismiss the importance of 
mastering foresight methodologies, but emphasized how crucial industry expertise was in 
creating credibility for the foresight practitioner in the eyes of senior managers and help-
ing them communicate their views more effectively. However, extensive industry exper-
tise is not always only a positive. As previous comments from a Head of Development 
and an HR Manager show, being too versed with the intricacies, operations and history 
of a company and its industry can provide a cognitive barrier of its own. Time as a limited 
resource requires all sense-making parties to be uniformly informed of the internal con-
text, but at the same time, denies the opportunity to question the basic premises and as-
sumptions which form the understanding. An interesting question arises: how much can 
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an individual have industry expertise, functioning as a cognitive framework, that it actu-
ally curtails creative imagination and limits thinking of possibilities and alternatives? Ob-
viously, this thesis cannot provide but partial answer to this question.    
Emotions and cognition drive and manifest as behavior. The commentary of practi-
tioners included personal factors that, while being manifestations of emotions and cogni-
tion, as behaviors can be seen to have considerable effect on the performance of interpre-
tation. Thus, they warranted a group of their own. The discussed behaviors included top-
ics like ability to engage with others and ways of communication, personal involvement 
and involvement of others when interpreting, and the negative habit of jumping to con-
clusions. 
As indicated by all interviewees, interpretation is primarily a dialogical activity. A few 
pointed out how important for practitioners is to establish a common lexicon of foresight 
terminology with stakeholders. Both internal practitioners and consultants highlighted the 
need for simplifying results of foresight work and summarizing futures knowledge, even 
though it might be based on comprehensive and detailed analysis. Simplifying and sum-
marizing facilitates effect interpretation and avoids getting stuck with state interpretations 
in time limited situations. Several emphasized the necessity for foresighters to network 
and involve multiple stakeholders in strategic interpretation processes, not only senior 
managers.  Thus, the methods and skills in communication, or how practitioners engage 
with managers and other stakeholders, are an important behavior-based success factor. 
Yet, how individuals engage others is not only a matter of skill, but also willingness. 
An Information Specialist shared a stunning research finding from his company, a major 
insurance firm employing several thousand people: according to an internal study, a third 
of the employees admitted they do not share futures knowledge and market and compet-
itor intelligence willingly with colleagues. While the study did not target foresight prac-
titioners, it painted a stark picture of a challenge to involving employees internally in 
sense-making. When I asked about reasons why people are unwilling to share their in-
sights, the Information Specialist argued that ‘knowledge is power’. Some people apply 
knowledge only when it benefits them personally: for example, a competitive Sales Di-
rector could hold on to customer insights to benefit his/her personal sales efforts, or a 
Business Director could present futures knowledge only when it makes him/her look per-
ceptive and smart in the eyes of specific peers. In conclusion, the emotion and attitudes 
of serving one’s own self-interest manifest as a behavioral hindrance to engaging and 
involving others in joint futures knowledge interpretation.   
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Figure 4. Dilemmas of futures knowledge interpretation: jumping to conclu-
sions and reverse reasoning in the flow of interpretation as part of strategizing 
 
When asked about the behavioral aspects of interpretation, a number of practitioners 
talked about a specific type of negative behavior. According to them, ‘jumping to con-
clusions’ is what some managers tend to do when presented with trend insights, scenarios 
or even initial assumptions about possible futures. Instead of allowing for elaborations 
and discussions of effect interpretations, these managers disregard interpretation and di-
alogue, and instead voice action options and muse about the potential outcomes of strat-
egies the futures knowledge (often still in the progress of being created) is implying or 
could be perceived to imply. As a result, they break down the logical flow of interpreta-
tion and reasoning. Using the model I developed for illustrating the interpretation flow 
and its integration with strategizing in chapter 2.3.3, I visualize the influence of jumping 
to conclusions in Figure 4. 
A Director of Insights shared an example of this behavior from a recent strategy pro-
cess, where already in the first strategy workshop of many, some business managers 
raised questions should a brand be discontinued, or production be transferred to another 
country, even when analysis of what was happening and what it meant for the firm had 
not really even begun in the participating teams. The Director of Insights also illustrated 
how managers also bind futures thinking with perceived realities of the present, asking if 
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something, often a strategy or an initiative, is possible given the current state of the com-
pany or its micro-environment, thus narrowing and scoping the discussion and limiting 
imagination and dialogue. In both cases, I argue this behavior effectively nullifies inter-
pretation by leaping to discussion about preferable actions or at least inhibits the elabora-
tion of interpretations: in an instant, implicit process, managers develop lines of reasoning 
from state uncertainties to effect interpretations, strategic action option formulation and 
finally to action decisions. Additionally, just as self-interest manifests as unwillingness 
to involve others in knowledge creation and interpretation, self-interest and emotions like 
fear manifest as jumping to conclusions, a defense mechanism to cope with new 
knowledge.   
However, the behavior has other potential dire effects in addition to disrupting and 
skipping the logical flow of interpretation. The Head of Development, while describing 
an earlier strategy development project where the aim was to develop a new vision for 
the company’s digitally driven and data-centric operations, pointed out how unilateral 
interpretations of future trends’ impacts combined with jumping to conclusions can actu-
ally reverse the flow of interpretation and reasoning. In the project, the first challenge was 
how the new vision was developed with a pre-formulated action recommendation in 
mind. This constitutes the original ‘jump’ to a conclusion. The strategy recommendation 
was then argued to be optimal by developing alternative, less feasible and suitable action 
options that were presented side-by-side with the recommendation. In the presentation, 
the relevance and importance of the recommendation was then argued for by how well it 
addresses business implications that notable external trends have. However, the external 
trends were short-listed and chosen according to how they fit with the original action 
recommendation, its features and the implications it addressed! Thus instead of starting 
from the external trends and objectively building the case for a new strategy through state, 
effect and response interpretations and open discussion, the case was built in reverse.  In 
Figure 4 above, the flow of reverse reasoning illustrates this dynamic. I argue that when 
interpretation occurs in reverse, it reduces itself into the dynamic of lobbyists and politi-
cians with interests and agendas they wish to further. If it happens only in reverse, it 
removes iteration from the cycle and threatens the rationality, transparency and objectiv-
ity of interpretation.  
4.4.3 Input-related factors 
In addition to organizational and personal factors, a number of practitioners mentioned 
how inputs of interpretation, namely futures knowledge itself and understanding of real 
and perceived path dependencies of the company and its micro and macro-environments, 




Table 12. Input-related factors impacting futures knowledge interpretation 





• Quality, volume and availability of futures 
knowledge, 
• its distance to business 
Path de-
pendencies  
• Perceived and real path dependencies affecting indi-
vidual and organizational decision-making 
   
The volume and quality of futures knowledge can affect interpretation both negatively 
and positively. A Director of Insight reflected how a previous strategy process had built 
on a rich base of futures knowledge, drawn from trend analysis, weak signal scanning, 
ethnography and lead user interviews, and semiotics. Thus, a fuller picture of the envi-
ronmental change emerged, and well-argued interpretations could be made. However, he 
also admitted that some managers felt they were swamped by the amount of information. 
A Head of Strategy noted a common contradiction among her clientele: often, senior 
managers desire a simple interpretation and action recommendation, endorsed with clear 
figures, from a futures context that was complex and driven by systemic, inter-related 
factors. When managers are overloaded with information and perceive external factors as 
too abstract and complex, their interpretation focuses on more tangible, operational mat-
ters which are something they can decide and act on. The quality of futures knowledge is 
therefore subjective and hard to assess, even though it is required for strategic decision-
making.  
Examples of good quality futures knowledge, given by interviewees, included charac-
teristics like being supported by real-life cases (e.g. forerunner companies or showing 
trends already having an impact in some other country, market or industry). When he 
talked about what makes futures knowledge valuable and credible, a Director of Insight 
pointed out that futures knowledge, such as reports, should include assessments of how 
probable external changes were and how considerable, or large, their impact would be, in 
addition to what the nature of the change is. I argue such, even qualitative, assessment is 
an important mechanism to facilitate and encourage contextualization of change effects. 
Such ‘meta-data’ about the external change provides the first understanding that bridges 
the analysis gap between external and internal environments.  With the ‘meta-data’, the 
perceived quality of the knowledge is not only improved, as pointed out by the Director 
of Insight, but managers are better equipped to interpret its detailed implications to their 
strategy and organization.  
Interviewees mentioned how futures knowledge and its perceived quality and credibil-
ity can suffer if strategizing stakeholders have not been involved in its creation. This 
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challenge concerns a quality characteristic of futures knowledge called ‘distance to busi-
ness’ (Hines and Gold 2013). It refers to where futures knowledge was created, by whom, 
and about what topic, in relation to the user of futures knowledge and their context. Pref-
erably, the ‘distance’ would always be as short as possible: as a Research Scientist admit-
ted, futures knowledge is often peripheral, removed from the daily life of managers and 
abstract to the point of seeming irrelevant, compared to other types of past and present 
based information.    
Along with the volume and quality of futures knowledge, a mentioned input-related 
factor were the path dependencies of the company and its environment. In other words, 
the content and outcomes of foresight interpretation are impacted by the history of the 
company. Like noted earlier in this section, how history is perceived can affect emotions 
and attitudes, but it is used directly in sense-making as an input as well. Interestingly, a 
Head of Strategy talked about how moldable history was: 
 
“I thought earlier that history is written in stone, but my work has made me realize 
that you can really rewrite history too… like someone said, past is fiction, future 
is real.” (Interviewee, Head of Strategy) 
 
Nonetheless, history is used as a context for interpretation. A Head of Development 
told about how their industry is viewed by senior managers as slow-moving and rigid by 
historical nature, and futures knowledge on the contrary and subsequent effect interpre-
tations and action responses are challenged using the industry’s path dependencies as 
counterarguments. A Director of Insight explained how in his company that mainly pro-
duces consumer durables, current businesses are locked into certain business models, and 
when presented with new knowledge and interpretations, their owners immediately revert 
to path dependencies in defense: 
 
“They ask me, ‘from what is this new thinking taking away, what is it discontinu-
ing, I have a certain budget to operate with, if I over-invest in something new that 
won’t even generate profit in the first years, how can I argue for that [to my su-
periors]’?”  (Interviewee, Director of Insight) 
4.5 How to perform valuable futures knowledge interpretation 
Early in his interview, a Research Scientist commented how futures knowledge today is 
becoming a basic commodity, widely available online in forms of trend reports, publi-
cized scenarios by companies, governments and NGOs, articles by researchers, white pa-
pers and blog posts by experts, among others. If such ‘un-tailored’, general futures 
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knowledge is truly a basic commodity, the fact only accentuates how important interpre-
tation is as a way of adding value to futures knowledge. But the question remains: how 
to perform futures knowledge interpretation that is valuable to companies as they strate-
gize? Put differently, what capabilities does valuable interpretation require, and what 
tools are used? 
As I strive to answer the above questions, I have to note that the skills and capabilities 
discussed next could also be perceived to be success factors of foresight interpretation: if 
practitioners and managers lack them, they become hindrances to successful interpreta-
tion. Similarly, if they do not possess these capabilities, the  individuals cannot utilize 
them to manage other factors influencing interpretation. Instead of viewing them as be-
havioral factors (and discussing them in the previous chapter), I categorize them as ‘meta-
capabilities’ of futures knowledge interpretation. I argue this separation allows me to ap-
preciate their nuanced, two-fold nature. In this section, I first explore what capabilities, 
expertise and personal traits are required for performing successful, valuable interpreta-
tion, then what practical techniques and tools are used in interpretation, and finally what 
practical means help manage factors that influence interpretation.       
4.5.1 Ideal capabilities, expertise and traits  
I asked the practitioners about how interpretation ideally happens and what kind of indi-
vidual characteristics and capabilities either are necessary for successful interpretation or 
make up what they believe is an interpretation capability. Their answers split into three 
groups: the capabilities that could be trained, the expertise that could be attained through 
experience (akin to information) and the traits that are part of one’s attitudes or personal-
ity. To ensure that the conclusions about ideal capabilities do not become a laundry list 
of general characteristics of foresighters or knowledge-workers, but actually include only 
relevant findings that are directly related to futures knowledge interpretation, I must eval-
uate the findings critically.  Without the risk of falling to the trap of circular, self-explan-
atory logic, I can show that each of the presented capabilities, expertise areas and traits 
can be included in the conclusions  by identifying the objectives, core characteristic, and/ 
or factors of interpretation that they affect. In other words, I can logically develop a ca-
pability set, or outline an ‘interpretation capability’, based on what interpretation aims to 
achieve, what it is ideally, and how to manage the structural, personal and input factors 
that affect it. I consider each of the capabilities, types of expertise and traits and how they 




Table 13. Summary of the capabilities, expertise and personal traits that are 











Structured cognition and tool use 
Turning interpretations into action 
Expertise  









Sense of responsibility 
Transparency 
   
As interpretation of effect uncertainties (i.e. uncovering and imagining implications of 
environmental factors to business) aims at problem solving, problem finding and expand-
ing understanding together with revealing managers’ cognitive frames, it is unsurprising 
that practitioners mentioned imagination and analytical thinking as key capabilities. In-
terestingly, none of the interviewers referred specifically to creativity when speaking of 
the imaginative aspects of interpretation, though a few inferred interpretation to be a cre-
ative process. For example, when elaborating on imagination as a characteristic of fore-
sighters, a Head of Strategy simply called it “insightfulness” and “the ability to see farther 
than others, more clearly”, implying this to be a personal trait rather than a capability. In 
my analysis, however, I adopt the actionable aspect of creativity (i.e., that is the ability to 
act and create something new) and I specify the use of imagination, or imagining, as the 
act of explorative intuiting (Crossan et al. 1999, see discussion in 2.2.1.3)  which involves 
making novel connections between trends, factors, phenomena and the business. When I 
conflate creativity with imagination, I suggest that imagination, as understood here, can 
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be trained as a capability, rather than a trait of being imaginative or insightful, as the Head 
of Strategy remarked.  
If the use of imagination is about making the connections, I then suggest analytical 
thinking can be viewed as the rigorous, objective examination of said connections. Logi-
cally inferring this, I claim, requires a number of meta-capabilities the interviewees noted: 
first, interpreters must be able to structure their thinking. A Senior Partner in a foresight 
consultancy referred this to as “being systematic” in one’s reasoning. Such structured 
approach is naturally facilitated by ability to use tools and frameworks (which are dis-
cussed in the next chapter). Subsequently, the ability of tool use includes tools and frame-
works that are in the realm of foresight or futures studies, hence, expertise in foresight is 
a component of this ability.  
Several interviewees indicated how central asking questions is to foresight interpreta-
tion. Therefore, I’ve included the skill of query as an ideal capability of practitioners. 
When interpreting effects and responses, asking questions is not only about elaborating 
on perceived implications and challenging personal assumptions that reveal how one has 
arrived to their conclusions, as a Foresight Consultant pointed out, but also identifying 
the underlying reasons why one has arrived to certain conclusions about effects and re-
sponses. Such query is integral to interpretation’s core characteristic of critical reflection, 
which I presented in chapter 4.3.      
As several interviewees highlighted, the skill of query has to be complemented with 
the ability to debate logically. Put differently, this means the ability to present logical 
arguments, not only for initial interpretations of futures knowledge, which foresighters 
provide for decision-makers, as a Research Scientist highlighted, but also when conver-
sations about futures and iteration through questioning generate new interpretations. 
Here, I conflate logical, rational presentation of arguments thus with the skill of main-
taining a rational debate. 
If interpretation is seen as dialogic, social and to have the purpose of sense-giving 
through shared interpretations, it comes as no surprise how practitioners emphasized the 
abilities of effective communication and creating networks of relationships with other 
individuals. An important aspect of communication mentioned was to summarize one’s 
own thinking and message.  A Senior Partner at a foresight consultancy noted how im-
portant confidence is for a practitioner to be able to give presentations and handle some-
times heated debates in a social setting with top management, as futures knowledge and 
interpretations often provoke emotional responses from senior managers. Subsequently, 
based on my own experience as management consultant, I suggest posing questions to 
top executives (in a manner discussed above) also requires courage, if questions challenge 
the cognition, beliefs, or behavior of said executives.   
Related to creating relationships is what I refer to as sourcing, or the ability to develop, 
maintain and utilize rich base of sources for futures knowledge, both within and external 
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to the organization. Perhaps unsurprisingly, particularly those interviewees operating in-
side companies (and not as external consultants), like the Director of Insight, emphasized 
the “richness of sources”: he also celebrated how one of his major foresight projects had 
used a wide range of insights and knowledge gathering techniques. While the extent of 
available futures knowledge in each case should be appropriate, futures knowledge is 
simply necessary for its interpretation and it is thus not difficult to argue that being able 
to efficiently access futures knowledge is a critical capability of interpretation. 
To be able to be inquisitive and imaginative, interviewees mentioned a necessary per-
sonal trait of curiosity and learning about new things and the capability to explore. A HR 
Manager said one has to have “crazy curiosity”, referring to a sort of bold openness to 
things. A Head of Strategy put it bluntly when she said “if you’re not willing to learn - - 
to be curious, you’re on weak ice”. She also described exploration as looking for things 
without knowing what to look for, searching for information about things that there is no 
information about, or searching insights based on a scope or a frame (e.g. a business need 
or an industry) but without heeding the scope. Exploration, like many other activities and 
characteristics of interpretation, emerges as paradoxical. Granted, one could argue that 
exploration is not a particular aspect of interpretation (which assumes that exploration has 
been done and futures knowledge as an input has been generated). However, interpreta-
tion, as noted earlier, is iterative in nature. It generates new questions for which new 
futures knowledge has to be created, before further shared interpretations can be made. 
Therefore, I argue the skill of exploration becomes relevant to interpreters insofar it is a 
part of the iteration.  
To create inputs for interpretation, i.e. futures knowledge and analysis of the past and 
present of the business and its environment, one needs both foresight and industry sub-
stance expertise (see chapter 4.4.2). However, as noted by the interviewees, practitioners 
also need to balance the influence of these expertise areas according to the business need 
and purpose of interpretation, that is, whether it is problem-solving or problem-finding in 
nature. The third expertise (i.e. attained more through experience than outright training) 
is general knowledgeability. This was highlighted by a Senior Partner of a foresight con-
sultancy, who argued good general awareness of social issues, technology development, 
politics, history etc. provides a basis for intuiting and analytical thinking both.      
As interpretation in a social context is based on trust, interviewees noted how it re-
quires personal transparency, objectivity and also empathy. Based on their commentary, 
I suggest transparency and objectivity are particularly important to critical self-reflection 
and managing self-interests. When managers experience others as transparent and objec-
tive, this together with their genuine empathy or interest towards others breed a sense of 
trust to engage in imaginative interpretation and the courage to come out behind one’s 
role. 
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Finally, the ideal outcome of interpretation is that it leads to action or creates actiona-
ble results. From an individual’s capability perspective, the ability to turn interpretations 
into action requires multiple things. A Head of Strategic Foresight gave illustrative ex-
amples how he connects foresight practitioners with relevant counterparts inside client 
organizations, utilizes his considerable industry expertise to provide interpretations and 
recommendations that managers can use directly, and involves managers responsible for 
execution throughout the foresight process. Furthermore, as a Director of Insight ex-
plained, actionability requires a sense of responsibility or ownership of the interpretations 
among interpreters, decisionmakers and those acting on interpretations and decisions, 
which to him in ideal situations are all the same people.    
The logical relationships of necessary capabilities and the different purposes, objec-
tives and ideal characteristics of futures knowledge interpretation presented above are not 
conclusive. Their relationships could be discussed even further and other connections 
could be made, but my analysis shows the relevance of the suggested ideal capabilities, 
expertise and traits. Furthermore, given the explorative nature and limitations of my 
study, I cannot claim that the list of findings is comprehensive. However, if a practitioner 
has such a capability set, what are then the practical tools and frameworks they can utilize 
to perform interpretation in practice?       
4.5.2 Practical tools 
While most of the interviewees agreed that futures knowledge interpretation is about ex-
ercising intuition, the study nevertheless aimed to shed light on the practice of interpreta-
tion by asking practitioners about the frameworks, techniques and tools they use and have 
found helpful for engaging managers3. By providing structure for cognition and imagina-
tion, these are what allow for heightened analytical thinking during interpretation. The 
frameworks and practical techniques mentioned by interviewees are listed in Table 14 
below. The table uses the same classification logic as one I identified for tools and tech-
niques mentioned in existing academic literature (see discussion in chapters 2.2.1.1.3 and 
2.2.1.3) . 
Without explicitly naming the framework, an HR Manager described how they ap-
proach futures interpretation with TOWS, a reverse SWOT analysis model, where the 
starting point of analysis is identifying the threats an external driver presents to the com-
pany, then trying to imagine opportunities (or reimagine threats as opportunities) it offers 
 
3 The interviewers, particularly those on the external consultant side, presented some of their templates and 
frameworks during interviews, but given how they constitute a major part of their competitive advantage 
and often include confidential information, I cannot reproduce and present them in full in this analysis. 
However, the examples interviewees gave show the variety of perspectives available for practitioners. 
103 
before elaborating the internal implications by imagining emerging weaknesses and de-
sirable strengths of the organization.    
 




TOWS (reverse SWOT analysis) model 
VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity) model  
Micro-environment models (with or without internal environment) 
End-customer perspective (e.g. customer journey models) 
Business model canvas 
Techniques 
"Trip to Mars", inspired narration 
Back-casting 
Trend hunting trips 
Stakeholder validation interviews and meetings 
Stories, narratives 
Tools 
Trend analysis software and online tools (e.g. Futures Platform) 
Digital tools for collaboration and co-creation 
 
VUCA (acronym of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity) was mentioned 
by a Head of Strategic Foresight as something he is aware is used in the field but which 
personally doesn’t rely on anymore. In brief, VUCA is a cognitive framework for identi-
fying the characteristics of the external environment when doing foresight or interpreting, 
and thus is not applicable for interpreting the implications of external factors to business 
per se. Yet, by helping to understand the nature of the external environment, I suggest it 
can be a useful framework for initiating state, if not effect, uncertainty analysis.  
Different templates for modeling the micro-environment of the company were shown 
during the interviews. These force interpreters to consider the effects of external changes 
from the perspective of their external stakeholders, e.g. customers, suppliers, partners and 
competitors. In some cases, the models equally included the internal environment, i.e. 
company’s resources, capabilities and questions about how external changes affect the 
business models of the company, and who is the company’s employee in the future. Such 
approaches, if being more detailed, resembled TOWS models. The end-customer perspec-
tive, being either the customer or the consumer, was the most used segment of the micro-
environment. In one example, interpretation begun with the question ‘what does our fu-
ture customer look like’. A Head of Strategic Foresight e.g. commented how models of 
customer journeys, or processes through which customers engage with their product and 
service providers as they search, choose, buy and use products and services, are used as 
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frames to make sense of how trends impact the life of consumers, and subsequently, the 
business of the provider.  
Finally, practitioners used ways to model the company itself in order to flesh out the 
implications of external factors: one mentioned framework was the business model can-
vas, popularized by Osterwalder (2005), which includes as perspectives the company’s 
key partners, key activities, key resources, value propositions, types of customer relation-
ships, channels to reach customers, target customer segments, cost structure and revenue 
streams. The differences between models used to analyze the businesses vary in depth 
and detail and most importantly in the questions they pose to sense-makers. 
In addition to ‘hard’ cognitive frameworks, interviewees shared a few examples of 
practical techniques and ‘tricks’ to facilitate interpretation. The playfulness of approaches 
was underlined. A Lead Business Designer told she had found useful a method she called 
‘trip to Mars’, where she asked managers to imagine they had gone to Mars and come 
back, a journey that had taken two or three years and during which they had not been able 
to contact home, and then told them to describe that their business looked like after they 
returned, based on their understanding of how futures will unfold. Instead of simply ask-
ing “what is the situation in three years’ time and what has led to it”, the playfulness of 
the premise together with futuristic images of Mars spaceships and rovers inspire imagi-
nation and thinking. A reverse example of trip to Mars is back-casting, a technique where 
an implication or a situation are presented as given, but managers need to elaborate how 
the situation was reached or the implication became real. Another playful example given 
was a news interview in the future, where a manager had to play themselves in the future, 
explaining to a journalist what had led to the present (future) situation.  
Trend hunting trips can serve as an example of both a space for interpretation and a 
technique to facilitate interpretation. A Head of Strategic Foresight described how he 
takes his clients across the world in such trips: for these, the clients inform him of a hand-
ful of themes or trends they’d want to learn about, in general and in terms of their future 
business, and the Head of Strategic Foresight looks for forerunners globally: examples of 
early adopter individuals or companies who already are embodying the trend and could 
serve as a learning and interpretation mechanisms about change and what it could mean 
for his clients. The Head of Strategic Foresight himself as well becomes familiar with the 
subjects as he plans the visits and participates in interpretations by fusing the content of 
the trips with his industry expertise in the form of action recommendations. 
Several interviewees also mentioned how interpretation occurs not only inside the fo-
rums of the company, but with and by their stakeholders, namely customers. While it 
requires specific capabilities as discussed above, managers themselves can engage their 
customers in dialogue and query directly from them how they envision the impacts of 
external changes. In many cases, such stakeholder interviews and meetings where used 
to validate initial interpretations or to bolster the process with further interpretations.      
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Another technique to facilitate imagination and analysis was storytelling: like a Direc-
tor of Insight recollected, interpretation sessions during a previous strategy process often 
begun with visual narratives depicting a preliminary understanding of what was happen-
ing, why, and how it was affecting the wider world and the company. These were the 
initial interpretations of practitioners, designed to provoke a response among managers 
and kick-start their personal interpretation processes.  
Finally, interviewees shared a few comments about tools they use for interpreting. Fu-
tures Platform, a digital trend analysis tool offered by a Finnish company of the same 
name, was mentioned several times. Futures Platform can be used for collaborative fu-
tures knowledge creation and gathering, trend impact analysis, and factor impact rating 
and evaluation, among others. As an Information Specialist noted, such tools are used 
especially to share learning and interpretations across organizational boundaries, between 




5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
My thesis poses two questions:  
1) How foresight practitioners interpret futures knowledge for the use of strate-
gizing  
2) Why interpretation occurs as it does  
I have the specific aim to study the practice of futures knowledge interpretation from 
practitioner and systemic perspectives. Put practically, my thesis explores and describes 
the behavior of foresight practitioners and its drivers as they respond to their colleagues’ 
question “what does this futures knowledge mean for us and our organization” and “how 
should we act accordingly”. Here, I strive to provide new understanding of how practi-
tioners interpret futures knowledge for their colleagues’ use and subsequently try to ad-
dress research gaps highlighted by other academics, namely that the foresight theory lacks 
understanding of the individual practice (Tapinos and Pyper 2018, 294) in general and 
that foresight interpretation as a process is poorly understood (Horton 1999, 7) in partic-
ular. My thesis also serves a more wider purpose of trying to synthesize from existing 
theory and empirical evidence and new empirical findings a comprehensive, if not ex-
haustive, framework of futures knowledge interpretation that can be used to understand 
it as both as an activity that can be managed and as a personal capability that can be 
developed. Moreover, with the framework I attempt to understand futures knowledge in-
terpretation more comprehensively and specifically than has previously been discussed 
in futures studies field.  
In this section I bring together existing theory and evidence and new findings in an 
attempt to understand futures knowledge interpretation both as an activity and a capabil-
ity.  Weick illustrates a key challenge this thesis grapples with when he writes that “sense-
making tends to be swift, which means we are more likely to see products than process.” 
(Weick 1995, 49). Interpretation is personal, and it seems swift partly because it is highly 
intuitive, as both existing theory and new findings agree. Furthermore, simplifying inter-
pretation to a process with inputs, actions and outputs is not sufficient if the intention is 
to understand it well enough to develop one’s own actions and capability to perform it in 
a way that is valuable in practice. Because interpretation is in part personal and intuitive, 
the need to understand it more as a capability than a rigid process increases. Thus, while 
they are important, one has to look beyond the inputs, actions and outputs of the activity 
and grasp the factors that affect its success, the means to manage the factors, the practical 
tools that are used in interpretation, and the skills and expertise that make up the capabil-
ity.  
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5.1 Purpose and objectives of futures knowledge interpretation 
The theory and academic discussion in the field of futures studies at large covers the wide 
range of purposes and objectives of corporate foresight in general. These include e.g. 
creating awareness and deeper understanding of external, ‘state’ uncertainty (e.g. Hines 
2003, 32; Voros 2003) but also of ‘effect uncertainty’ implications of external change to 
businesses and business strategic decision-making (e.g. Horton 1999, 7; Rohrbeck 2012, 
449; Heger and Rohrbeck 2012, 829; Ruff 2015, 47). The research in this study shows 
that foresight practitioners view the business context, e.g. the goals, operations and re-
sources of the company, as the domain from which the case-specific business needs and 
use cases for foresight and interpretations emerge. Objectives of futures knowledge inter-
pretation stem from concrete business needs, and while state interpretations are neces-
sary, I suggest futures knowledge is only valuable when it is contextualized to the organ-
ization at hand. The purposes for creating futures knowledge also range from the wide-
scope, explorative search of ‘problem-finding’, where the understanding of implications 
to business emerge from open-ended futures knowledge creation and interpretation, to 
‘problem-solving’ type of futures knowledge creation and interpretation, where the aim 
is to address business-oriented, specific issues and problems (see e.g. Hines 2003). Even 
when business strategists have a mentality of ‘problem-finding’, the driving purpose can 
of course be business-centric, meaning that futures knowledge is created and used to e.g. 
help determine vision or strategy of the company, yet, I argue the crucial difference is 
exactly at the level of interpretation. Here, the type and level of strategic questions differ, 
and as questions differ, so do the frameworks used in interpretation. When managers are 
problem-solving, the frameworks and contexts used for interpreting the implications of 
macro and micro environmental change are specified to the pre-determined problem. 
Here, available time is a practical constraint. When managers problem-find, the frame-
works and context become more open and can cover the entire organization. Futures 
knowledge creation becomes more an issue of exploration and discovery, or looking for 
things one does not know they are looking for. It is up to the mentality of the managers 
to then determine whether they interpret the findings narrowly, in the context of an indi-
vidual business decision or problem, or more widely, in the context of the company and 
its strategies.  
While the interviewed practitioners themselves universally claim that interpretation 
and futures knowledge creation at large should stem from clearly articulated business 
needs, I suggest this does not mean that the initiative for strategic search for futures 
knowledge should only flow from the business context. Consider wildcard situations like 
the COVID-19 pandemic: here a company is subjected to an external crisis where the 
impetus of futures knowledge creation is not the company but the external, massively 
impactful factor. Here one has to interpret and understand the state uncertainties first in 
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order to focus on effect uncertainties. However, based on both views of interviewed fore-
sight practitioners and findings of other researchers (e.g. Rohrbeck 2012) one could argue 
that futures knowledge, even though its creation has been driven by the external context, 
only becomes valuable when it is interpreted into the internal context.  
As the findings of this research suggest, interpretations of futures knowledge have a 
key role in strategizing. As a Head of Strategic Foresight pointed out, interpretations are 
building blocks of the change narrative of the company that tells why it must change, how 
it changes and when. However, as Jarzabkowski (2005, 5) notes, strategy does not only 
concern change, but it often involves reproduction and maintenance as well. Thus, I pro-
pose interpretations about the future could rather be viewed as part of strategic narratives, 
stories about why a company must act, how it acts, and when, that are communicated to 
stakeholders to facilitate the desired action. A Foresight Consultant put it similarly if 
somewhat more concretely when she said foresight helps in development of the com-
pany’s vision and its strategic options and determining the correct time to implement the 
strategic choices. In other words, it helps provide the what, how, and when of the com-
pany’s strategies.  
5.2 Outcomes of futures knowledge interpretation 
Along with different purposes and objectives, both existing research and this study show 
that futures knowledge interpretation has multiple outcomes, i.e. products and benefits, 
when it is applied in the context of strategy making.  
First, interpretation, when it is understood as contextualization of futures knowledge, 
produces understanding of effect uncertainties. Concretely, these are awareness and 
knowledge of opportunities and threats that the external changes pose of the company 
(e.g. Day and Schoemaker 2004, 128; 2005, Ralston and Wilson 2006, 142), but also 
knowledge of what I call ‘positives’: positive implications of external change to the com-
pany that do not require action or pro-action on behalf of the company to realize the im-
pact, unlike opportunities do. Put in another perspective, the understanding of effect un-
certainty is the understanding of organizational resilience, because awareness of possible 
implications can be used to assess the current state of the company in the face of potential 
external change.  
Second, interpretation produces understanding of response uncertainty, i.e. under-
standing of the possible outcomes of strategic actions the company can take in the futures 
context to both the company’s performance itself and its own micro- and macroenviron-
ment (e.g. Ralston & Wilson 2006, 149; van der Heijden 2005, 273-5; Lehr et al. 2017, 
216-9). Here, the question of “what do the possible futures mean for us” becomes a ques-
109 
tion of future robustness, feasibility and suitability of current strategic choices and strat-
egy alternatives. Instead of focusing on the present, the attention turns to considering the 
possible futures and the current strategic direction and possible action options of the or-
ganization, and the question becomes will the company have the resilience and ability to 
survive and thrive in the future. When considering the future context and the possible 
strategic avenues the company can take, managers also ask themselves which alternative 
is the optimal. When addressing response uncertainties, the relationship of the future state 
of the company with the future external environment is interpreted: this includes under-
standing what implications the company’s strategic choices might have on its micro- and 
macro-environment, but also how alternative futures might affect different strategic 
choices and their realization. Interpretation informs the managers about the relationship 
of the firm and the external environment, which as Rumelt points out, is the focus of 
strategy (Rumelt 1979, 196). Ultimately, interpretations of the relationship should lead to 
conclusions about strategy alternatives and choices of action.  
Such products – opportunities, threats, positives and conclusions about strategy alter-
natives – in turn inform the company about issues relevant in the external context and the 
need to take action. This is true to both narrowly scoped strategy questions such as 
whether or not to launch a new product line, or wider strategy questions such as what the 
corporate level vision and objectives of the company are. As several interviewed foresight 
practitioners indicated, interpretations should lead to action. To enable such an outcome, 
people involved in interpretation should take ownership of the results, as a Director of 
Insight noted, and disseminate and argue for the shared conclusions in the organization. 
Furthermore, interpretation activities should, among others, be integrated in strategizing 
and corporate processes, for example, interpretation should have time reserved for it in 
the top management agenda. Interpreters, strategists and implementers should be, if not 
the same people, closely networked not only socially but also structurally, in terms of 
roles, responsibilities, forums and agendas. A Head of Strategic Foresight described this 
well when he urged interpreters, decision-makers and implementers to have counterparts 
in the organization who fluidly can communicate and co-operate in turning foresight into 
action.  
Action is not the only potentially beneficial outcome of performing interpretation. Ac-
cording to existing theory and new empirical findings, these can include: 
• Learning and unlearning (see e.g. Crossan et al. 1999, van der Heijden 2005, Hu-
ber 1991) 
• Challenged cognitive frames (e.g. Day and Schoemaker 2004, Hines 2003) 
• Shared understanding (Daft & Weick 1984, Crossan et al. 1999, Weick 1995, 
Ramirez et al. 2013) 
• Coalescence to one view or expanded horizons of many views (Crossan et al. 
1999, Weick 1995) 
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• Grown hunger for change 
• Constructive emotions: increased optimism, courage, open-mindedness, willing-
ness to act and experiment, and negative but useful emotional responses, such as 
impatience or anger in the company’s sluggishness to act in the face of external 
change forces 
• Coming up with new relevant questions for iterative futures knowledge creation 
and interpretation 
• Promotion of futures thinking in the organization 
 
If interpretation is made according to business needs in one hand and the level of strategic 
questions – being either of problem solving or finding type – on the other, what deter-
mines what is interpreted for strategy making, and if it is done at all? In other words, if 
business needs and strategic questions drive interpretation as an activity, what drives the 
content of interpretation?  
Case-specific business needs, influencing factors such as limited time and managerial 
self-interests and the need to know how to act all scope what is interpreted in strategizing 
contexts according to the findings of this thesis. I claim that what connects them is the 
issue of relevance: they all help scope what external signal or change is relevant. Rele-
vance in turn determines what should be interpreted. If uncertainty of decisions about 
strategic action is a crucial driver of interpretation, then signals are deemed relevant if 
they require action on behalf of the organization. Similarly, if managerial self-interests 
drive interpretation, then signals that affect them positively or negatively and thus require 
reaction or pro-action are considered to be relevant. Thus, whether or not a signal requires 
a response becomes a filter, one that defines what is interpreted or not. This poses a risk 
of blind spots, as if a signal has no perceived relevance, its interpretation is likely to be 
ignored. Furthermore, this also presents a paradox: if the act of interpreting uncovers what 
is relevant by producing a shared understanding of the implication to business, how do 
individuals know what to begin interpreting, i.e. what is/could be relevant? Here, issues 
the findings and theory have discussed such as individual intuition and self-interests, and 
power dynamics and politics that manifest as expected and explicit interests of the organ-
ization at large and other stakeholders in the organization could be considered as ‘pre-
social’, ‘pre-shared’ filters for interpreting, meaning that these direct individuals as they 
note and bracket signals and ponder where to focus their attention and time required for 
in-depth interpreting. Yet, I believe relevance is ultimately established socially through 
interpretation, dialogue and integration that lead to shared understandings. I argue this 
applies even if individual figures have absolute authority in the organization and who 
force their views unto others, because each person is unique in terms of their personal 
background and cognitive views and they cannot be expected to perfectly reproduce the 
imagination and thinking of others.  
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On the topic of relevance in interpretation, I find it interesting how indications from 
the interviewees about actionability being a key ideal characteristic of interpretation be-
trays a bias in corporate thinking. Based on the discussion in the literature review (see 
chapter 2.2.3), I claim that perceived effects of environmental uncertainty, not the need 
for action, is what determines relevancy of environmental uncertainty. An action bias, or 
response bias, directs attention towards uncertainty whose effects demand action, i.e. op-
portunities and threats, and ignores uncertainty with positive effects that do not require 
action from the outset or based on an initial interpretation. While understanding of the 
latter type of effects might be argued to be ‘nice-to-know’ knowledge, they might cloak 
a threat or a missed opportunity. Returning to an earlier example about meat producers 
and increasing demand for pork, and how this initially could be viewed as a simple posi-
tive effect not requiring a response (e.g. realignment of strategy) on behalf of the pro-
ducer: such a bias on action instead of focusing on indepth awareness of effects could 
blind the meat producer to the risk of the growing market attracting new producers that 
not only compete for the new demand but also for existing market shares. Avoiding action 
bias is also exactly what Day and Schoemaker (2004, 138-9) imply when they recommend 
managers to suspend the urge reach a quick judgment and avoid trying to reach a consen-
sus on one meaning. The bias for action also hints at reasons why strategy is viewed 
primarily being about change instead of reproduction and maintenance: action is implied 
to be about doing something new, about changing behavior or strategy, or trying some-
thing different, instead of maintaining course and continuing the implementation of ex-
isting strategies. 
5.3 Core characteristics and practice of interpretation  
What is futures knowledge interpretation in practice? How does it happen, and according 
to foresight practitioners, how should it happen? Asking these two questions separately 
is deliberate, because theory of organizational sense-making (see e.g. Weick 1995), or-
ganizational learning (see e.g. Crossan et al. 1999) and relationship of foresight and strate-
gizing (see e.g. Kaplan and Orlikowski 2013) provides a wealth of descriptive under-
standing of the practice of interpretation, in other words how it happens, whereas new 
empirical evidence sheds light on its normativity, i.e. how it should ideally happen to be 
valuable for companies and their strategy making. These opinions of normativity can be 
complemented with other findings and expert opinions that concern the measurement of 
foresight in general and its interpretation in particular (in e.g. Rollwagen et al. 2008, 
Rijkens-Klomp 2012, Piirainen et al. 2012, and Van Twist and Van der Steen 2012), be-
cause attributing measures to an activity means applying normativity to it.  In synthesis 
of the different existing theories and empirical evidence with the new findings, I suggest 
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that futures knowledge interpretation has twelve core characteristics, of six of with are 
descriptive (dubbed functional below in Table 15) and six are normative (dubbed ideal).  
 
Table 15. Synthesis of core characteristics of futures knowledge interpretation 
Functional 
Intuitive and analytical  
Continuous and iterative 
Individual and social: sense-making and giving 
Focused on and by extracted cues 
Based on and driven by cognitive frames and contexts 




Founded in trust 
Made in right time and space 
Rooted in participation and dialogue of different disciplines and per-
sonalities 
Actionable and fit for purpose 
Uses critical reflection 
Part of strategic decision-making processes and cycles 
 
I argue, based on its own findings and views of Crossan et al. (1999) that futures 
knowledge interpretation is a combination of intuitive and analytical thinking. Here, in-
tuition regards the use of creative abilities of imagination to make novel connections be-
tween issues, while analytical thinking concerns the ability to assess the meaning, strength 
and relevance of these connections in a structured, logical manner.    
Following the argument of Weick (1995, 43) who argues that sense-making is on-
going, similarly I suggest interpretation is continuous and iterative. As Orlikowski and 
Kaplan (2013, 978) suggest, strategic accounts required for decision-making and inter-
pretations they are based upon are provisional, i.e. subjected to constant iteration and 
reconsideration.   
The act of interpreting is both individual and social, as per the findings of this thesis 
and the existing theory on sense-making. If sense-making is about using personal cogni-
tive abilities of intuition and analytical assessment, it is inherently done by individuals. 
As Gioia and Chittipedi (1991) make a distinction between sense-making and sensegiving 
and given how power dynamics, organizational politics and emotions and personal inter-
ests of managers affect futures knowledge interpretation,  I too argue that sense is made 
individually, but it is given socially. Furthermore, this distinction is supported by Crossan 
et al. (1999, 525) who describe integration, a concept resembling sensegiving, as a pro-
cess where shared understanding is created among individuals and what follows interpre-
tation in their model for organizational learning. Being social, interpretation is not only 
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an act of intuiting and cognition, but also influencing and use of power, even if these 
occur with benign intentions.   
I agree with Weick (1995, 49) and suggest that interpretation is focused on and by 
extracted cues. Following Weick’s description, this means that interpretation requires in-
dividuals taking note of signals or cues, and how particularly surprising, alarming, pecu-
liar, colorful, abnormal etc. signals are noted. In other words, interpreting is about picking 
up signals for sense-making, but the signals themselves, their nature and form, partly de-
termine what is noted and what is not. 
Similarly to cues, I propose interpretation is based on and driven by cognitive frames 
and contexts. As Starbuck and Milliken (1988, 51) point out, sense-making is about “plac-
ing stimuli into some kind of framework”. These frameworks are both mental and tangible 
cognitive maps, such as beliefs of industry logic and SWOT matrices, respectively, and 
organizational and personal contexts that affect individual’s thought processes, such as 
company culture, personal history and experiences, etc. Interpretation requires these 
frameworks to happen, but the frameworks in turn also influence how interpretation is 
made and what it produces.  
The sixth and last descriptive type of core characteristic that I propose is how futures 
knowledge interpretation combines and rethinks futures with present concerns and his-
torical paths. This claim follows from the findings of Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013, 965) 
who argue that strategic decision-making requires organizations to “settle on particular 
strategic accounts that link interpretations of the past, present, and future in ways that 
appear coherent, plausible, and acceptable”. However, findings of this thesis suggest that 
not only do strategic accounts involve linking interpretations across different temporal 
levels, but so do the interpretations of futures knowledge themselves as well. As noted by 
a Director of Insight as he was describing a recent strategic process that included inter-
pretation and creation of shared understanding, interpreting the implications of external 
factors to the brand’s or, or company’s, future and setting up a vision of the business 
required reimagining the past of the company’s business, or seeing the past in a new light, 
thus more or less reinterpreting it. Put more concretely, in order for a manager to agree 
on an interpretation of an external, futures-based implication to the company or a brand, 
the interpretation must be coherent with interpretations of the environment’s and the com-
pany’s present states and histories. This core characteristic resembles what Weick (1995, 
18) argues is a property of sense-making, namely how it is grounded in identity construc-
tion. Just as Weick points out, interpretations challenge and reconstruct both personal and 
organizational notions of identity, particularly when coherence must be achieved between 
interpretations about the future of the organization and its past.        
In addition to six functional characteristics of futures knowledge interpretation, I sug-
gest there are six normative characteristics that should manifest in practice if interpreta-
tion is executed successfully.       
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First, interpretations must be founded in shared sense of trust to allow for free, fruitful 
exchange of ideas. This involves participants feeling safe to share their interpretations, 
views and opinions without fear of losing face or being ridiculed or dismissed. Per expert 
opinions of the interviewees, a shared sense of trust implies some familiarity between 
participants and even the notion of fun and having fun while interpreting effects and in-
tegrating shared understandings. 
Second, according to the interviewed experts and e.g. Day and Schoemaker (2005), 
the activity of interpretation should be rooted in dialogue and participation and not as a 
sole responsibility of one or few individuals. Furthermore, not only is dialogue encour-
aged, it is performed by individuals who differ in their areas of expertise, discipline and 
personalities. Instead of homogenous groups, interpreting, when it is most fruitful, brings 
together individuals with varying backgrounds.     
Third, following the insights from interviewees, interpretation should be made in the 
right time and space. The right time refers to timing: they should not be done too late 
because the organization cannot act upon the shared understanding, nor too early, if the 
organization lacks the sense of urgency to act upon the shared understanding. Right space 
refers in making the interpretations in forums and situations where the shared understand-
ings can be rolled out to processes and individuals who can promptly make relevant de-
cisions based on or act according to the conclusions.  
Fourth, interpretation should, unsurprisingly, then be actionable and lead to action by 
being fit for purpose, i.e. be based on and driven by real business needs, as highlighted 
by the interviewees and also other scholars and experts such as Schwartz (1998, xiv) and 
Rohrbeck (2012, 448). Fitness for purpose concerns also fit with political and organiza-
tional cues and processes – the social boundaries – of decision-making, as noted by Van 
der Steen and  Van Twist (2012, 482-4).  
Fifth, an individual performing interpretation should exercise critical reflection, not 
only towards the ideas, views and arguments of others, but especially their own. Here, 
managers should not only consider the logicality and rationality of their own arguments, 
but also ideally examine their own ways of thinking, in other words, why and how they 
arrive to their conclusions. Such reflection increases stakeholder rationality and transpar-
ency and helps identify their oft-hidden assumptions, which Rijkens-Klomp (2012, 438) 
and Piirainen et al. (2012, 471) also consider ideal effects of performing quality foresight. 
Last, in addition to being made in the right time and space, if interpretation aims to 
contribute to strategy making, it should be integrated into strategy making processes and 
planning cycles, as suggested by the interviewees. Related to this, also Rollwagen et al 
(2008, 342) propose the highest possible level of interaction between foresighters and 
decision-makers during interpretation as a principle of impactful foresight.  In practice, 
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interpretation should be in the management’s agenda, with time allotted for it, and fore-
sight and interpretations should fed to or be produced among strategy-making executives 
and stakeholders.
Futures knowledge interpretation thus has a number of descriptive characteristics, but 
also normative ones that illustrate how ideally it should be performed to produce value 
for strategy making in corporate contexts.             
5.4 Factors impacting the success of futures knowledge interpreta-
tion 
After synthesizing the findings and previous empirical evidence of purpose, outcomes 
and the core characteristics of futures knowledge interpretation, I turn to the multitude of 
factors influencing its success and performance. While I have not done quantitative as-
sessment of which factors are the most important, or have the strongest impact on the 
performance of interpretation, I have compiled the views from new (see chapter 4.4) and 
pre-existing empirical evidence (see chapter 2.2.2.3 for discussion). Table 16 presents the 
synthesis, which uses the same classification logic as my analysis of this study’s empirical 
findings on influencing factors.  
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• Integration with other structures and processes  
• incentive systems  
• top management encouragement and support  
• top management ways of working  
• (flat or rigid) hierarchies of management  
• management attitude towards ambiguity and uncertainty  
• cultural focus on the short term  
• freedom to think differently  
• curiosity and the openness to new ideas in the organiza-
tional culture  
• overall mood in the company 
• power dynamics among stakeholders 
Resources 
• available time and funding  
• managerial attention 
• access to information 
Space and 
timing 
• correct timing and demand for interpretation  
• available forums, channels and technologies  




• emotions  
• attitudes (incl. openness)  
• self-interests 
Cognitive  
• skepticism  
• personal experiences and education  
• biases (incl. Bounded rationality, attribute framing, 
risky framing, overconfidence, creeping determinism, 
groupthink & peer pressure, confirmation bias)  
• cognitive abilities and frames, incl. ’sacred cows’ 
beliefs  
• subject matter expertise on foresight and relevant indus-
tries 
Behavioral 
• level of involvement (of self and others)  
• engagement with others and ways of communication 
(incl. sharing) 





• Quality, volume and availability of futures knowledge  
• its distance to business  





• Perceived and real path dependencies of the firm and its 
environment affecting individual and organizational de-
cision-making 
 
I do not repeat the description and analysis of the factors in this section, but make a few 
concluding overall notes. First, while comprehensive, I cannot claim the list to be exhaus-
tive. However, it informs practitioners of the potential issues affecting their success and 
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provides them with means to reflect how they, strategy-making managers and the wider 
organization could be better managed to ensure better quality, fruitful interpretation. To 
an organizational developer with a systems analytical perspective, it provides a map for 
dialogue about pinpointing and addressing behaviors that lead to sub-optimal and/or un-
derperforming futures knowledge interpretation. Second, it is important to note that many 
of the factors are not inherently negative or positive. Rather, they can manifest with pos-
itive or negative effects to interpretation. It is up to the foresighters and executives to 
manage these factors in a way that leads to their positive influence.     
5.5 Tools for interpretation in theory and practice 
Along with a comprehensive look on different factors influencing interpretation’s perfor-
mance, I have built a synthesis of the different frameworks, techniques and tools used by 
practitioners as they perform futures knowledge interpretation. Of course, their highest 
practical value comes with the ability to use them, and it is up to practitioners themselves 
to become capable in their use. Merely listing different approaches used in other cases 
and by interviewees of this study is informative, but I argue understanding how they are 
used and how they differ is more enlightening for practitioners. Such information is es-
sential as it provides an insight into how interpretation is made. Overall, the use of frame-
works and techniques is particularly crucial in interpretation, because these provide 
means to practice effect implications analysis and pose relevant questions and document 
valuable answers. They also help communicate mental models, beliefs and assumptions 
in a tangible way.   
How are the different tools of interpretation used, and how do they differ? I’ve dis-
cussed briefly their use as part of the academic literature review (see chapter 2.2.1.3) and 
the analysis of my empirical findings (see chapter 4.5.2). Table 17 provides a synthesis 
of the different ‘hard’ frameworks that can be applied as such to bolster cognition, ‘soft’ 
techniques that are less structured and more engagement-oriented and are used as means 






Table 17. Synthesis of frameworks, techniques and tools for interpretation in 














Micro-environment models (with or without internal 
environment) 
End-customer perspective (e.g. customer journey mod-
els) 
Five Forces  
Internal en-
vironment 
as the frame 
Value chain  
SWOT 
TOWS (reverse SWOT analysis) model  
Business model canvas 
The Business Idea (van der Heijden 2005) 






"Trip to Mars", inspired narration 
Back-casting 
Trend hunting trips, and other shared experiences to 
learn about the future 
Stakeholder validation interviews and meetings 
Stories, narratives, metaphors and analogues 
Simulation, wind-tunneling & roleplay  
Coherence analysis (comparison between strategy and 





Trend analysis software and online tools (e.g. Futures 
Platform) 
Digital tools for collaboration and co-creation 
Workshops for engaging stakeholders 
 
I differentiate the hard frameworks further according to the context they are used to ana-
lyze: they either use the macro-environment, the micro-environment, or the internal en-
vironment of the company as the frame in which implications are identified. (Granted, 
the Futures Wheel, mentioned in the literature review, could be used in any environment). 
The ‘hard’  and ‘soft’ classifications of frameworks and techniques reflects also the dif-
ferent approaches, i.e. either framework-based to structure cognition or freeform ideation, 
or their combination, that practitioners must choose from. As an interesting example 
guideline to practitioners, in his theoretical paper, Tapinos (2012) provides a general rec-
ommendation how to utilize different hard frameworks in a logical sequence to produce 
scenarios, strategic options and decisions (see chapter 2.2.1.1.1 for details).  Frameworks 
and techniques can be used side-by-side to complement each other, but ultimately, their 
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fit for purpose determines which should be used, and their value is shown by how well 
they help pose most insightful questions used for uncovering implications and conse-
quences of macro- or micro-environmental uncertainty and, if possible, identifying (fur-
ther) environmental uncertainty that should be studied and interpreted. Case-specificity 
means that comparing their quality and utility is ultimately pointless, even though each 
has its own relative strengths and weaknesses. Rather, a practitioner should be well-
versed in the use of each and apply their combinations according to the needs of the situ-
ation. 
It is not my intention to further analyze in-depth the different tools (although in chapter 
2.2.1.1 I’ve provided a critique of SWOT/TOWS framework which in my own experience 
is one of the most used foresight interpretation tools in business). However, in chapter 
4.4.3 while analyzing Input-related factors of futures knowledge interpretation, I high-
light how a Director of Insight, working inside a major consumer durables company and 
reporting to various managers and executive across the organization, observed that futures 
knowledge could gain credibility if it could include estimations about the severity, prob-
ability and nature of the external change or driver. I call such estimates, or information, 
‘meta-data’ of the futures knowledge about a change and argue such ‘meta-data’ provides 
the first understanding that bridges the analysis gap between external and internal envi-
ronments. Based on my own experience as management consultant, I would add the issues 
of timing (when is the e.g. event going to unfold), what is it contingent upon (what needs 
to happen for the effect to become reality) and whether it requires immediate action or 
only monitoring, to the Director’s list.  When applied, not only does meta-data enrich 
futures knowledge and provide necessary insight for managers to begin framework-based 
interpretation in the first place, it enriches interpretations themselves as well. Here, above 
questions that are used to create the meta-data can be posed to the contextualized impli-
cations, i.e. opportunities, threats and positives. The result is enriched, more comprehen-
sive understanding of the nature, severity, timing, contingency and required action of the 
implications. Thus, in my view such a structured approach becomes a sort of framework 
in itself, to complement the other different tools of interpretation.   
Finally, as two interviewees, a Foresight Consultant and Head of Strategic Foresight, 
pointed out to me, generating interpretations is much about systematically posing ques-
tions. Arguably, the above concept of meta-data is based on a set of five questions! While 
I classify the ability be inquisitive as an ideal capability of futures knowledge interpreta-
tion (see next chapter), other scholars and practitioners have developed other generic 
question sets that in themselves could be viewed as tools of interpretation. I discuss them 
in more detail in my literature review, and they are Day and Schoemaker’s (2005) ques-
tions to reveal hidden opportunities and threats and Ralston and Wilson’s (2006, 142) 
questions to visualize strategy implications of scenarios (see chapter 2.2.1.1.1). I believe 
these are tangible and useful assets for practitioners.  
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5.6 Ideal capabilities, expertise and traits 
Successful interpretation is not only about proper tool use: practitioners must also possess 
a set of capabilities. I have aimed to explore futures knowledge interpretation as its own 
capability, defining it ‘structured imagination’ in brief (echoing Weick (1989)), and as a 
capability which synthesizes experience, knowledge, analytical frameworks, systemic and 
logical thinking, and intuition (based on findings of Crossan et al. 1999, Montuori 2000, 
Miller 2007, Savage and Sales 2008, Dufva & Ahlqvist 2015a, Tapinos & Pyper 2018). 
This suggests that interpretation capability is a combination of the abilities to imagine, 
think in systems, think critically, and reason logically. It is the capability to imagine and 
identify and gauge the interconnections of factors, and articulate the relationship of inter-
connected factors to the company and its strategic choices and communicate them in a 
way that facilitates in turn the imagination, critical thinking, logical reasoning and sys-
tems thinking of others. But in more detail, what is the interpretation capability built 
upon? Synthesis of the literature review (see chapter 2.2.2.3 and Table 7) and new empir-
ical findings (chapter 4.5.1) provide a summary of the ideal capabilities, expertise and 
traits of futures knowledge interpreters, and is seen in Table 18.  




Analytical skills (deduction & induction, causal & systems) 
Communication (ability to summarize, storytelling, using the lan-
guage of the audience and ‘hiding the machinery’ of foresight) 
Exploration (i.e. looking for things you don’t know you’re looking 
for) 
Influencing (e.g. debating, reframing, feeding others’ curiosity) 
Making (novel) connections between issues 
Networking with people 
Questioning skills (critical thinking and self-reflection, counter-fac-
tual reasoning) 
Sourcing (for futures knowledge) 
Structured cognition and tool use 
Turning interpretations into action 
Expertise 
Foresight substance expertise 
General knowledgeability 
Industry expertise 










Openness (to different sources of information, perspectives and con-
cepts when developing ideas and sense-making, and considering al-




I’ve discussed the arguments for including these particular issues in aforementioned pre-
vious chapters. I note the list is comprehensive though not exhaustive. Again, listing the 
different aspects is by itself informative for especially less experienced corporate fore-
sight and sense-making practitioners, but its true value lies in how it provides practitioners 
a fuller picture to grasp the elements of futures knowledge interpretation capability, and 
a basis for evaluating one’s own capabilities. They are these capabilities, expertise and 
traits that I argue practitioners (including executives) require to gain most utility from 
interpretation and to ensure their performance embodies the ideal characteristics of inter-
pretation.   
However, does the new empirical evidence necessitate adjustments to the concept of 
interpretation capability that I suggest based on literature review? In other words, do the 
results suggest that it should be changed? When reflected against the synthesis of ideal 
capabilities, expertise and personal traits, I admit that the definition is action-oriented and 
pragmatic. It does not emphasize the value-based or normative aspects of interpretation, 
such as traits of empathy, transparency and courage. Put differently, while it does not 
overlook the social nature of interpretation, my definition of interpretation capability em-
phasizes its cognitive nature while considering the emotional aspects only through their 
role in influencing what one’s experiences are and how they intuit and think. I believe 
this perspective is justifiable. First, I suggest valuable interpretation is a function of a 
sound emotional basis, meaning that in order to be able to perform valuable interpretation, 
involved individuals share a sense of trust, show objectivity, empathy and openness, and 
feel confident. Here, the role of emotions and normative behavior is secondary: to enable 
high quality cognition and intuition. Emotions and normative behavior are essential inso-
far they help produce valuable interpretation. Second, I argue that interpretation should 
aim for rationality and objectivity, and to be acts of rationality and objectivity. Hence, 
cognitive aspects can justifiably emphasized when considering what capabilities the ac-
tivity requires. While corporate strategizing and interpretation are never fully rational, 
they should not be determined by emotions either or be emotionally driven. If this is the 
case, the central components of interpretation capability should not be emotional or nor-
mative – even though emotions and normativity affect cognition and intuition always to 
a degree. 
The capability perspective of futures knowledge interpretation brings forth an addi-
tional perspective to the discussion about its purpose. Given how interpretation is social 
and rooted in dialogue of different personalities and disciplines, I suggest every instance 
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of interpretation in general and facilitating practitioners in particular have a pedagogic 
purpose to increase the capabilities of participants in addition to meeting their practical, 
case-specific, business-oriented objectives. This argument lays on the premise that in or-
der to optimize the value of generated shared understandings, the capability of all partic-
ipating individuals should be high. Therefore, not only should foresighters or consultants 
have the necessary capabilities, but increasingly should the decision-makers.              
Finally, I point out that the capabilities, expertise and traits are specifically individual, 
and this synthesis does not identify organizational capabilities, as e.g. Rohrbeck (2010, 
72) does when he discusses the capabilities of a corporate foresight system. 
5.7 Conclusions and implications 
5.7.1 Main conclusions 
My purpose in this thesis is to explore and describe the behavior and reasons behind the 
behavior of foresight practitioners as they respond to their colleagues’ question “what 
does this futures knowledge mean for us and our organization” and “how should we act 
accordingly”. By doing so, I strive to provide new understanding of how practitioners 
interpret futures knowledge for managers’ use in the context of strategy making. My anal-
ysis of both literature and new empirical evidence the thesis was based on two main re-
search questions: 1) how foresight practitioners interpret futures knowledge for the use 
of strategizing and 2) why interpretation occurs as it does.  
In my search for answers to the research questions, I consider futures knowledge in-
terpretation for strategizing both as an activity and a capability. This view incorporates 
the purpose, objectives and outcomes of interpretation, its core characteristics, tools and 
techniques used to perform it, different factors influencing its success, and personal ca-
pabilities, expertise and traits necessary to perform it successfully. Each of these ele-
ments shed light on either one of the two research questions or both. 
To understand why interpretation occurs the way it does, I have studied the different 
purposes, objectives and desired outcomes of interpretation. Based on the findings and 
synthesis, I suggest that it is performed for the case-specific business objectives and needs 
and is influenced by the type of strategic purpose managers can have: the purpose can be 
to solve problems or find problems. It helps build the strategic narratives of the firm: the 
‘what’ of the corporate vision, the ‘how’ of strategic options, and the ‘when’ of the timing 
of strategy execution. More specifically, as part of strategizing it produces both effect and 
response implications. Effect implications are shared understanding of the organization’s 
resilience vis-à-vis the external environment and opportunities, threats and positives to 
123 
the organization. Response implications refer to understanding about the possible out-
comes of strategic actions the company can take in the futures context to both the com-
pany’s performance itself and its own micro- and macroenvironment. Because futures 
knowledge interpretation is used for reducing effect and response uncertainty, it is central 
to corporate strategizing.     
In my view, two things drive what futures knowledge is interpreted socially: on one 
hand, it is determined by the interpreted object’s presumed effect on the organization. 
This is simply because if a thing has no effect on an organization, it is irrelevant (doubly 
so because it demands no action on behalf of the company) and not interpreted. On the 
other, interpretation is driven by perceived relevance of the object and its effects. I suggest 
initial relevance in turn is determined by individual intuition, self-interest and expected 
interests of others. Sense-giving, iterative sense-making and formation of shared under-
standing however ultimately produce effect (and response) implications. 
In a corporate strategizing context, interpretation is valued according to its utility, and 
to be valuable, interpretation should fuel and lead to action. Interpretations thus has an 
action-orientation, but I argue this poses a risk to corporate foresight and interpretation: 
a bias on action can blind organizations to external forces that initially register only as 
positives or what initially are seen to have no impact, i.e. requiring no pro-action or reac-
tion. However, further inquiry or using a longer-term perspective might reveal effects that 
initial perceptions overlook. 
How do individuals perform futures knowledge interpretation as a part of corporate 
strategizing? I argue trying to understand it as a linear process is impractical. Rather, it 
should be viewed as a cyclical flow (see Figure 2, chapter 2.3.3) that has no single starting 
point but a clear logical direction. Also, instead of viewing it as a process, it should be 
analyzed using a number of core characteristics. To produce the outcomes and benefits 
indicated by the interviewees of this study and relevant studies at large, I suggest per-
forming individuals share a sense of trust and use critical reflection. Interpretation is par-
ticipative and engages different disciplines and personalities. It occurs in right time and 
space so its outputs can be disseminated and used in the organization.  It combines and 
rethinks futures with present concerns and historical paths: when interpreting futures 
knowledge for strategizing, reimagining of the past and present are required as well to 
produce strategic accounts that in turn allow for decision-making. Finally, interpretation 
is integrated in strategizing and corporate processes. In addition, interpreters, strategists 
and implementers should are networked, if not the same people. 
A core characteristic of futures knowledge interpretation is that it is both based on and 
driven by cognitive frames and contexts. To understand how individuals perform inter-
pretation, one must understand how they use tools for framing. I’ve categorized these 
tools as ‘hard’ frameworks and ‘soft’ techniques. Frameworks help scope and understand 
both the contexts in which external forces have an impact and what these effects could 
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be. Such frameworks could e.g. SWOT matrices or customer journey models. Techniques 
are ways to perform free-form ideation that does not rely on (nor are limited by) tangible 
frames but emphasizes intuition. Such techniques include e.g. backcasting and storytell-
ing. Ideally, practitioners use both and choose tools that are best fit for purpose. In addi-
tion, practitioners use digital and analog tools to facilitate interpretation, sharing and to 
store information, such as workshops and trend analysis apps. 
In my findings and discussion, I highlight a concept of  futures knowledge and inter-
pretation ‘meta-data’, that helps bridge both the analysis gap between knowledge and 
interpretation, and between interpretation and action by enriching and structuring futures 
knowledge and interpretations. The futures knowledge meta-data concerns the nature, se-
verity, timing, and contingency of the external force. The meta-data of the interpretation 
concerns these and the required action of the implications. I suggest applying such a struc-
tured approach to assessing futures knowledge and interpretations is a tool in itself and 
this helps turning futures knowledge into interpretations and interpretations into action.          
The activity of futures knowledge interpretation is affected by a multitude of organi-
zational, input-related and personal factors, as shown by both existing literature and my 
findings. In particular, available time and attention of top management appears as critical 
and often in a negative sense as barriers.  My research highlights several negative behav-
ioral factors, such as jumping to conclusions. These are manifestations of personal emo-
tional and cognitive hindrances of interpretation, and thus are easiest to note and mitigate. 
However, all types of factors should be considered when developing the individual and 
social aspects of interpretation. I claim jumping to conclusions is a notable negative be-
havior because it causes the individual and the social group, e.g. a strategizing manage-
ment team, to ignore the rational flow of interpretation, where state, effect and response 
uncertainty are all assessed in a logical sequence. Furthermore, it can reverse the inter-
pretation flow in strategic decision-making, leading to situations where (pre-determined) 
conclusions about strategy are used to influence what is interpreted and how, instead of 
letting interpretations lead to conclusions. Here, rationality, objectivity and transparency 
of strategic thinking and decision-making are threatened. I argue that lack of time, self-
interests and emotions are the main reasons driving jumping to conclusions in interpreta-
tion and strategizing situations. 
When answering the question how individuals perform futures knowledge interpreta-
tion, it is not sufficient to view it as an activity only. Based on the review of literature and 
new empirical evidence I propose that futures knowledge interpretation can be understood 
as a capability of ‘disciplined imagination’, that combines experience, knowledge, ana-
lytical frameworks, cognitive ability for systemic and logical thinking, and intuition. As 
a human capability it is built from several sub-capabilities, areas of expertise and benefi-
cial personal traits. Being a capability, I further argue that success (as defined above) in 
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interpretation relies on others having the capability as well. This means that every in-
stance of foresight and futures knowledge interpretation must have a pedagogic purpose 
to increase the participants’ capabilities in addition to meeting the practical, case-specific, 
business-oriented objectives. 
An interesting question is how the capability of futures knowledge interpretation dif-
fers from existing notions of corporate foresight capability, since there exists a number 
of models for corporate foresight capability (see e.g. Rohrbeck 2010 and Hines et al. 
2017). Interpretation naturally is a part of foresight, but it is my view that some differ-
ences exist. First, the emphasis of actionability and how interpretations should ideally 
lead to action in the organization is not highlighted by Hines et al. (2017, 131) among 
their six Foresight Competencies. However, while not including the ability to influence 
action as a capability, Rohrbeck (2010, 83) still includes ‘triggering internal actions’ and 
‘influencing others to act’ as two of the four main impacts and ways for value creation 
corporate foresight has. In other words, in Rohrbeck’s view, action is an ideal outcome 
though enabling action is not specified as a key capability of corporate foresight. In lieu 
the role of enabling action, the findings of this thesis suggest that abilities of influencing 
and managing others’ self-interests and emotions are particularly relevant and these are 
not emphasized in either Rohrbeck’s or Hines et al’s models. Furthermore, the role of 
industry expertise and understanding of the business logic of the company at hand emerge 
as critical, especially since they provide valuable contexts and frames for futures 
knowledge effect and response interpretation. Hines et al. (2017, 133) do not specify these 
among their six foresight competencies, but include ‘organizational sector competency’ 
in their wider foresight competency model, while Rohrbeck (2011, 78) includes ‘deep 
knowledge’ in one domain, where knowledge helps to “understand how far a topic needs 
to be understood to come to conclusions”. Understood very loosely, this could be consid-
ered to apply to case-relevant industry and business expertise as well. Finally, the find-
ings, especially how uniformly all interviewed experts viewed the importance of effect 
interpretation and how foresight in general should be driven by the business context. sug-
gest that foresight work and foresight approaches should focus on scrutinizing the effect 
and response interpretation and not rely on foresight processes and approaches where 
interpretations emerge from a ‘black box’ (see e.g. Voros 2003) for strategizing and cor-
porate decision-making.  
5.7.2 Evaluation of the study  
I pre-evaluate this study by discussing research validity and by using Winter’s principles 
(Fisher 2010, 276) in earlier chapters (see 4.4.1 Quality considerations and 4.4.2 Limita-
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tions of the research). However, some of the same principles provide a practical frame-
work for post facto evaluation of the quality and validity of the primary research. Suitable 
principles are reflexive critique, dialectical critique, collaborative resources, risk to one’s 
own values, and theory, practice and transformation. In addition, in this chapter I take a 
retroactive look at the population validity of my research. 
During my work, I strove to exercise reflexive critique by challenging the new evi-
dence with existing theory and empirical evidence and to be transparent about my objec-
tives to develop practically valuable outcomes from the synthesis. Transparency includes 
my admission of having a practical eye on both the theory and new evidence and viewing 
them from the perspective of a practitioner. I believe this perspective is visible in both the 
analysis and produced conclusions.    
As the concept of dialectical critique suggests, I found contradictions in the research 
findings between categorizations used to ‘neatly structure things’ and ‘details of the 
things that challenge the structures’. While analysis of exploratory research typically be-
gins with choosing an interpretive grid or a framework through which results are inter-
preted (Fisher 2010, 244-5), a key challenge with content coding in this study was that 
any given remark could be interpreted from many perspectives even inside a given frame-
work. For example, when a practitioner was explaining a harmful behavior affecting fu-
tures knowledge interpretation in practice, I could have coded and discussed the issue 
both as a behavior-based factor affecting interpretation or as an example of lacking ca-
pability or trait on the part of the interpreter which manifested as harmful behavior. Thus 
despite being supported by an objective analysis framework, was is up to me then to 
choose a lens through which they look at the issue, which made the analysis increasingly 
subjective. However I believe my arguments for my proposed models and concepts are 
both logical and made as transparently as to warrant understanding and constructive crit-
icism. 
Though planned and executed by one researcher, my study emphasized collaboration: 
The findings and conclusions were validated with the interviewees themselves, and this 
gave them the opportunity to comment on, add views and confirm or challenge the in-
sights, thus not only allowing them to learn from the synthesis, but also making the results 
more robust. I could have achieved an even higher level of collaboration (and arguably 
robustness of insights) by ethnographic research means, by following the actual perfor-
mance and behavior of foresight practitioners as they engage with managers during strate-
gizing and thus integrating them even more into the research process.      
Risks to one’s own values concerns the researcher’s willingness to let the research 
process challenge the views and values he had when starting the process, including e.g. 
assumptions about the research material, the purposes of the research, and the original 
research plan (Fisher 2010, 277). Using an analogue from warfare, while the original re-
search plan ‘survived the contact with the actual research’, meaning that the process did 
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not warrant going back to the plan and the purpose and adjust them retrospectively, the 
process and findings highlighted the fact that the points of view of strategists, i.e. manag-
ers who did not specifically act as foresight practitioners, could have provided comple-
mentary research material. The views of managers especially when it comes to the factors 
influencing futures knowledge interpretation and how to address them should be re-
searched in future studies. 
When discussing quality considerations that I identified before I undertook my own 
empirical research in chapter 4.4.1, I highlight the risks to population transferability. In 
particular, given that I quite loosely defined my unit of analysis (foresight practitioners 
working in-house or as consultants with a specific amount of experience in foresight and 
interpretation), I note that my empirical results might not be specific enough to be applied 
to any particular practitioner’s needs, or to the context of any particular organization, or 
industry, for example. Based on my synthesis of the new empirical results and other in-
sights in academic and business literature however I can claim that my results comple-
ment and build upon findings of previous studies. I did not identify any instances where 
difference of research populations would limit their comparison. I hypothesize however 
further in-depth studies focusing on the cultural aspects of practitioners and organizations 
might uncover notable differences in the activity of interpretation that only specific cul-
tures or cultural backgrounds might exhibit. In addition, given that my research is explor-
atory and not descriptive, further research might uncover findings that are subjectively 
more relevant to other practitioners and their everyday contexts. However, given how this 
thesis validated its results with the interviewed practitioners themselves and I build the 
conclusions from a synthesis with other findings, I argue this thesis fulfills Winter’s sixth 
principle of theory, practice and transformation. This refers to the need to have business 
and management theory with practical applicability and to have new theory tested in real 
life. The findings, synthesis and conclusions of this thesis have produced theory and in-
sight that business practitioners can directly utilize in their work.         
5.7.3 Implications for practitioners and further research 
For practitioners performing futures knowledge interpretation in corporate strategizing 
contexts, my thesis provides multiple benefits. First, I outline functional and ideal core 
characteristics of futures knowledge interpretation that can be used as a guideline when 
assessing and developing one’s own interpretation as an activity. Second, I explore and 
identify a number of competences, areas of expertise and personal traits that I argue con-
stitute the capability of futures knowledge interpretation, and this summary can be too 
used as a guideline for assessing and developing one’s own interpretation as a capability. 
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For up and coming foresight practitioners (and sense-making managers) working in busi-
ness, I offer a summary of potentially useful frameworks, techniques and tools for inter-
pretation, and understanding of their differences and purposes. For them, I also provide a 
comprehensive if not exhaustive view into various factors that might influence the success 
of interpretation activities and provide insights about means how to address challenges 
and negative systemic behaviors influencing interpretation.   
For academia, I have produced novel insights about the practice of foresight and how 
futures knowledge is utilized in corporate contexts and as part of strategy-making. I have 
reviewed and synthesized existing theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence from a 
novel perspective that responds to gaps in understanding highlighted by Horton (1999, 7) 
who claims “interpretation, the most crucial step in the whole [foresight] process, is 
poorly understood, and has few theoretical techniques”. 
I also present several ideas for further research. Most importantly, the explorative find-
ings of this study should be made more robust and developed by more in-depth, longitu-
dinal studies, e.g. utilizing ethnography, that investigate the actual (and not reported) be-
havior of futures knowledge interpretation as part of strategizing. Moreover, I have con-
ceptualized and defined strategy and strategizing very loosely and generally and have not 
studied how futures knowledge interpretation occurs as part of specific strategic pro-
cesses. Further comparative research that engages several different specific cases, or in-
stances of strategizing, e.g. via ethnography, might provide insights about how different 
strategic processes or even schools of strategic thought might in practice influence inter-
pretation as an activity.  
I have also identified and reported a limited number of interpretation influencing fac-
tors and means how to manage these. Additional research could focus on identifying fur-
ther practical means how to address individual and organizational hurdles to interpreta-
tion. Such research could e.g. explore how to encourage critical self-reflection and hold-
ing one’s ego in check during interpretation, and how to affect others self-interests with-
out manipulation to maximize the objectivity, rationality and transparency of interpreta-
tion. 
The final suggestion for further research concerns the execution of corporate strategies. 
While informing strategizing and decreasing response uncertainty are valuable contribu-
tions of futures knowledge interpretation, a possible venue for further research is studying 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide as a mind map of issues to be covered
 
 
